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1 Introduction 
1.1 The starting point 
This study was inspired by the implementation of the German soil conservation act, which 
passed the legislation process in 1998. This soil conservation act touches many aspects related 
to soil use, including agricultural use as well. However, a closer look at this act reveals that its 
impact on agriculture is rather limited. The effect is small because the law refers to non-
controlled standards such as “good technical practice”, which is a description of “proper” 
agricultural land use that is specified in a non-juridical sense. Soil scientists involved in the 
preparation of the law, proposed options that went further or were more elaborate, such as 
legal binding restrictions or subsidies for targeted areas (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 
Bodenschutz beim BMU 2000). However, these suggestions were neither further specified 
nor implemented in the soil conservation act or in the respective enactments.1 
These findings gave rise to the idea for a study that 
1. analyses the effectiveness of policy options in the implementation of soil conservation 
measures, which go beyond the “best management practices” referred to in the 
German Soil Conservation Act and  
2. describes the influence of property rights and transaction costs on the implementation 
process of policies.  
This study focuses on the analysis of instruments and measures that can be used to promote 
more efficient soil conservation in Germany and gives suggestions for their implementation, 
so that the best practice and best policy options for soil conservation may be found2. 
Soils are seen as a non-renewable resource that needs protection from degradation. This 
definition is crucial for this study, since it sets the focus on the soil erosion process itself 
without the distinction of on- or off-site damages. Later conclusions in this study confirm that 
soils do need protection from degradation in order to fulfil the long term demands of society. 
                                                 
1
 Even to date, after the end of this study, agricultural soil use is not affected any further by this law. 
2
 Parts of this study were achieved during an interdisciplinary, participative research project in Northeastern 
Germany (GRANO, “Approaches for a sustainable agricultural production: Application for North Eastern 
Germany”) that was supported by the German Federal Research Ministry (BMBF). One of the aims of this 
project was to develop regionally adapted agro-environmental programmes in a co-operative manner with 
farmers, administrative agencies, environmentalists and other stakeholders through a round table (“Agri-
Environment-Forum”) (Arzt et al. 2003). Soil conservation issues and soil erosion processes were part of the 
agenda of this discussion process.  
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1.2 The research objective 
The main objective of this study is to find decision support for the implementation options of 
soil conservation policies. Therefore, a combination of best practices (on-farm measures) and 
best policies (instruments) is needed for a more precise and efficient soil conservation and 
erosion control.  
The aim of the study is to analyse and discuss the juridical, soil scientific, economic and 
agricultural aspects of soil conservation and to propose instrument-measure combinations for 
efficient soil conservation. Here, emphasis was given to both the resource and institutional 
economics of soil conservation. From an economic point of view, the scale on which an 
efficient promotion of erosion-avoiding measures is most adequate (best scale) and which 
instruments are best used for their promotion must be determined. 
Therefore, it was important to develop an appropriate framework for the economic and 
environmental assessment of the implementation options. This framework was derived from 
the state of the art of economics and soil science. 
The scientific work of this study depends on the consistent combination of soil science and 
economic theory for achieving an assessment tool that allows for the evaluation of different 
implementation options. The inclusion of new institutional economics allows for the 
consideration of transaction cost effects. 
1.3 A brief outline of this study 
The subject is approached in the following way: After the introduction and a short description 
of the study region in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 focuses on the relevant soil science aspects. Soil 
functions, definitions of soil degradation, current conditions of soils and further aspects of soil 
conservation are described in this chapter. The need for soil conservation is briefly 
highlighted by a short summary of soil conservation issues, and the related definitions of this 
aspect are given. Soil functions include more than just being an input for agricultural 
production. Soil serves also as a habitat for wildlife and plants, regulates ground water 
replenishment, and filters and metabolizes hazardous substances. 
Chapter 3 contains approaches on soil conservation from the international to the national 
level. The instruments used for conserving and improving environmental conditions are 
discussed based on the general objectives and principles of the environmental policy in 
Germany. This is followed by an overview of the currently used instruments in soil 
conservation policies. Additionally, further proposals of possible policy changes are 
described. 
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Chapter 4 describes the economic theory that was applied in this research topic and sets the 
framework for the economic modelling approach. The role of property rights, public good 
characteristics of soils and the resulting externalities are discussed. The resulting market 
failure can be seen as the justification for a non-market coordination of soil use. 
However, since the application of pure welfare economic instruments on the promotion of soil 
conservation shows some shortcomings in terms of data generation and applicability, a way to 
face the “coordination” problems of natural resources titled “A safe minimum standard of 
conservation” (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1963) is therefore illustrated. The resulting method is the 
cost-effectiveness analysis of the implementation options of soil conservation policies. 
Chapter 5 describes the assessment of soil erosion risks based on both the natural conditions 
and the characteristics of the cropping practice. After an overview of the available soil erosion 
models, the chosen approach, which is an adapted Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) 
model, is described. Details are given for the underlying data used to describe the erosion risk 
of a region. The erosion risk of the cropping practices was analysed based on the application 
of a fuzzy-logic model. This procedure allowed for the provision of specific erosion risk 
values for standard and adjusted cropping practices.  
Chapter 6 describes the design of the bio-economic model used in this study. After the 
description of the selection method for policy options, the structure of the model and the data 
used to describe the agricultural activities of a region are defined. The reason the applied 
model that was used to estimate the effects of implementation of policy instruments and 
measures for soil conservation was chosen is also outlined and justified here. With the use of 
a regional linear-programming model, the evaluation of the economic and ecological effects 
of agriculture was done using the example of a study region in Northeastern Germany.  
Chapter 7 provides the results for a set of scenarios. First, a status quo solution based on the 
policy conditions of Agenda 2000 was calculated to show a starting point solution of the 
model and to check the model’s plausibility against the original data. Based on these results a 
new scenario was designed that contained the main policy changes that were introduced by 
the 2003 CAP-reform. Then, a scenario that approached the issue from a social planner’s 
viewpoint (one with the aim of reducing soil erosion) was analysed, with the assumption that 
the social planner has complete information on soil erosion rates for all cropping practices.  
As main policy options, three policies were analysed based on the assumption of differing 
property rights concerning the right to cause soil degradation through soil erosion. 
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Based on a set of indicators, the cost-effectiveness of soil conservation policies was derived 
and evaluated. These results served as the basis for the further evaluation of policies in the 
following chapter. 
Chapter 8 opens the scope to the aspects of institutional economics in soil conservation, 
discussing the influence of transaction costs and property rights on the success of soil 
conservation programmes. After an introduction of the theoretical foundations of this field of 
economics and their implications on policy making, a qualitative comparison of transaction 
costs and feasibility concerns on soil conservation programmes is presented. The results of the 
analysis highlight the relevance and the dimensions of transaction costs in terms of the cost of 
implementation, control and administration. 
Chapter 9 draws some final conclusions on the theoretical framework, the bio-economic 
modelling approach, the relevance of transaction costs and, finally, the appropriate 
instruments for soil conservation based on the overall results of this study. 
1.4 Description of the study region 
The study region (total surface of more than 200 km²) is a mostly agriculturally used area 
situated in the administrative district “Uckermark”, which is part of the federal state 
Brandenburg, 100 km north east of Berlin (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Source: Regiograph; own presentation 
Figure 1: Map of North-Eastern Brandenburg including the administrative district Uckermark and the 
study region “Prenzlau-West”  
The Uckermark is famous for its hilly landscape, which was shaped mainly by the ice ages 
(morainic landscape). In the southern parts of the Uckermark, the sandy soils of the outwash 
Uckermark 
Prenzlau-West 
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plains that resulted from the melt waters of the ice-age glaciers can be found. 
Environmentally, the selected study region “Prenzlau-West” is typical for the district, with 
arable farms, less structural elements and an open landscape to the North, while the Southern 
part shows more structural elements, forests and mixed farms. The share of land use types for 
the study region “Prenzlau-West” and the district Uckermark is shown on Table 1. 
Table 1: Land use types in the study region Prenzlau-West and for the district Uckermark  
Area type unit Prenzlau-West Uckermark 
Total area of the region km² 208 3058 
Arable land % 59.9 50.2 
Pasture % 11.2 9.0 
Forests % 16.6 22.3 
Lakes, Rivers % 2.7 5.1 
Special habitats (§ 32) % 7.3 7.4 
Others (settlements, infrastructure) % 2.3 6.0 
Source: Landesumweltamt Brandenburg (LUA) 2002; Landesbetrieb für 
Datenverarbeitung und Statistik 2006 
 
Figure 2 shows a land use map of the study region based on data from the biotope mapping in 
Brandenburg (Landesumweltamt Brandenburg (LUA) 2002).  
Arable land
Grassland
Forests
Lakes, rivers
Settlements
4 km
 
Source: Landesumweltamt Brandenburg (LUA) 2002 
Figure 2: Land use map of the study region Prenzlau-West; based on biotope mapping data  
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This region was chosen because it is a “representative” region that covers the characteristics 
of a region in North-Eastern Germany in terms of heterogeneity of the landscape, land use and 
erosivity, with the advantage of reduced data needs. 
1.4.1 Natural conditions 
The Uckermark region has a yearly average temperature of 8.4 °C with an average 
precipitation of 486 mm per year (ZALF Müncheberg 2006). Another climatic characteristic 
often referred to by local farmers is the lack of rain during the late spring months (April, 
May), the months most important for plant growth. 
The soils of Uckermark are roughly divided into more loamy type soils in the north, which 
provide relatively good conditions for agriculture, and lighter, sandy soils in the south (GIS-
Data based on Schmidt and Diemann (1981)). 
The water supply conditions of the soils seem to be non-problematic. It appears that potholes 
(dt. Soelle), a characteristic element of the North-eastern German landscape, do create some 
problems but only locally in agricultural land use. These relicts of the ice age are drainless 
water bodies in many fields, with changing water levels that affect the crops grown around 
them.  
The entire region has a high number of lakes and small rivers. Although the landscape in 
northern Uckermark possesses fewer elements of scenic landscapes than the southern part, 
some features could still be found (e.g. potholes, hedges, old tree lined avenues, small woods 
along the fields).  
1.4.2 Regional economic situation  
The metropolitan, urbanized region of Berlin is potentially an appropriate sales market for the 
regional products of the region. However, the Uckermark region has not yet developed a 
suitable supply for this demand. North of the region lies the even less populated state of 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania that offers only a few possibilities as a market for 
agricultural products. Poland, the eastern neighbour of the region is seen economically more 
as a threat to the local economy than an opportunity. Agriculture however, is still an 
important economic factor in this region (Regionomica 2006).  
The unemployment rate is around 25 % in the Uckermark district. Job opportunities are rather 
low. The landscape offers some points of tourist attractions, however the economic 
importance of tourism could be further developed (Regionomica 2006).  
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1.4.3 Agricultural situation  
About two thirds of the district is used for agriculture (Landesumweltamt Brandenburg (LUA) 
2002). The more fertile northern parts are usually worked by crop farms, while the share of 
livestock farms increases towards the south as a result of less fertile soils and fen pasture 
lands (Arzt et al. 2000; Arzt et al. 2002). 
The most important cultivated crops are cereals, oil seeds and sugar beets. The production of 
renewable energy and industrial raw materials particularly the cultivation of non-food 
rapeseed reached a high level under the EU-set aside regulations (Landkreis Uckermark 2006; 
Ministerium für Ländliche Entwicklung 2006). Depending on the availability of premia for 
energy crops, this level might stay constant or even increase further. Animal husbandry 
comprised of cattle and pigs fell dramatically in numbers since the reunification of Germany 
(Bork et al. 1995). 
In general, non agricultural income sources (e.g. tourism) play a smaller role in the local 
farms in comparison to the western part of Germany (Regionomica 2006). 
Large scale, not individually owned farm enterprises (e.g. corporations, cooperatives) are still 
utilising approximately 60 % of the agriculturally used surface. Individual firms manage only 
20 % of the agriculturally used surfaces (private companies manage the remaining 20 %) 
(Ministerium für Ländliche Entwicklung 2006). 
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2 Soil science aspects 
2.1 Soil Functions 
The awareness of soil functions is usually centered on the different aspects of production. 
However, there are other functions that are of high relevance even though they are not traded 
on markets. With increasing scarcity of non-degraded soils, their management is more and 
more subject to the ways of regulation, (e.g. landscape planning and land use jurisdiction). 
By highlighting the different functions of soil, the need for soil protection can be underlined. 
The German Advisory Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der 
Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen (WBGU) 1994) classifies the functions of 
soils concerning their importance to plants, animals, micro-organisms and mankind as well as 
for the balance of energy, water and matter as follows (Table 2):  
Table 2: Different aspects of soil functions  
Function German term Example 
Habitat Lebensraum Habitat for animals and plants 
Regulation  Regelung Regulation of thermic, hydrologic, physical and 
chemical processes 
Use function Nutzung Soil itself can be used for the production of building 
materials (e.g. bricks, tiles etc.) 
Production function Produktion Production asset in agricultural production 
Spatial location function Träger Soil carries buildings, streets etc 
Information function Information Soil contains information about pre(-historical) events 
Cultural function Kultur Soils are a part of the cultural heritage of a country or landscape (e.g. Loess regions) 
Source: Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen (WBGU) 1994 
 
Hannam and Boer (2002) provided a more detailed summary of soil functions. Their three 
main functional groups are natural functions, cultural functions and land use functions, with 
further subgroups (see following box).  
Both definitions contain functions related to production, (land) use or spatial location of any 
construction and development. These functions are mostly used to generate income. In 
contrast, parts of the natural functions and the cultural functions do not usually generate 
income, but are, nevertheless, important for the functioning and survival of any society. The 
differing valuation of these functions is one of the causes of the mismanagement of a natural 
resource (see chapter 4.4.2). 
Degraded soils cannot or can only partly fulfill the aforementioned functions. Therefore, the 
importance of viable soils is not only a focus in the production function for food and fibre 
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(world food problem), but also a crucial condition for maintaining global biodiversity and for 
preserving the cultural heritage of societies. Non-degraded soil is the basic condition for 
globally sustainable development. 
 
Soil functions  
Natural functions 
• Soil is the basis of life and living space for humans, animals, plants and 
micro-organisms. 
• Soil is a fundamental element of nature and landscape 
• Soil is part of the ecological balance, particularly with its water and 
nutrient cycles 
• Soils provide a filtering, buffering and transformation activity, between 
the atmosphere, the ground water, and the plant cover, protecting the 
environment and especially humans through the protection of the food 
chain and the drinking water reserves 
• Soils are used for agriculture and forestry to produce biomass 
• Soils are biological habitats and gene reserves, much larger in quantity 
and in quality than all the above-ground biomasses 
Cultural functions 
• Soils are a geogenic and cultural heritage, which form an essential part of 
the landscape in which humans live, and  
• which conceal paleontological and archaeological information of high 
value for the understanding of the history of earth and humankind 
Land use functions 
• Soils serve as a spatial base for technical, industrial and socio-economic 
structures and their development 
• Soils are used as a source of raw materials 
• Soils are a location for agriculture, including pastures and forestry 
Source: Hannam and Boer 2002 
2.2 A definition of soil degradation and its different aspects 
The proper functioning of soils is threatened by soil degradation. The definition of soil 
degradation given by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU 1994) 
describes “anthropogenic soil degradation as permanent and irreversible structural, 
functional changes in soils or their complete loss being caused by human induced physical, 
chemical or biotical stresses that exceed the recovering capacity of the soil systems” 
(Translated by the author). Schachtschabel et al. (1992) defined soil degradation (in this case 
soil erosion) as “a natural process on many sites on earth but globally, it is aggravated or even 
caused by the human use of soil” (translated by the author).  
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Bridges et al. (2001) listed a group of intrinsic factors for soil degradation, among them the 
influences of climate, terrain, vegetation and biodiversity and in particular, the soil 
biodiversity characteristics. However, the rate of human induced soil degradation is 
determined by other causes. Bridges et al. (2001) described these forces as: 
• The biophysical (land use and land management, including deforestation and tillage 
methods); 
• Socio-economic (land tenure, marketing, institutions, income and human health); and  
• Political forces (incentives, political ideology) that influence the soil degradation 
processes. 
Oldeman et al. (1990) distinguished five causative activities of human induced soil 
degradation: 
• Deforestation and removal of the natural vegetation; usually for the reclamation of 
land for agricultural purposes, commercial forestry, road construction, urban 
development etc. 
• Overgrazing; both the effects of removal or destruction of vegetation and trampling 
by livestock cause damage to soil cover, which increases the risk of water and wind 
erosion. Compaction can also be increased by trampling. 
• Agricultural activities can cause soil degradation through improper management 
practices such as insufficient or excessive use of fertilizers, shortening of the fallow 
period, poor quality irrigation water, absence of anti-erosion measures, and 
inappropriate use of heavy machinery. 
• Overexploitation of vegetation for domestic use is seen when vegetation is used for 
fuel wood, fencing, etc. Even though the vegetation is not completely removed, the 
remaining vegetation does not provide sufficient protection against soil erosion. 
• (Bio-)industrial activities lead to the chemical and physical pollution of soils, causing 
soil degradation processes. 
For further descriptions of degrading processes, see Hannam and Boer (2002). 
The natural condition of soil can be more or less easily changed by the fore-mentioned factors 
and the rate at which it degrades depends on the influence of the human activities. Therefore, 
the rate of degradation is firstly the result of the natural conditions of the whole soil system, 
which is hardly changeable, but secondly the result of human land use. Land use affects soils 
and is the result of management decisions that are themselves dependent on a framework of 
socio-economic and political conditions (see Figure 3).  
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Economic and social conditions create new incentives and driving forces for changes in land 
use that can result in higher rates of soil degradation. Short-term incentives such as famine or 
non-sustainable, fast growing economies can increase soil degradation to a level that goes far 
beyond any recovery rate. Certain types of agricultural land uses are considered among the 
most important human induced driving forces of soil degradation (e.g. soil erosion) 
(Boardman et al. 2003). Therefore, finding ways to influence land use can be a very 
successful option for reducing soil degradation. 
 
rate of soil degradation
political forces
land tenure systems
marketing
institutions
wealth
human health
incentives
political ideology socio-economic factors
deforestation
tillage methods
crop selection
irrigation
livestock system land use and land management
grazing intensity
climateterrain
primal vegetation soil biodiversity
natural characteristics
 
Source: own presentation; based on Hannam and Boer 2002 
Figure 3: The influence of natural characteristics, socio-economic factors and land use on soil 
degradation  
So far, it can be stated that soil degradation itself is like “a natural process on many sites on 
earth, which is globally aggravated or even caused by the human use of soil” (Schachtschabel 
et al. 1992). It only becomes a perceived problem when it exceeds levels that are no longer 
sustainable and jeopardizes the development and viability of a society. Nevertheless, 
degradation processes do increase the risk of irreversible losses of soil functions for the future 
generations. 
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2.3 Current conditions of soil degradation  
Soils and their related viable functions are globally threatened by degradation through 
desertification, overuse, hazardous wastes and soil erosion by wind and rainfall. The 
fundamental survey in the “Global Assessment of Human-induced Soil Degradation” 
(GLASOD), which is still the only globally realised study on soil degradation showed that 
soil degradation is a threat to almost all countries in this world (Oldeman et al. 1990). 
According to this study, 1,964 M Hectares of land, representing 15 percent of the world’s land 
surface, show signs of degradation. Water erosion is the most important factor for soil 
degradation, causing 56 percent of the degraded soils worldwide, followed by wind erosion 
with 28 percent. Table 3 gives an overview of the types of soil degradation and the surface 
being affected by it globally.  
Table 3: Human-induced Soil Degradation for the World, expressed in million hectares  
 
The rather out-dated data of GLASOD have led to the projection of a newer global approach 
“Global Assessment of Land Degradation and Improvement” (GLADA), but the project is 
still in the stage of development, so no data is yet available3 (ISRIC - World Soil Information 
2006). 
                                                 
3
 Last update of website: 5/14/2007 
 Degradation classes (million hectares) Percent 
Type of degradation Light Moderate Strong Extreme Total  
Loss of Topsoil  301.2 454.5 161.2 3.8 920.3  
Terrain Deformation 42.0 72.2 56.0 2.8 173.3  
WATER 343.2 526.7 217.2 6.6 1093.7 55.6 
Loss of Topsoil  230.5 213.5 9.4 0.9 454.2  
Terrain Deformation 38.1 30.0 14.4  82.5  
Overblowing  10.1 0.5 1.0 11.6  
WIND 268.6 253.6 24.3 1.9 548.3 27.9 
Loss of nutrients 52.4 63.1 19.8  135.3  
Salinization 34.8 20.4 20.3 0.8 76.3  
Pollution  4.1 17.1 0.5  21.8  
Acidification 1.7 2.7 1.3  5.7  
CHEMICAL 93.0 103.3 41.9 0.8 239.1 12.2 
Compaction  34.8 22.1 11.3  68.2  
Waterlogging 6.0 3.7 0.8  10.5  
Subsidence organic soils 3.4 1.0 0.2  4.6  
PHYSICAL 44.2 26.8 12.3  83.3 4.2 
TOTAL 749.0 910.5 295.7 9.3 1964.4  
Total Percent 38.1 46.4 15.1 0.5  100 
Source: Oldeman et al. 1990 
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A report on the environmental indicators of agriculture published by the OECD (2001) 
analyses soil erosion using two main indicators: risk of soil erosion by water and wind. This 
report stated that the condition of soil quality has gotten better in the past years in some 
countries, ever since the adoption of conservation and no tillage systems, which have led to a 
reduction in the run-off values. Nevertheless, for certain OECD countries, more than 10 per 
cent of their agricultural land fall within the risk class of high/severe risk (OECD 2001). 
According to the OECD report, other aspects that decrease the quality of soil are acidification 
and sodification of soils, salinisation of soils, soil compaction, reduction in soil fertility and 
the increase in chemical and heavy metal pollution of soils.  
As stated in the same report, “water erosion is causing considerable damage to soil fertility 
and ecological functioning in East Germany [Note: where this study focuses empirically], but 
the German Soil Protection Act (see Federal Ministry for the Environment 2003a) is 
beginning to address the problem”(OECD 2001). One of the objectives of this study is to 
investigate whether the German Soil Protection Act is really addressing this problem. 
The report “Soil erosion risk in Europe” (Grimm et al. 2002) found high erosion risks in the 
Mediterranean region due to the climatic conditions of long dry periods followed by heavy 
bursts of erosive rainfall that fall on steep slopes with fragile soils. The Northern parts of 
Europe are less prone to such high erosion rates due to climatic differences, but regions with 
hilly landscapes such as the example region of this study can have considerable rates when 
inappropriate cropping practices are applied.  
In the German federal state of Brandenburg, where the example region of this study is 
situated, medium to high risk water erosion is estimated for 6 percent of its agricultural 
surface (Matzdorf and Piorr 2003) when the spatial comparison method VERMOST is used 
(Deumlich et al. 1997). This method does not provide information on the amount of erosion in 
the region, but rather a way to compare local proneness to water erosion. The mid-term 
review report of the Brandenburg agri-environmental measures (Matzdorf et al. 2003); also 
Appendix Map M2-5, p. 4) showed a concentration of medium to high erosion risks in the 
North-Eastern part of Brandenburg, underlining the heterogeneity of the water erosion 
problem. An extreme number was given by Frielinghaus et al. (1997), who reported erosion 
rates of 170t/ha from single events of strong rainfalls during periods of low soil coverage.  
As shown in Table 3, soil degradation takes on many forms. In this study, soil erosion by 
water as one form of soil degradation will be the main topic because of the area affected in 
the test region and the amount of soil that can be lost through a single event of heavy rainfall.  
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2.4 Definition of soil conservation 
Definitions of soil conservation “which tend to be technocentric” (Hannam and Boer 2002) 
are abundant and mostly similar. A typical definition is: 
“The prevention, mitigation or control of soil erosion and degradation through the application 
to land of cultural, vegetative, structural and land management measures, either singly or in 
combination, which enable stability and productivity to be maintained for future generations 
(Houghton and Charman 1986; cited from Hannam and Boer 2002).”  
Usually soil conservation is understood as the implementation of agricultural measures on the 
field level (e.g. contour ploughing, reduced tillage, terracing). However, soil conservation 
comprises also steps at the political, economic and juridical levels, given the fact that the 
main driving forces are created on these levels (Boardman et al. 2003; Bridges et al. 2001; 
Hannam and Boer 2002).  
The International Board for Soil Research and Management (IBSRAM) (1997) defines 
sustainable land management as “land management systems that combine technologies, 
policies and activities aimed at integrating socio-economic principles with environmental 
concerns to satisfy the five pillars of sustainable land management.” These pillars are 
(IBSRAM) 1997):  
• maintain or enhance production, 
• reduce the level of production risk, 
• protect the potential of natural resources and prevent the degradation of soil and water 
quality, 
• be economically viable and 
• achieve social acceptability. 
Morgan (1981; cited from Hannam and Boer 2002) defined the aim of soil conservation as 
obtaining the maximum sustained level of production from a given area of land whilst 
maintaining soil loss below a threshold level which, he said, theoretically permits the natural 
rate of soil formation to keep pace with the rate of soil erosion. 
This definition contains two specific aims that can be used in an economic analysis. One is to 
find a long term maximum level of soil use that is not threatened by over-exploitation and 
nutrient mining. The other contains the idea of a threshold rate of soil use or depletion that 
can be adjusted to the natural rate of soil formation. 
How these concepts are transferred into and used in economic theory will be taken up in 
chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 3 – Policy Approaches for Soil Conservation 
15 
3 Policy Approaches for Soil Conservation 
3.1 International efforts  
The protection of soils is of great importance throughout the world. The number and quality 
of valuable soils are becoming more and more scarce and degraded by soil erosion and 
uncontrolled land consumption (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale 
Umweltveränderungen (WBGU) 1994). The “Brundtland”-report stressed the need for 
sustainable development that include the prevention of further soil degradation as well (The 
World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). 
In North America, soil conservation research and extension services have played a dominant 
role since the 1930s after the effects of non-sustainable soil use in the prairies was 
experienced (Furtan and Hosseini 2003).  
Hurni (2003) described the history of soil conservation attempts at the international level 
starting in the 1970s. Numerous workshops and meetings had been held addressing soil 
erosion and land degradation at the international level. Organisations like FAO, WASWC, 
IBSRAM (now IWMI), IUSS and ISRIC4 were involved. Some projects for assessing the 
global effects of soil degradation such as “Global Assessment of Human-induced Soil 
Degradation” (GLASOD, continued through GLADA) (ISRIC - World Soil Information 
2006), which showed that soil degradation is a threat to this resource in almost all the 
countries of the world (Oldeman et al. 1990), were started. Another project that assesses soil 
degradation is SOTER (Soil and Terrain Digital Database), a joint program organized by 
ISRIC, FAO and UNEP5. The WOCAT project (World Overview of Conservation 
Approaches and Technologies) was started in 1992 as a result of the 7th ISCO6 conference to 
improve the information on tools and approaches for soil conservation on the global level. For 
further international projects addressing soil conservation see (Hurni 2003). 
Another approach by the scientific community to try to set soil degradation on the 
international political agenda was the agreement to a concept of a convention for the 
                                                 
4
 FAO (World Food and Agriculture Organisation), WASWC (World Association of Soil and Water 
Conservation), IBSRAM (International Board for Soil Research and Management), IWMI (International Water 
Management Institute, Sri Lanka), IUSS (International Union of Soil Science), ISRIC (International Soil 
Reference and Information Centre, Wageningen, The Netherlands) 
5
 (UNEP) United Nations Environment Programme 
6
 (ISCO) International Soil Conservation Organisation 
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protection of soils, which requests national governments to place soil conservation on a legal 
basis (Held and Kümmerer 1997). The influence of such a convention is still discussed among 
politicians and scientists, but the need for more efficient soil protection measures cannot be 
denied (Hurni 2003). 
Hannam and Boer (2002) stated in a report by the IUCN7 Environmental Law Centre the poor 
recognition of the need for internationally more binding soil protection, and emphasised the 
importance of an international legal framework to help avoid further global soil degradation. 
They postulated the need for ecological soil conservation standards or norms for ensuring 
sustainability. Although erosion is a problem with a very local physical impact, the effects of 
eroded and degraded soils are of international relevance. This means, actions are needed on a 
regional, national and international level. On the regional level, measures and programmes 
that are adapted to local conditions need to be developed to provide effective soil protection. 
On the national level, a soil law should set the legal fundaments for these regional measures. 
However, both national and regional laws will not be implemented without an international 
treaty or convention, which sets equal binding standards for all signing states and avoids 
competition for the least restricting legislation.  
Since soil degradation as a problem shows its effects more in the long run, politicians will be 
tempted to base their decisions on short term considerations to be re-elected (Buchanan et al. 
1980). A sustainable soil conservation policy that shows its effects only in the long run, but 
which places restrictions on farmers in the short run while decreasing their competitiveness 
on the world market, will not be very popular. However, when embedded in an international 
agreement, a soil conservation law is more likely to mediate the objectives of farmers, 
politicians and soil scientists. These agreements vary among non-binding instruments (e.g. the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992), binding instruments (e.g. United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 1994) or non-government initiatives such as 
the proposal for the “Convention on Sustainable Use of Soils” (Held and Kümmerer 1997). 
Looking at the huge number of organisations involved in soil conservation world-wide, there 
does not seem to be a lack of knowledge and research dedicated to the conservation of soils 
world-wide. Hurni (2003) stated that a gap still exists between research and stakeholders like 
farmers and farm extension agencies that has to be filled with local agendas, so that 
technological knowledge and the awareness for more sustainable land management can be 
transferred from research to land users.  
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 (IUCN) International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
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It is questionable whether a mere global approach on either the scientific or political level will 
improve the management of soils. Nevertheless, these projects can set a framework for 
national, regional and even local approaches to improve sustainable land use by setting 
binding goals for action (Khan 1993). Environmental law is an essential component for 
setting and implementing global, regional, and national policy on the environment and 
development. 
On the EU-level, soil conservation had been the subject of a non-binding instrument since 
1972, when the Council of Europe adopted a European Soil Charter as a part of the attempt to 
stop the steady deterioration of land in Europe (Hannam and Boer 2002). 
In 2002, the European Commission published the communication “Towards a Thematic 
Strategy for Soil Protection” (Commission of the European Communities 2002). Since then, 
several EU-working groups have developed a legal framework that assures the protection of 
soils from their major threats. A wider overview on soil related policy activities on the EU-
level is shown in Kraemer et al. (2006). The final objective of the strategy is a framework 
directive that was designed similar to the water framework directive.  
This thematic strategy was passed by the European Commission in September 2006, 
instructing the member states to monitor soil conditions in their countries and to set-up 
measures to counteract harmful effects of soil degradation (Commission of the European 
Communities 2006). However, the first attempt to reach a political agreement on the draft 
directive for establishing a framework for the protection of soil did not attain a qualified 
majority in the European Council meeting of the Ministers for the Environment in 2007 
(European Council 2008b).  
Excursus: a comparison between North America and Europe 
North American soil conservation strategies (e.g. the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)) 
have been more targeted and focused on the prevention of off-site effects as compared to the 
European approaches (Plankl 1999). European soil conservation efforts are focused mostly on 
the prevention of erosion in general without the consideration of where the damage occurs. So 
far, only a few European environmental programmes have targeted soil conservation 
measures to specific erosion prone areas (e.g. North Rhine-Westphalia (Hartmann et al. 
2006)). To some extent, the European legislation relies mostly on the proper management of 
resources by land users, e.g. as pointed out in the soil protection act (Federal Ministry for the 
Environment 2003a). Financial incentives for the adoption of conservation practices are 
usually available to all farmers of a region for reasons of fairness (Hartmann et al. 2006); 
(Huylenbroeck and Whitby 1999). Furthermore, soil erosion problems in Northern and 
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Central Europe never reached such extremes seen in the North-American Prairies (Masutti 
2004).  
The differences may lay in the history of soil erosion problems: farmers were faced with huge 
problems in the North-American Prairies, when soil erosion by wind and water was 
threatening both farmers directly and society indirectly through the loss of future food 
resources (Furtan and Hosseini 2003). The problem started as an individual problem that 
turned into a problem for the society, which justified the grounding of intensive research and 
extension (Furtan and Hosseini 2003; Masutti 2004). After years of farm extension on soil 
conservation in North America (Furtan and Hosseini 2003; Popp et al. 2002), society 
continues to concentrate on the off-site effects, while the on-site effects are left to the decision 
of the farmer, who decides on the more or less sustainable use of his property (Crosson 1984). 
3.2 National legal approaches for soil conservation in the example of the 
German environmental policy  
The use of soils is usually regulated at the national level. In most countries, the aspects of soil 
conservation are usually covered under specific laws that are not aimed directly at soil 
conservation. The use of soil or land is rather regulated so that specific aims may be achieved 
(e.g. nature conservation) or property rights among potential users may be regulated. Hannam 
and Boer (2002) listed potential soil use regulating laws as follows: 
• land administration, 
• pastoral land management, 
• maintaining of biodiversity, 
• conservation of native vegetation,  
• forest law, 
• environmental protection, 
• environmental planning and assessment. 
In order to give a clearer picture of the situation in Germany, the German legal approaches on 
soil conservation are described in the following. The general objectives and principles of the 
German environmental policy are first highlighted, since they serve as a guideline for 
environmental policy making. Then, the instruments of environmental policies in Germany 
are shown. The current instruments for soil conservation in Germany are then illustrated 
based on this. The chapter closes with a brief description of the shortcomings of this legal 
system in relation to soil conservation, argued from all the different sides. 
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3.2.1 General objectives of environmental policy 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the environmental policy is based on three main 
objectives. Firstly declared in a governmental environmental programme in 1971, the 
environmental policy comprises all measures needed to meet the following three objectives 
(Storm 1988): 
1. ensuring an environment for people, which meets their needs for health and a 
humane existence, 
2. conserving soil, water, air, fauna and flora from harmful effects of human impact, 
3. eliminating damage and harm from human impacts. 
By referring to human activity and interest in all three objectives, it is underlined that 
environmental conservation is seen from an anthropocentric point of view, which sets 
conservation in relation to the maintaining and improving of human welfare in the broadest 
sense. Nevertheless, conflicts between concurring objectives like agriculture and nature 
conservation will always be common and will need to be solved through the evaluation of the 
individual case (Storm 1988). 
3.2.2 Principles in the German environmental policy 
In order to achieve the objectives of the German environmental policy, three main principles 
will need to be applied (Freshfields 2003; Storm 1988): 
3.2.2.1 The principle of precaution (Vorsorgeprinzip) 
This principle aims at avoiding any damage before it even occurs through preventive 
measures and regulations. By applying this principle sustainability can be ensured, as a pure 
reactive approach will only regulate liability after the damage has occurred and precious 
resources irreversibly destroyed. This principle is of high importance in the soil conservation 
legislature, because soil degradation can only be reversed with huge efforts. 
3.2.2.2 The polluter pays principle (Verursacherprinzip) 
The polluter pays principle is used as a means to allocate the costs of environmental effects of 
any human action, but it is not yet an allocation of the total liability. Any person, who 
endangers, pollutes or causes damage to the environment is held liable for the costs of 
avoiding the damage and the clean-up. Exceptions are made when economic distortions occur 
or when the polluter cannot be tracked down. In those cases, the public would be responsible 
for paying for the damage. For soil conservation this principle is a crucial point: most of the 
EU-countries hardly apply this principle when it comes to off-site damages from agricultural 
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fields (Boardman et al. 2003). On the contrary, this principle is often applied when soils are 
contaminated by industrial uses. 
3.2.2.3 The co-operation principle (Kooperationsprinzip) 
This principle sets the directions of how the state and society should interact in environmental 
policy, as long as existing laws do not interfere. The involvement of stakeholders should 
assure better decision quality in environmental issues and prevent future claims by persons 
affected by the planned activities. Participation processes are common in any big transaction 
or investment with a possible impact on the environment. In soil conservation, approaches 
such as incentives for less damaging agricultural practices could be grouped into this 
category. Even though the polluter pays principle could be applied, the existing set of 
property rights allows farmers to use their soils according to good technical practice, which 
includes a certain amount of erosion (see chapter 7.9). Therefore, farmers and the community 
agreed in a type of voluntary process to negotiate on a new level of soil erosion. 
An additional aspect in policy making is seen in the option of establishing laws that are valid 
without restrictions or laws that are based on subsidiarity, which means that the law is only 
applicable, if no other law already regulates the specific case. 
3.2.3 Juridical Instruments of environmental law in Germany 
Schmidt and Müller (1992) listed the instruments available for the management of natural 
resources in Germany. These are: 
• Planning instruments 
• Instruments of regulatory law (Ordnungsrecht) such as preventive and repressive 
prohibitions 
• Environmental impact assessment (Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfung). 
• Fiscal instruments such as subsidies, taxes and duties 
These instruments are discussed in the context of their applicability to improvement in soil 
conservation. 
3.2.3.1 Planning instruments 
Most of public or private investments are accompanied by an obligatory planning process (dt. 
Fachplanung) by public and private planning agencies, (e.g. house building or construction of 
new processing plants in industry). During this process the possible conflicts with all relevant 
laws are investigated before any development can begin. Only when this process proves that 
there is no violation of any law or regulation, can the actual construction begin. The 
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instrument of urban land use planning (dt. Bauleitplanung) must also consider the effects on 
the environment. 
Furthermore, environmental conservation is promoted by a more general spatial planning that 
is based on the regional planning act (dt. Raumordnungsgesetz). This law sets the guidelines 
for zoning in urban and rural areas based on economic developing objectives and priority 
setting for the construction of public infrastructure projects like schools, roads etc. Among 
other things, the goal of environmental issues needs to be taken into account in order to 
protect valuable sites from destruction or deterioration. 
The relevance of planning instruments in soil conservation in agriculture is limited. Some 
importance is seen in the zoning of certain areas to allow only certain crops or cropping 
practices. 
3.2.3.2 Instruments of regulatory law  
Administrative rules (dt. Ordungsrecht) allow public agencies to influence the environmental 
effects of most economic and private actions. There is a long list of instruments that are 
usually applied: 
1. registration and report obligations (dt. Anmelde- und Anzeigepflichten) 
2. disclosure obligations (dt. Auskunftspflichten) 
3. security obligations (dt. Sicherungspflichten) 
4. preventive and repressive prohibitions (dt. Präventive und repressive Verbote) 
5. injunctions (dt. Verfügungen) 
Agriculture is subject to many of such instruments: pest management (PAV 2006), 
construction of agricultural buildings, manure and fertilizer use (DüV 2006), which are 
regulated by such guidelines. So far, soil use has not been directly addressed by such 
instruments. However, soil use is indirectly affected by them. One possible option of using 
such an instrument is to implement certain soil conserving practices through the law, or to 
legally make farmers report off-site damages, as is already outlined in the soil protection act 
(Federal Ministry for the Environment 2003a; Federal Ministry for the Environment 2003b). 
3.2.3.3 Environmental impact assessment  
Certain projects may even call for a special Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (dt. 
Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfung) with specific regulations on how the impact on the 
environment is to be evaluated (e.g. power stations, chemical plants, railway tracks or 
airports). This regulation is based on a EU-guideline that demands the application of this 
instrument in all member countries within a three year period (art. 12, European Council 
2003). The applicant has to provide information on the possible impacts of the planned 
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project that will be evaluated by the authority. Furthermore, a public hearing is required in 
this procedure. Finally, a comprehensive report of the environmental effects has to be 
published. Soil conservation on agricultural fields however is too decentralized to be subject 
to such an assessment. 
3.2.3.4 Fiscal instruments 
German law also allows the use of economic instruments for influencing environmental 
behaviour. Depending on the objective, a subsidy, tax, or a duty is applied for, the instruments 
can be structured as follows (Schmidt and Müller 1992; Storm 1988): 
Environmental taxes and subsidies: Taxes can be used to decrease the use of scarce 
resources or to internalize negative external effects, as the increasing price of production will 
decrease the use of the natural resource. Subsidies are seen as a negative tax offered by the 
government to enforce economic activities that would not occur or at least not at the wanted 
level without this financial transfer. While taxes are more or less uncommon in the European 
agri-environmental policy making, subsidies are widespread for the promotion of agricultural 
activities demanded by society. Examples are tax reductions for cars with lower exhaust gas 
pollution, or differing taxes on hydrocarbon fuels in accordance with their pollution effects 
(e.g. unleaded fuel). 
Environmental duties: Duties are used to either steer the use of resources in a more 
sustainable way (guidance duties) (dt. Lenkungsabgaben), or as a compensation for damage 
done to the environment (compensation duties) (dt. Ausgleichsabgaben). Duties can be seen 
as a fee that has to be paid for the use of a resource. 
Both these instruments (taxes and duties) create the same economic effect because both will 
increase the price of the resource and will at the end decrease the consumption of the 
resource. The difference between taxes and duties is based more on legal reasons and the 
purpose the money is used for. According to the legal definition, taxes have to create at least 
to a certain degree public income and do not entitle the taxpayer to claim for any 
governmental action in exchange. By contrast, duties are seen as a compensation to a legal 
body for efforts in waste clean-ups or damages to the environment. 
Both instruments are of increasing importance in the political process, leaving the methods for 
damage reduction to the knowledge of consumers and producers trying to avoid the costs of 
pollution. However, governmental regulation and control still plays a major role in 
environmental conservation (Freshfields 2003). 
Standard taxes for soil degradation have not been used in soil conservation. However, 
subsidies for soil conserving practices are used commonly in agri-environmental programmes 
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(Hartmann et al. 2006). Furthermore, the concept of ambient taxes for non-point source 
pollution such as from soil erosion had been discussed in the economic literature (Segerson 
1988). This tax is imposed on all possible polluters of a given area, irrespective of the 
individual pollution. Economic theory shows that such a tax can reduce pollution even if 
producers with high pollution levels are not identified. 
3.3 Current instruments for soil conservation in Germany 
3.3.1 The German soil protection act 
Soil use in Germany is regulated through a multitude of laws and guidelines from different 
categories as follow: 
• the fertilisation regulation (Düngeverordnung) (DüV 2006), which controls the use of 
manure and synthetic fertilisers on agricultural plots,  
• the guidelines for the execution of Good Technical Practice in pest management 
(Pflanzenschutzverordnung) (PAV 2006)  
• the general principles of good technical practice of agricultural land use, which have not 
been legally specified except under the above regulations DüV and PAV and 
• the Federal Soil Protection Act (Federal Ministry for the Environment 2003a), which 
was implemented in 1998. 
Soil and legal scientists had stated the need for soil protection based on an independent law 
before the implementation of the soil protection act, as the pressure on soils from human 
activities had created demands for preventive measures in soil protection (Wissenschaftlicher 
Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen (WBGU) 1994). It was argued 
that this goal could be better achieved with the help of a specific soil conservation law than 
with a patchwork of singular laws aimed at specific aspects of land use (Landel et al. 1998). 
Finally, after years of discussion at scientific and political levels, a federal German soil 
protection act (Federal Ministry for the Environment 2003a) was brought on its way and 
finally passed in the federal legislation (Bundestag) on March 17th 1998. The case for and the 
aim of such a law was nevertheless doubted throughout the discussion process. Critics of the 
specific soil conservation act stated that soil protection is still better achieved through several, 
specific laws that already exist, whereas advocates of the law demanded a more binding frame 
law that emphasises the importance of soil protection and conservation.  
According to Landel et al. (1998), the legislators have two main objectives: 
• the establishment of precaution aspects in the soil related legislation and 
• the harmonisation of residual waste legislation. 
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The law passed encompasses elements of prevention, emergency procedures (precaution 
principle) and restoration/clean-up of polluted soils (polluter pays principle) (Landel et al. 
1998), showing two of the aforementioned principles of German environmental legislation 
with elements of cooperation being less implemented (see Chapter 3.2.2). The law is based on 
subsidiarity, so other laws that already regulate the specific cases are given priority. This 
restriction had to be made, since there are already existing specific laws concerning soil (e.g. 
regulation of herbicide use or hazardous waste, see above). The law is accomplished through 
an ordinance that guides the administrator in the use of the law and sets threshold values for 
the contamination of soils (Federal Ministry for the Environment 2003b). Therefore, the soil 
protection act sets the frame for the instruments of regulatory law (see Chapter 3.2.3.2). 
The soil protection law aims at the avoidance of any harmful deterioration of soils and 
regulates the legal effects of hazardous substance contamination. The law is not aimed at the 
restoration of soils to its almost natural state: the functions listed in the law include also the 
use function for production. It however sets limits on uncontrolled use of this natural 
resource. 
3.3.2 The role of agriculture in the Soil Conservation Act and other regulations 
A separate article of the law is dedicated to agriculture, describing how agricultural practices 
should be accomplished while considering preventive aspects of sustainability. The box below 
cites article 17, which regulates the agricultural use of soils.  
The fundamental principles related to agriculture comprise (Landel et al. 1998): 
• the maintenance and improvement of soil structure 
• avoiding soil compression and run-off 
• conservation of structure elements of the landscape 
• conservation and improvement of the biological activity of the soil through rotational 
aspects 
• conservation of organic matter (humus). 
The soil conservation act however, sets relatively small restrictions on agriculture, since 
sufficient soil degradation protection can be achieved through the “Good Technical Practice”. 
However, the article does define such rules on a legal basis, which was not the case before the 
implementation of the soil protection act (see following box, part 2). As mentioned before, 
agricultural soil use was already regulated under the fertilisation regulation 
(Düngeverordnung) (DüV 2006), the guidelines for the execution of Good Technical Practice 
in pest management (Pflanzenschutzverordnung) (PAV 2006), as well as the general 
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principles of good technical practice of agricultural land use, which have not been legally 
specified.  
As Landel et al. (1998) pointed out, the soil protection act does not add too much to those 
existing regulations. Additionally, the article is formulated in such a way that all other laws 
concerning soil use would be used primarily, even if the soil protection law would set higher 
restrictions or demands on sustainable and adequate soil use (see subsidiarity). The authors 
saw this as one of the weakest parts of this enactment (Landel et al. 1998). 
 
Description of the German Federal Soil Conservation Act (Article 17)  
 Part Four 
Agricultural Soil Use 
Article 17 
Good Agricultural Practice 
1. In cases of agricultural soil use, the obligation to take precautions pursuant to Article 7 
shall be fulfilled by good agricultural practice. In their advising, the competent 
agricultural advising bodies pursuant to federal state (Länder) law should impart the 
principles of good agricultural practice pursuant to paragraph (2). 
2. The principles of good practice in agricultural soil use are the permanent protection of the 
soil’s fertility and of the soil’s functional capacity as a natural resource. In particular, the 
principles of good agricultural practice include: 
• in general, the soil shall be worked in a manner that is appropriate for the relevant 
site, taking weather conditions into account, 
• the soil structure shall be conserved or improved, 
• soil compaction shall be avoided as far as possible, especially by taking the relevant 
soil type and soil humidity into account, and by controlling the pressure exerted on 
the soil by equipment used for agricultural soil use, 
• soil erosion shall be avoided wherever possible, by means of site-adapted use, 
especially use that takes slope, water and wind conditions and the soil cover into 
account, 
• the predominantly natural structural elements of field parcels that are needed for soil 
conservation, especially hedges, field shrubbery and trees, field boundaries and 
terracing, shall be preserved, 
• the soil’s biological activity shall be conserved or promoted by means of appropriate 
crop rotation and 
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• the soil’s humus content, as is typical for the site in question, shall be conserved, 
especially by means of adequate input of organic substances or of reduction of the 
intensity with which the soil is worked. 
3. Obligations pursuant to Article 4 shall be fulfilled by means of compliance with the 
provisions mentioned in Article 3 (1); where these provisions contain no requirements for 
prevention of hazards and no such provisions result from the principles of good 
agricultural practice pursuant to paragraph (2), the other provisions of this Act shall apply. 
 
Source: Federal Ministry for the Environment 2003a 
 
Due to the federal system in Germany, the soil protection law had to be implemented at the 
federal state level. Some federal states had existing specific soil protection laws (e.g. Berlin, 
see Landel et al. 1998) that had to be revised according to the frame conditions of the new 
federal law. However, some federal states have not yet passed the soil protection law and its 
corresponding ordinances. In the case of Brandenburg, a federal state law on soil protection 
was still not passed in 2008, while other federal states had already implemented such acts. In 
Brandenburg, soil use is still regulated under other soil related laws, which underlines the low 
impact the federal soil protection act actually has.  
3.3.3 Other political instruments for soil conservation in agriculture 
3.3.3.1 Cross compliance 
Since the implementation of the new CAP-reform (European Council 2006a; European 
Council 2006c), Cross compliance as a new instrument also affects agricultural soil use. 
Member states have to set up minimum standards for resource protection, nature conservation 
and animal welfare. Farmers have to meet these standards in order to receive EU direct 
decoupled farm payments. If farmers violate these rules of Cross Compliance, the EU-direct 
payments can be withdrawn. Cross compliance is in fact an application of the instruments of 
regulatory law (see Chapter 3.2.3.2). 
For Germany, the following cross compliance rules affect soil conservation issues directly: 
• Erosion reduction (DirektZahlVerpflV 2006) §2): no ploughing on 40 % of arable 
land between after harvest and February 15th unless a new crop is sown before 
December 1st. Local authorities can cancel this article if erosion risk is low for the 
region or if the weather conditions do not allow the application of this regulation. 
Human made terraces in agricultural plots may not be removed. 
Chapter 3 – Policy Approaches for Soil Conservation 
27 
• Conservation of soil organic matter (DirektZahlVerpflV 2006) §3): on the farm 
level, a minimum number of three crops have to be grown, with a minimum share of 
15 % per crop. If more than 3 crops are grown, smaller shares can be added up to 
reach the 15 % minimum. In the case where less than 3 crops are grown, farmers have 
to monitor soil organic matter by a balance through a scientifically approved method 
and prove values that are above thresholds specified in the regulation. Furthermore, 
the burning of stubble fields is forbidden. 
• Preservation of grassland shares within regions (European Council 2006c): 
Member states have to show proof of a constant grassland share within regions to the 
European Commission. For Germany, a region comprises a federal state. If the share 
of grassland decreases under the specified limits, the federal state has to show proof of 
legal steps to stop such trends. 
Other regulations such as the preservation of landscape structures (e.g. hedge rows) 
(DirektZahlVerpflV 2006) §5) have an indirect influence on soil conservation, e.g. by cutting 
slopes into shorter parts or by providing protection against wind erosion. 
3.3.3.2 Agri-environmental measures 
Member states of the EU have introduced agri-environmental programmes based on the 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 (European Council 2006b) that also allow the support 
of soil conservation measures. Some federal states in Germany have introduced programmes 
that provide incentives for the adoption of soil conservation practices such as reduced tillage 
and direct seeding (see Table 4).  
The amount of subsidy provided in these programmes varies between 42 €/ha and 117 €/ha. 
Some federal states support reduced tillage only for row crops with a higher erosion risk, 
others target these programmes on areas with a high erosion risk or support investment in 
special equipment (Brand-Saßen 2004). For a complete overview of agri-environmental 
programmes under the EU 1257/1999 regulation see Hartmann et al. (2006). Since 2007, the 
agri-environmental programmes had been based on the Council Regulation (EC) No 
1698/2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD) (European Council 2008a). 
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Table 4: Soil conservation programmes co-financed by the EU directive 1257/1999 in the German 
federal states in 2003  
Federal state Programme 
acronym 
Programme objectives Amount of subsidy 
(€/ha) 
Bavaria KULAP A Reduced tillage in row crops with cover 
crops 
100 
Baden-Württemberg MEKA II Reduced tillage with cover crops  60 
Brandenburg KULAP Cultivation of small seed legumes  310 
Hesse HEKUL Reduced and no tillage with cover crops 60 
Lower Saxony NAU 
AFP 
Reduced and no tillage 
Investment in reduced tillage equipment 
72 
allowance up to 20 % 
North Rhine-Westphalia KULAP - Reduced and no tillage for beets, corn, 
rapeseed, legumes and potatoes with cover 
crops as well as cereals 
- Conversion of arable land to grassland 
- Both parts of the programme are only 
available in targeted regions based on soil 
erosion risk 
102 
 
 
306-715 (depending 
on soil quality) 
Rhineland-Palatinate FUL Reduced tillage for corn and sugar beets 
- no cover crops 
- with cover crops 
 
46 
117 
Saarland - Reduced tillage 60 
Saxony-Anhalt - Reduced tillage 42 
Saxony UL 
 
 
 
Reduced tillage 
With cover crops 
Under sown crops 
Investment in Reduced tillage equipment 
25 
66 
51 
allowance up to 35 % 
Schleswig-Holstein -  Reduced tillage 60 
Source: Brand-Saßen 2004; Hartmann et al. 2006 
 
The efficiency of such programmes is still under discussion. In a comparison of the agri-
environmental programmes in North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate with the 
example of model farms, Busenkell (2004) found that the soil conservation programmes 
(reduced tillage) either overcompensated the losses incurred by the programme, causing 
windfall gains; or on the other extreme, did not cover the costs through yield losses, which 
resulted in low adoption rates. For Brandenburg, it was demonstrated that soil conservation 
programmes showed little spatial focus on areas where soil erosion risk is elevated, resulting 
in the low efficiency of such programmes (Matzdorf et al. 2003). 
3.3.4 Criticism on existing policy approaches 
Despite taking part in the formulation of the soil conservation act, the German Scientific 
Advisory Council on Soil Conservation did outline their opinion that good technical practice 
does not guarantee sufficient prevention of soil erosion (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 
Bodenschutz beim BMU 2000). The Advisory Council criticized the missing specification of 
minimum standards for the “good technical practice” that meant an ecological evaluation and 
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estimation of the erosion effect of the appropriate production procedures was not possible. In 
comparison to examples from fertilisation regulation, or the guidelines for the execution of 
good technical practice in plant protection or the principles and recommendations for good 
technical practice in agricultural land use, it shows that the “aspects of soil protection are not 
yet sufficiently substantiated” especially in terms of more binding guidelines in support of 
soil conservation. 
Both the Enquete-Kommission (1994) and the German Advisory Council for the Environment 
(Der Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen (SRU) 1996) considered the specifications 
for the “good technical practice” guidelines insufficient for guaranteeing sustainable soil 
management. They had suggested further, partly restrictive measures for the conservation of 
soils and proposed management restrictions, obligations and/or limitations for the cultivation 
of fields, land use limitations and retraction of certain measures. The Scientific Advisory 
Council for the Environment demanded as well for a more precise definition of ”good 
technical practice” that contains more obligatory rules. Additionally it recommended a more 
purposeful promotion of erosion-avoiding measures, which cover the regional aspects of soil 
erosion as well, i.e. to consider particularly erosion-endangered fields or regions (Der Rat von 
Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen (SRU) 1996).  
However, in a paper submitted by the scientific advisory board (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 
Bodenschutz beim BMU 2000) neither the precise measures of soil protection were specified, 
describing their expected effect (practical issues), nor was the amount of the compensations 
mentioned. Beyond that, the conceptions are still very vague with regards to the political 
implementation or negotiability of the appropriate measures (policy issues). Furthermore, the 
question of how the assignment of subsidies can be bound more strongly to the prevailing 
erosion potential arose.  
Overall, it can be stated that soil conservation in Germany is still lacking in further 
implementation, which comes either from more binding law applications or from increasing 
the efficiency of the incentive based soil conservation measures (through more adequate 
measures and/or spatial targeting of such programmes). 
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4 The economic background for soil conservation 
While soil science demanded a rather absolute prevention of soil degradation processes 
(Frielinghaus et al. 1998), economists brought up the notion that any use of a resource has 
both positive and negative effects on different individuals, on different sites and at different 
times (Dabbert 1994; Hampicke 1991; Pearce and Turner 1990; Pimentel et al. 1995; Tisdell 
1991). 
Therefore, the economic question arose, as to whether, from a normative viewpoint (i.e. 
searching for an increase in total welfare of society), a socially optimal soil degradation rate 
should be derived, or, to find efficient ways of soil conservation based on a pragmatic, given 
threshold facing the empirical difficulties to reach a social welfare optimum. 
In order to base the analysis on a theoretical framework, a brief overview of the economic 
characteristics of the decision problem is given in the following chapter. The available 
methods for solving such problems are additionally discussed. After that, an approach that 
meets the conditions and restrictions of the empirical decision problem best is derived based 
on a consistent economic background. 
4.1 Natural Resources and Welfare economics  
In resource economics, a welfare economics approach that is based on utility maximization is 
usually used to analyse and evaluate the management of natural resources (such as soil and 
soil conservation). This approach can be described as a sustainable management of a natural 
resource (Kooten 1993; Pearce 1993; Pearce and Turner 1990).  
In general, the analysis compares solutions to a pareto-optimal state, where the utility of an 
individual cannot be further increased without the utility of another worsening. Any state that 
is not pareto-optimal implies welfare losses to society. In a less strict criterion for a social 
optimum, the individual with the increased utility is at least capable of compensating the 
individual whose utility had decreased, even when this compensation does not happen 
(Kaldor-Hicks-criterion) (Tisdell 1991). Welfare economics can be used in a theoretical or 
more conceptual way to analyse the rents generated by a policy. 
Under perfect conditions with competition, perfect information and clearly defined property 
rights, markets achieve the social optimum through the coordination of “the invisible hand” 
(Smith 2005) of the market. Therefore, market-based prices are usually the most efficient 
instrument for the management of most resources; however, there are conditions that can lead 
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to market failure with a sub-optimal provision of the specific good. Crucial elements for 
market failure are (Hampicke 1991; Tisdell 1991):  
1) public good characteristics,  
2) the resulting presence of externalities,  
3) unsustainable levels of resource use based on uncertainty and risk 
including the divergence of individual and social interest rates, 
4) the irreversibility of the resource use, 
5) the low possibility of substitution of the natural resource. 
Other aspects are monopoly rights and common property that can lead to conditions where 
markets no longer provide the most efficient management of the resource. In such cases, 
governmental intervention may be indicated (Kula 1992; Pearce and Turner 1990; Tisdell 
1991). 
Governmental policies for resource management are therefore a means to more efficient use 
of resource from society’s viewpoint (Cansier 1993; Hampicke 1991; Tisdell 1991; Weersink 
et al. 1998).  
Given the deficiencies of using pure market values for the evaluation of natural resources, the 
“Total Economic Value” (TEV) of a natural resource was introduced as a construct to define 
and measure values for natural resources that go beyond the market prices (Pearce and Turner 
1990; Turner et al. 2003). Pearce (1993) defined the total economic value of a natural 
resource as the sum of use values and non-use values (see Table 5). The use value consists of 
direct and indirect values.  
Table 5: Components of the “Total Economic Value” of soil resources  
Total Economic Value 
Use value Non-use value 
Direct value Indirect value Option value Bequest value Existence value 
Agriculture 
Forestry 
 
Flood protection 
Filtering 
CO2 sink 
direct and 
indirect values 
for future 
generations 
heritage for 
future 
generations 
The value of mere 
existence, i.e. not 
related to any human 
use, but only as a part 
of nature 
Source: modified, based on Pearce 1993 
 
The direct value of soil expresses the production function for agriculture or forestry for 
producing direct income. Turner and Jones (1991, cited in Pearce 1993) expanded the TEV-
approach by introducing another use value: the primary value that expresses the ecosystem 
functions of soil. The indirect value expresses soil ecosystem functions associated e.g. with 
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flood protection, cleaning, buffering, storage, cooling as well as habitat functions. The option 
value corresponds to the direct and indirect value for future generations, which is the value to 
use to maintain options for future generations e.g. to grow food and fibre in a sufficient way 
but also to provide indirect functions for the future (see Chapter 4.2.4). Non-use values are 
defined as bequest and existence values. Human beings desire to bequeath sound soil 
resources to future generations including inter alia the cultural heritage function of soil that 
can be evaluated and expressed as a bequest value (Tisdell 1991). The existence value of soils 
describes society’s appreciation of the mere existence of different soil types (intrinsic value) 
that goes beyond conventional utilitarian approaches (Pearce 1993). For a critical review on 
the different approaches on how to define use and non-use values, see Cicchetti and Wilde 
(1992). A recent overview of evaluation techniques can be found in Turner et al. (2003). 
In the following, the characteristics of soil and soil use are analysed with the help of 
economic categories to find the appropriate framework for further analysis of soil 
conservation strategies. 
4.2 Economic Properties of Soil as a Natural Resource 
4.2.1 The degree of publicity – Soil as a private or public good 
From an economic viewpoint, the optimal management of any resource is strongly dependent 
on whether it shows the characteristics of a private or public good (Tisdell 1991). Public 
goods show no rivalry in their usage and nobody can be excluded from their usage 
(Henrichsmeyer et al. 1991). In the case of public goods, prices cannot reflect the scarcity of 
the good, so the production of the good would be insufficient. The same is true for public 
“bads” such as environmental pollution. The malfunction of price signals can cause an 
“overproduction” of pollution (Hampicke 1991; Tisdell 1991).  
At first glance, soil used by a farmer for agricultural production can be seen as a private good, 
for a farmer usually holds the production rights for a field. He or she has the right to use and 
change the good, others can be excluded from its usage, and there is rivalry for the use of the 
grounds8.  
However, the use of soil as a private good, being defined with absolute exclusion of other 
users, could harm other individuals through the run-off from a field. Obviously, there are 
effects from such “private land use” on other individuals caused by the run-off of soil matter 
                                                 
8
 The possibility of commonly used soils such as grazing lands is neglected here. 
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washed on to other fields or into waterways that affect the water quality for people living 
downstream of the eroded fields (Crosson 1984). 
Additionally, soil degradation affects the long-term fertility of the soil, which, under certain 
conditions, can be less important to the farmer than to society (Dabbert 1994). This can be 
seen as a non-rivalry effect of soil use. All individuals of a society as a whole would suffer 
from this loss without being able to exclude themselves: A non-rivalry condition versus long-
term degradation. The public costs arising from soil degradation will most probably not 
influence the farmer’s decision (Kiker and Lynne 1986). Therefore, the long-term fertility of 
soils can also be seen as a public good, representing an option or bequest value for society 
(see Table 5). This will be further discussed in chapter 4.2.3. 
4.2.2 Externalities 
Public good characteristics of a resource often lead to externalities, since the non-rivalry and 
non-excludability would lead to an over-consumption or exhaustion of a resource (Tisdell 
1991). In the case of soil degradation, the resulting effects would be soil use above 
sustainable levels. The example of soil use shows that the off-site effects of soil use would 
become a public good (or bad, respectively) (Barbier 1995). Externalities are defined as 
effects on other individuals that are not part of an economic transfer (Cansier 1993; Pearce 
and Turner 1990). Such externalities are effects of economic activities that change other 
individuals’ welfare and this welfare change is not compensated (Pearce and Turner 1990), p. 
61). The change of welfare is expressed in the external costs of an economic activity. The 
external costs of soil degradation can also be defined as their social costs, since these are not 
internalized into the producer’s decision. Hence, these costs are burdened on society (i.e. 
other individuals). Given the differing social and private production costs of a good, a 
producer will use the resource to a higher extent as if he would also face the additional costs 
that society or other individuals have to bear (Tisdell 1991). In the example of soil use, the 
producer would choose a production level or technique that degrades soil more than what is 
optimal from society’s perspective. In most cases, degraded soils will not only decrease the 
farmer’s income (Evans 1995), but the external effects of degradation through soil erosion 
will also harm neighbours and society (Pimentel et al. 1995).  
Soil conservation measures do not only affect the farmer’s income as a private good. They 
can also be considered as a public good, since nobody can be excluded from the benefits of 
less damage. Many studies stressed that farmers’ private costs are by far exceeded by the 
social costs of off-site damages from soil erosion (Boardman et al. 2003; Hansen et al. 2002; 
McConnell 1983; Commission of the European Communities 2006). The resulting effects can 
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range from long term trends like decreasing soil fertility (which threatens food security), and 
increasing sediments in rivers and dams, to short term catastrophic events like muddy floods 
that cause considerable damages in residential areas (Boardman 1995; Boardman et al. 2003; 
Clark 1985; Evans 1996; Grimm et al. 2002; Hansen et al. 2002; Pretty et al. 2000). 
Therefore, soil as a resource can show different characteristics: The resource itself is used as a 
private good but shows public good characteristics, which lead to externalities. As a result, it 
can be stated that soil degradation through soil erosion is to a large extent a public good (bad). 
Since the preferability of the market solution holds only true for private goods, the existence 
of public good properties of soil degradation through soil erosion can cause the sub-optimal 
use of the resource. Therefore, external intervention of the management of a natural resource 
is appropriate (Tisdell 1991). Furthermore, soil degradation threatens the long-term fertility of 
soils (Dabbert 1994). Thus, there is a value in the long-term fertility of soils, which is more 
important to society than to the individual. This adds a further argument for governmental 
action.  
Excursus: The economic research on soil conservation in North America and Europe 
North-American economic literature on soil conservation and soil erosion (for a short 
overview see (Furtan and Hosseini 2003) is much more profound in comparison to the 
European literature. Most articles follow the idea that soil erosion in general is not a problem 
to society as long as the erosion only harms the polluter/owner (Fox et al. 1995). Therefore, 
economic studies on the preferability of instruments for soil conservation take the location 
where the damage is occurring and where this damage can be avoided at the least cost more 
into account than trying to reduce erosion in general (Nakao and Sohngen 2000; Westra et al. 
2002; Yang et al. 2003).  
European literature on the economics of soil erosion and soil conservation is still rather 
limited. Dabbert covered the issue in a general approach on the economics of soil fertility 
(Dabbert 1994), but publications in scientific journals are still rare (Jarosch and Zeddies 1991) 
and limited to the farm scale (Brand-Saßen 2004; Busenkell 2004; Meyer-Aurich 2005) or to 
certain regions (Boardman et al. 2003; Evans 1996; Pretty et al. 2000; Schuler and Kächele 
2003). 
4.2.3 Uncertainty and risk 
An important assumption made in economics for the efficient functioning of markets as the 
optimal way of resource management is the existence of certainty regarding price signals. 
However, reliable information about future prices is almost impossible to predict, since the 
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influence of time brings at least a range of probabilities of the possible outcomes (Hampicke 
1991; Pearce and Turner 1990). 
4.2.3.1 Definitions and relevance of uncertainty and risk 
There is a difference in the definitions of risk and uncertainty (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1963; Pearce 
and Turner 1990). The distinction is that uncertainty is not measurable whereas risk can at 
least be described through expectation values (i.e. probability) (Bishop 1978).  
Potential soil erosion can be influenced by the probability of heavy rain falls throughout the 
year and other climatic factors. However, there is uncertainty about many erosion related 
processes such as the replenishment rate of soils, since knowledge about these processes is 
still not very profound (Shortle and Miranowski 1987).  
4.2.3.2 The divergence of individual and social interest rates 
Interest rates are usually used to link and compare economic decisions from different time 
periods. In the context of resource conservation, interest rates play an important role in 
solving dynamic decision problems through being coordinated by the market or other 
economic instruments (e.g. taxes). Individual and social interest rates are also distinguishable 
(see Dabbert 1994). The definition and their effects are given in the following: 
Individual interest rates 
Individual interest rates are a result of time preference, which serve as the compensation for 
the time span between activities and the flow of money. Time preference is a phenomenon 
that is seen in almost any economic activity. Economic literature states that individuals and 
society have differing time preferences (Pearce et al. 1990).  
It is a widely accepted fact that individuals prefer the payment of a certain amount in the 
present rather than in the future. Pearce et al. (1990) gave some explanations for this 
behaviour.  
The time preference of individuals is affected by: 
1. the uncertainty of the future,  
2. impatience, 
3. the risk of dying, and 
4. the decreasing net benefit of consumption. 
Impatience is a very human characteristic. Therefore, an immediate payment is given a higher 
value than one in the future. In fact, it is a very rationale behaviour for individuals to prefer an 
earlier payment because there is always the risk of dying. Furthermore, future payments are 
affected with uncertainty, especially if the payment is scheduled far into the future. The 
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source of payment could disappear, the bank could go bankrupt or the economy could 
deteriorate with a severe inflation of the currency. Furthermore, when considering the growth 
of the individual income, the marginal net benefit of a payment in the future would not be as 
high as its value in relation to the present income (Dabbert 1994). 
Social interest rates 
Social time preference originates from the opportunity costs of capital, for it is possible to 
derive income from the productivity of capital. The marginal return from the last used unit of 
capital is the social interest rate. Basically, the social interest rate is the aggregated interest 
rate of individuals that had been cleared of any external effects that could affect an 
individual’s interest rate (Dabbert 1994). 
The effect of an interest rate is to discount future benefits from the present value so that the 
preference for the two investment options may be compared. This is well accepted for the 
evaluation of private investments such as new machines or factories because the new 
investment has to compete with other opportunities. However, when the effects of the 
investment in public goods, and certainly the conservation of exhaustible natural resources are 
analysed, more difficulties are produced (Pearce and Turner 1990). The conservation or 
preservation of a natural resource for future generation is faced with a much longer time 
horizon than the usual investment in assets. The choice of a discount rate that is too high 
would decrease future benefits expressed in present values to almost zero and therefore allow 
for a greater degradation of soils. For that reason, some authors even suggested an interest 
rate equal to zero for the conservation of a natural resource, while others suggested rates 
below that of financial markets (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1963; Dabbert 1994; Hampicke 1991). 
However, given the close relation between production output and soil erosion, setting the 
discount rate at zero would only overvalue future benefits from soil use (and soil 
conservation) and possibly not allow any production at present for the sake of future benefits. 
As a further effect, any investment in other options (other than soil use) would then be more 
profitable.  
In optimization or assessment approaches, the level of the interest rate used for discounting 
the future net benefits of public projects or policy programmes determines the most preferable 
option (Markandya and Pearce 1991; Tisdell 1991).  
The above mentioned uncertainty regarding the actual amount of soil loss related to certain 
soil uses and the natural replenishment rate will widen the range for an appropriate choice of 
discount rates (Shortle and Miranowski 1987).  
Chapter 4 – The economic background for soil conservation 
37 
In the economic literature on soil erosion, the proper functioning of interest rates as a means 
that temporally interlinks soil use had been questioned. Even though it has been shown 
theoretically (mostly based on McConnell (1983), who abstracted from any off-site effects) 
that interest rates are able to coordinate inter-temporal soil use, empirical difficulties (Ervin 
and Mill 1985; Kiker and Lynne 1986) and conceptual questions (Hampicke 1991), lead to 
the conclusion that the choice of the discount rate is one of the main problems faced in the 
management of exhaustible natural resources (Pearce and Turner 1990).  
The above aspects show how critical it is to rely on price signals for the sustainable 
management of soils; prices are affected by uncertainty, which can cause distortions in the 
proper reflection of scarcities. As a result, it can be stated that soil use is affected by 
uncertainty and risk, implicating distorted price signals, and therefore, soil resource 
management can be subject to market failure.  
4.2.3.3 Uncertainty in economic soil erosion models 
Most economic models on soil erosion assume a very rough linkage between production level 
and soil erosion. Usually, only the total output is correlated to the total amount of erosion (e.g. 
in models like McConnell (1983)) or a simple assumption of the erosivity of different 
cropping systems is made (Walker 1982). 
The above mentioned model by McConnell (1983) describes the inter-temporal, economic 
effects of soil erosion. The aim of McConnell’s model is to find out whether farmers have an 
incentive to use their soils in a sustainable way. Off-site effects were excluded in this model 
even though they were stated to cause the higher overall costs. The model is basically an 
optimization function of a capitalized profit stream over time that uses the soil both as a 
production asset and as a good with a future resale value. The level of soil loss is assumed to 
be correlated to the level of production output. Soil depth is an exhaustible resource that can 
be depleted within a certain time if production causes higher soil loss than replenishment by 
natural formation.  
While high levels of erosion can decrease the resale value of the farm, they do also increase 
the profits during the production period. McConnell stated that it is economically rationale to 
accept a certain amount of soil degradation. Theoretically, assuming perfect functioning 
market mechanisms, a farmer’s economic rationale would lead to the integration of soil 
conservation measures into private decision making through the matching of marginal costs of 
soil erosion with the marginal costs of soil conservation. According to McConnell (1983) 
farmers have in most institutional conditions an invested interest in soil conservation because 
they want to maximize the total income of their farms. Since farmers know that soil base 
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affects the farm resale value, they are willing to apply appropriate conservation measures. 
McConnell’s approach was strongly questioned by Kiker and Lynne (1986), who showed that 
market signals do not guarantee the proper conservation of soils according to societal needs.  
Firstly, the information of how much soil is actually lost through a certain production system 
is still difficult for the farmer to estimate during the production process. In fact, even soil 
research is still not satisfied with the current state of soil erosion risk modelling. Therefore, 
soil loss is not a variable that a farmer could actually vary according to the prices he gets for 
his products. Secondly, the lack of an appropriate interest rate for coordinating soil use 
produces wrong signals for how much soil may be depleted (see Chapter 4.2.3.2).  
The problem of modelling uncertainty in soil erosion economics was presented by Shortle and 
Miranowski (1987). Even though they underlined that it is analytically possible to identify the 
optimal level of erosion, they concluded that the empirical specification of such models 
causes problems that make the use of such optimization models questionable. These problems 
arose from estimating the soil losses related to cropping systems, soil types and spatial 
aspects. Therefore, it is not clear in most models as to what extent agricultural measures will 
contribute to soil conservation. The condition of soil can be described by soil depth, which is 
assumed to be a variable that can be influenced directly by the land users (e.g. in models 
based on McConnell (1983)) or can be related more directly to variables such as cropping 
systems. Such models are still lacking in enough variability in production methods and 
machinery use (Yang et al. 2003). 
Factors such as sparse information on replenishment rates or the actual erosion rate from 
specific cropping systems make it impossible to manage the sustainable use of soils through 
pure market mechanisms. Full information is fundamental for the generation of precise price 
signals that lead to an optimum (Arrow et al. 1995; Grepperud 2000; Kiker and Lynne 1986). 
Ervin and Mill (1985) derived in an analytical model the finding that land prices could 
incorporate signals for the proper management of soils. However, their findings were based 
on an appropriate level of information of the relationship between production and soil erosion 
processes. However, the uncertainty in this relationship is the crucial aspect within this 
system, not the function that relates cause and effect (Shortle and Miranowski 1987; Tisdell 
1991). 
4.2.4 Irreversibility 
Irreversibility is evident for the destruction of many exhaustible natural resources. Soil 
erosion processes are hardly reversible in spite of technical solutions that compensate for soil 
loss and degradation (e.g. fertilizers) (Dabbert 1994). Calculations of optimal soil run-off can 
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be too optimistic, causing the long-term degradation of a valuable resource for the future 
nutrition of the world’s population (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1963). Once a natural resource is 
completely exhausted, the time horizon for its rebuilding can be beyond human dimensions 
(The World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). Degradation of soils is 
more or less a one way process (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale 
Umweltveränderungen (WBGU) 1994). It might be even economically profitable to exhaust 
soils beyond the sustainable limit in a certain period, even though the opposite would be 
preferable in the following period, but the chance to reverse this process would be zero then 
(Arrow et al. 1995; The International Board for Soil Research and Management (IBSRAM) 
1997; Van den Born et al. 2000). 
Furthermore, option values (see Table 5) that express individuals’ value for keeping the 
option for future usage face difficulties in the way of how the value is expressed in monetary 
units. Therefore, the actual value of current use is overestimated (Tisdell 1991). Bequest 
values, expressing the value for future generations (Pearce 1993) are likely to be threatened 
by the irreversible effects of free-riding in the case of a public good (Tisdell 1991).  
For the markets to function, these non-use values have to express the irreversibility of 
resource use. Given the public good characteristics of a resource, these price signals will not 
develop appropriately (Walsh et al. 1984). These effects combined with the aforementioned 
uncertainty regarding soil processes can cause a pure market solution to become an inefficient 
management option.  
4.2.5 Substitution 
From an economic viewpoint, a sustainable use of a resource is given, when the overall 
capital stock stays equal, i.e. the transfer from the natural resource capital to man-made 
capital generates a higher social return than when keeping its original state (Pearce and 
Warford 1993). The underlying assumption is that natural resource capital can be substituted 
with man-made capital. This poses two fundamental questions: First, is it possible at all to 
compare the values of natural resource capital with man made capital, and second, which 
values should be used to estimate the returns of a natural resource. 
The first question is a question of definition. While some advocates of strong sustainability 
would argue against such comparisons (Batie 1989), environmental economists do not oppose 
the comparison, but concentrate rather on a clear comprising definition of the values to be 
compared (Pearce and Turner 1990; Pearce and Warford 1993) so as to find an answer to the 
second question. Table 5 shows the different types of values that are used to describe the total 
value of a resource. 
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The knowledge of existent values however does not lead to a clear answer for both questions. 
So, the possibility of substitution can either be argued by definition or the result of the 
substitution depends on factors such as discount rate chosen (see chapter 4.2.3.2) or the range 
of values introduced into the analysis (see above). 
A more pragmatic answer to whether soil can be substituted at all can be given from a 
technical viewpoint: The resource soil and its long-run fertility can hardly be substituted or, 
with present means, can only be substituted at prohibitively high costs (Dabbert 1994).  
The loss of soil fertility can be partly replaced by the use of fertilizers and other inputs, but 
this is only possible up to a certain degree and with declining marginal returns (Kiker and 
Lynne 1986). Moreover, the rate of substitution between natural fertility and technical inputs 
is not known. Soil degradation was accompanied by technical progress in the past that 
overlaid the negative effects of the decrease in natural fertility (Barbier 1995).  
As a result, the limited possibility of substitution of soil through other resources and the 
uncertainty of possible costs stemming from an underestimation of indirect and non-use 
values decrease market prices’ reflection of social preferable levels of scarcity. Therefore, 
soils should be used with an adequate level of caution that reflects the uncertainty und 
irreversibility of the degradation processes (Dabbert 1994). 
4.3 Conclusion: Market failure and the need for governmental intervention 
Based on the framework by Hampicke (1991), both soil use and soil conservation showed in 
all aspects at least some evidence that a pure market-based soil use management is 
questionable and will therefore not lead to a socially optimal solution. Market failure is a very 
likely result if the use of soils would be based only on price signals that are developed on 
markets. Therefore, other ways of resource management will have to be found. 
Given the above mentioned arguments, it can be assumed that soil degradation in relation to 
agricultural production means:  
• an externality with social costs exceeding the private costs,  
• that these costs of the resource use are not optimally internalized given the public 
good character of the off site effects (market failure), and,  
• that a social optimization procedure will face difficulties in selecting the appropriate 
interest rate for the discounting of the future costs and benefits (theoretical 
difficulties). 
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Due to the irreversibility of degradation processes and the limited possibilities of substitution, 
soils will not be conserved appropriately when only market signals are used for conservation 
decisions. 
In referring to the normative viewpoint (i.e. to search for an increase in the total welfare of 
society), the net social benefit should be maximized instead of only private benefits. The 
Producers’ internalization of external costs is one way of achieving this objective. In such 
cases, governmental intervention is indicated. Soil conservation policies are therefore ways to 
internalize such effects to achieve more efficient resource use from society’s point of view. 
However, market failure does not justify un-coordinated governmental intervention, as it 
might only lead to inefficient public expenditures. It is important to clearly analyse the subject 
and find cost-efficient solutions, so that market failure that turns into government failure can 
be avoided. Environmental economics provide instruments for both the internalisation of 
externalities and the management of public goods, and tools to analyse the efficiency of such 
governmental instruments. Furthermore, the consideration of transaction costs can lead to 
more efficient solutions within this process (see Chapter 7.9 and 8). 
4.4 Policy instruments for managing a natural resource 
4.4.1 Policy instrument categories 
Based on the above conclusion (that the use of the pure market mechanisms shows deficits for 
managing the sustainable use of soils), policy instruments for resource management are 
required. Weersink (2002) compiled a general list of policy options for influencing farmers’ 
behaviour and the resulting environmental performance: Moral suasion, command-and-
control strategies and incentive-based strategies (see also Weersink et al. 1998; Weersink 
2002). A list of instruments by Tisdell (1991) is further specified as: 
1. taxes 
2. subsidies 
3. auctioning of rights to engage in externality-producing activities 
4. state ownership and control of property 
5. strengthening of property rights 
6. internalisation of externalities by extension of ownership 
7. fiat, prohibition or regulation 
8. facilitation of private negotiation and agreement 
9. provision of information. 
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Although some are not economic instruments, most of them can be evaluated using an 
economic framework. While taxes and subsidies influence the behaviour indirectly by 
changing the relative prices of in- or outputs (1-2), all property rights related instruments 
change or strengthen the institutional conditions around the use of a resource (3-6). This is 
also true for prohibitions and regulations (7). Additionally, the effect is similar to a tax, but 
without creating income for the government (Tisdell 1991). The provision of information as 
well as facilitation of negotiation processes are aimed at the reduction of transaction costs, 
which could be too high for the proper functioning of a market solution (8-9). 
Another option for categorizing policies is the scale the policies are aimed at (Tisdell 1991): 
some policies address worldwide changes in resource consumption (greenhouse gases, 
desertification) (The World Commission on Environment and Development 1987), others 
focus on local or regional adjustments for a more sustainable resource use (i.e. the use of cost-
benefit-analysis for development projects (Bishop 1978)), and a third group tries to tie global 
and local efforts together i.e. the Agenda 21 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
2006). 
4.4.2 Achieving the social optimum through internalisation 
In the following, two theoretical approaches are shown by applying welfare economics 
analyses: the first is a tax-based solution based on the works of Pigou (1998), which explains 
the functioning of subsidies and the second is a negotiation approach following the 
argumentation by Coase (1960), which underlines the importance of property rights. Both 
approaches lead to a socially optimal allocation of the resource and the maximization of net 
social benefits. Therefore, most policy instruments are based to some extent on the ideas of 
these examples. Relative prices are either changed politically to induce a change in behaviour 
or the property rights are defined more clearly or actually changed so that change in the 
resource use is induced. Information instruments are not described here, since they only 
change the frame conditions of market situations that lead to conditions where markets 
themselves provide an efficient allocation of resources. 
4.4.2.1 Pigou taxes 
Given the problem of externalities (i.e. the off site effects of soil erosion) that decrease the 
welfare of society, Pigou (1998) developed an approach for internalizing the externalities into 
private cost functions in order to achieve a social optimum (example cited from Pearce and 
Turner (1990)). The differing social and private production costs of a good are the reason why 
a producer will use the resource more than he would if he had to bear the additional costs that 
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society is faced with. As a result of the overuse of the resource, the social benefits are lower 
than the social optimum, as the additional external costs decrease the aggregated welfare. 
Figure 4 shows how the external costs can be integrated into the decisions of a private 
producer. Here, a production intensity that is strongly related to soil erosion is assumed and 
high outputs mean high rates of erosion measured in tons per ha. The erosion rate does not 
affect the production costs of the producer, so the optimal level of production for the producer 
is where his marginal net private benefits (MNPB) equals zero, given a certain price level. 
This is the point where the increase of one unit in production will not increase the profits of 
the producer. The producer realises an output based only on his private optimum (MNPB=0). 
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Source: Pearce and Turner 1990 
Figure 4: Optimal pollution tax t*, marginal external costs (MEC) and marginal net private benefits 
(MNPB)  
Society is affected by the increased soil erosion rate, which leads to increased marginal 
external costs (MEC) per unit produced. 
However, if the social optimum is reached, the marginal external costs would equal the 
marginal net private benefits (MNPB = MEC). If it is possible to decrease the soil erosion to 
this level (Soc. Opt.), the gains through higher benefits to the society would outweigh the 
losses caused by reduced production for the producer. 
Pigou’s idea was to introduce a tax t on the product (in this example, the agricultural output) 
through a social planner (the government) so that MNPB are reduced by the amount of t*, 
which is exactly the amount of MEC at the social optimum. The producer now re-adjusts his 
production level given the tax t* and will produce at the socially optimal level  
(MNPB – t* = 0). 
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The damage caused by erosion gets reduced to the point where the positive effects of less 
erosion are outweighed by losses on the producer side. 
The example can be transferred to a subsidy that is paid for a production practice that causes 
less erosion than the standard practice, but which involves higher costs to the farmer. The less 
erosive practice becomes more advantageous and is therefore more applied than without the 
subsidy. 
4.4.2.2 Negotiation solutions  
Coase (1960) questioned the practicability of Pigou’s approach, since it might not be possible 
to define the optimal amount of tax through a governmental agency. In his argument he left it 
to the individuals involved in the decision problem and extended the approach by introducing 
the existence of property rights. He made clear that the solution of such a problem is highly 
dependent on the a-priori-distribution of property rights. The person who has the right to 
pollute can ask for compensation for the reduction of the damaging activity or if the affected 
person has the right of not being damaged by the producer, he can sell this right to the 
producer for the negotiated price. No matter how the rights are distributed at the beginning, 
negotiations will lead to a pareto-optimal solution. The same example with one producer (a 
farmer) and a person suffering from the effects of soil erosion is assumed here (representing 
the society as a whole) (see Figure 5).  
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Source: based on Coase 1960, following the example in Pearce and Turner 1990 
Figure 5: Social optimum achieved through negotiations  
Depending on the distribution of the property rights, there are two possible points where the 
negotiation can start. If the farmer has the right to pollute, he will produce at the point E (Priv. 
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Opt. P). For the society there is an incentive to pay the farmer for the reduction in soil erosion 
because it will decrease the marginal external costs more than the decrease of the net private 
benefits. Given complete information about the costs and benefits of both sides, a price of p* 
per unit of decreased pollution (ton of eroded soil per ha) will develop, where marginal 
external costs will meet marginal net private benefits.  
If the rights of not being polluted belong to society, zero pollution would take place at the 
starting point O of the negotiation (Priv. Opt. S). Marginal external costs are zero but the 
farmer has an incentive to purchase these rights from society (known as the “polluter-pays-
principle”), since any increase in production will increase his profit. Here, the bargaining 
process will end at the same price p*, the only difference is that the compensation is given to 
society. 
Coase made clear that the distribution of property rights is the crucial point in this discussion. 
Property rights generate income to the person who owns it but negotiations will finally lead to 
pareto-optimal solutions. The distribution of the property rights only determines which person 
will start the negotiation process. External effects could be internalized through negotiations 
between the market participants, so that the (inefficient) implementation of a Pigouvian tax by 
a government is not needed.  
This theoretical approach is not often directly used as a policy instrument. However, it helps 
one understand how environmental policies are implemented under different institutional 
environments. If the property rights are mostly claimed by the user of a resource, then the 
individual or society that suffers damage from the resource use will have to buy out some of 
these property rights (i.e. incentives or compensations). On the contrary, if the society holds 
the property rights, then the potential user of the resource will have to pay for “pollution 
rights” in taxes. 
However, Coase made two crucial assumptions for the functioning of negotiations:  
1. The transaction costs of negotiations have to be low enough for the process to 
start. 
2. There is complete information and transparency regarding the costs and benefits 
involved. 
Both assumptions are difficult to fulfill, even for a two-person example. Transaction costs are 
never at zero in real world conditions (Challen 2000). As a result, negotiations would not be 
possible because of the prohibitively high costs for bringing the stakeholders together. Private 
information however can be used strategically to improve each person’s result (Arrow 2001). 
Given the problem of soil erosion with a huge number of pollutants and individuals affected, 
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the theory is overrun by real world conditions. The common problem of non point source 
pollution (Griffin and Bromley 1982) will increase the probability of free riders that will take 
the compensation but not fulfill their part of the contract. 
4.4.2.3 Remarks on the approaches by Pigou and Coase 
Both Pigou and Coase developed ways to internalize externalities. Environmental taxes and 
subsidies (a negative tax) are used in policies for the management of natural resources, e.g. 
taxes on fossil fuels or subsidies for environmental friendly production (e.g. reduced tillage 
programmes). In other cases, it is left to the individuals to negotiate for the optimal price of 
pollution rights. One possible application is seen in the auctioning systems where the price is 
generated by supply and demand (e.g. the U.S. acid rain program (EPA - US Environmental 
Protection Agency 2006)). Note that even this example is weak, since the auction system 
needed governmental input for creating such markets. The US Conservation Reserve 
Programme (CRP) is an auction example for soil conservation that uses a bidding system to 
find appropriate land for this programme (Plankl 1999). 
The problem with both approaches is the empirical difficulties in gathering knowledge and 
data for all the involved costs and benefit functions (Pearce 1993). What seems clear in theory 
requires a lot of effort in real life. Companies may not easily provide confidential information 
regarding their production process, individuals may exaggerate their suffered damages when 
compensations are available (asymmetric information) (Arrow 2001). Even though the 
external costs of pollution exist, it is difficult to relate damages to specific activities (non 
point source pollution) (Segerson 1988). Weersink et al. (2002) pointed out the impossibility 
of gathering this information for practical studies. 
The above example was only abstracted to a two player case – one polluter “versus” society. 
If this simple case would be extended to a larger number of individual polluters, cost 
functions among them would differ causing greater difficulties in generating an aggregated 
cost function. Further aspects had been derived in Pearce and Turner (1990).  
The criticism regarding the assumptions of welfare economics will not be extended here 
(Kula 1992; Pearce 1993; Pearce and Turner 1990; Pearce and Warford 1993; Tisdell 1991). 
Nevertheless, the underlying assumptions of the homo oeconomicus are difficult to apply to 
real world problems. However, taxes, subsidies and, to a certain part, negotiations play a 
considerable role in the real economic world. Even if the functions are not known and the 
information on the private costs of pollution abatement is sparse, decision makers still use 
such instruments (not only in a trial and error way) to change and influence the behaviour of 
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individuals. Both Pigou and Coase provided a theoretical concept that is useful for the 
development of practical implementation options for soil conservation. 
4.4.3 Spatial targeting and regulation areas 
When environmental programmes are seen as a possible solution for natural resource 
management, the spatial targeting of such programmes is often suggested (perfect mapping) 
(Breton 1970). The term “regulation area” is relevant in the context of agro-environmental 
policy making (Latacz-Lohmann 2001), while the term perfect mapping was introduced by 
Breton in connection with the general provision of public goods (Breton 1970). The effect of 
such spatial targeting of environmental programmes had been widely discussed in economic 
literature (see examples Lankoski and Ollikainen 2003; Latacz-Lohmann 2001; Yang et al. 
2005b). In most cases, given the heterogeneous distribution of the environmental assets, 
targeting was preferable to non targeted policies. The approaches that were used for the 
selection of areas for soil conservation programmes were usually based on the statistical 
analysis of GIS data. This chapter provides some information on the spatial effects of the 
selection of the regulation areas of soil conservation policies. Several approaches are available 
to help in the selection of land for targeted conservation programmes. However, it is finding 
the “optimal” choice that poses a challenge. Here, the economic background of spatial aspects 
for policy instruments (e.g. targeted conservation programmes, regulation areas) are 
discussed.  
The importance of spatial aspects in non-point source pollution was emphasised by Wossink 
et al. (2001): Heterogeneity in the economic and ecological attributes must to be reflected in 
the underlying data. Aggregation of spatial data will lead to the false estimation of pollution 
prevention costs. Lintner and Weersink (1999) showed the effect of the spatial location of 
farms in a watershed with respect to achieving optimal abatement of pollution, which is an 
aspect often neglected in the economic analysis of environmental problems. 
Being different from neoclassical economics, where spatial effects are more or less neglected, 
the efficiency of agri-environmental policies is not only dependent on the choice of the 
appropriate instrument. Whether a policy is suitable and efficient depends greatly on the 
regulation area: the spatial unit where the policy will finally be legally effective. The choice 
of the regulation area is important because different agri-environmental problems have 
different spatial dimensions, ranging from small-scale local problems to issues of national or 
even global importance. In order to find an efficient solution for such problems, the 
geographical delimitation of an agro-environmental programme should fit the spatial 
dimension of the problem in question (Latacz-Lohmann 2001; Scheele et al. 1992). 
Chapter 4 – The economic background for soil conservation 
48 
There is a trade off between costs arising from setting a programme on too large an area (i.e. 
profit loss in areas that are not actually part of the environmental problem (Yang et al. 
2005b)) and costs that arise from a highly detailed scheme that require high administrative 
efforts for the implementation and control of such a policy (Urfei and Budde 2002). A balance 
should be reached for these costs through finding the optimal size for the regulation area. This 
can be achieved through a real world experiment, where the targeted area is increased step by 
step and the costs and resulting effects are compared (trial and error). The other option is to 
calculate the optimal regulation area size using a modelling approach, where the objective 
function maximises the overall net benefits of the regulation area size or selects areas with the 
highest net benefit. 
Figure 6 shows a soil erosion risk map of the two districts Uckermark and Barnim in the state 
Brandenburg as an example of varying administrative and ecological purposes. Erosion risk 
zones are scattered within municipalities and cut across borders. A policy that covers either a 
whole municipality or even both municipalities would create efficiency losses through 
regulating areas with low erosion risk.  
Risk for water erosion classes:
no
very low
low
moderate
high
very high
Administrative boundaries
 
Source: Matzdorf et al. 2003 
Figure 6: Administrative and erosion risk units over two districts (UM Uckermark; BAR Barnim) in 
Brandenburg  
Administration levels for regulations, negotiations and agreements can also vary from 
international level to the very small scale level of a land parcel that indicates the ownership of 
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a certain piece of land. Each environmental problem may need a different regulation level. 
Some global environmental problems demand solutions on the international level (e.g. 
greenhouse gas emissions), while the protection of environmental sensitive areas may demand 
regulations that target only a specific field. 
Additionally, ecological boundaries are not as sharp as those set in administration. For 
example, the boundaries of landscapes can only be vaguely identified or the diffusion of 
polluted air spreads randomly over a certain area. 
For further reading on the aspects of regulation areas, see Rudloff and Urfei (2000); Urfei 
(1999); Urfei and Budde (2002); Latacz-Lohmann (2001); Scheele et al. (1992). 
An approach that is widely used (mostly in the current EU-conservation schemes) all over 
Europe focuses on entire administrative regions or federal states. This choice is usually made 
for reasons of equality and easier administration. The regulation area is then tied to 
administrative boundaries. Whether this choice is suitable in terms of the programme’s cost-
effectiveness or in terms of ecological results is discussed as one of the subjects of this study, 
see also (Huylenbroeck and Whitby 1999). 
Agricultural administrations in the EU are up to now not very experienced with targeted 
conservation programmes, for most existing agri-environmental programmes are based on a 
standardised action oriented approach (Huylenbroeck and Whitby 1999). Exceptions are seen 
in only a few very site-specific contractual programmes for nature preservation that are 
undertaken with the cooperation of environmental agencies (dt. Vertragsnaturschutz) and 
some result- oriented approaches such as the MEKA programme in the German federal state 
Baden-Württemberg or in agri-environmental programmes in Switzerland (Oppermann and 
Gujer 2003). 
Within this study, the influence of different selection criteria on the size of eligible area for 
targeted conservation programmes will be demonstrated. Then, within a chosen regulation 
area, different options of conservation programmes will be analysed. This is done through a 
combination of measures and instruments. The question is whether it is preferable to use a 
policy with its instruments on a whole region while accepting some efficiency losses or to 
focus the policy only on highly erosive areas, which might be more efficient but accompanied 
by higher transaction costs. 
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4.5 Methodological approaches for the economic analysis of soil 
conservation policies 
The following chapters give an overview of approaches for the economic analysis and ex ante 
evaluation of policy options, with the aim of preventing policy failure. The basics of cost-
benefit-analysis including the concept of Total Economic Value (see Table 5) are discussed as 
a tool for the economic analysis of conservation policies. Then, cost-effectiveness-analysis is 
introduced as a solution for decision problems, where the costs and benefits of the 
environmental resource use are difficult to measure. The cost-effectiveness-analysis serves as 
a more pragmatic approach, which is combined with the concept of “safe minimum standard 
of conservation” (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1963). 
4.5.1 Cost-Benefit-Analysis 
Cost-benefit-analysis is a basic analytical instrument based on welfare economics for the 
evaluation of projects. It allows for the comparison of net effects of policies by using the 
theoretical background of welfare economics and by accounting the costs and benefits of a 
policy option in a static way.  
Cost-benefit-analysis (CBA) is commonly used to evaluate public development projects. It 
searches for the implementation option that brings the highest net benefit for society, which is 
an often needed governmental decision support for public spending (Musgrave and Musgrave 
1989). Hanusch (1987) described cost-benefit analysis as a tool for the “better” provision of 
public goods. The term “better”, as a normative expression is defined as the more efficient use 
of public money, expressed as the above mentioned net benefit of a project or programme 
(Hanusch 1987).  
Cost-benefit-analysis should examine all costs and benefits that are accrued to and result from 
a project that can affect on a national or even international level, including those costs that 
cannot be measured or valued (Clark 1996). An attempt was made using CBA to assess the 
economic impacts of projects or policies by analysing and comparing the total costs and 
benefits instead of finding the cost and benefit functions related to environmentally hazardous 
activities (based on the production function). This has the advantage of being able to compare 
the two scenarios of a development (i.e. with or without a certain policy or project). However, 
cost-benefit-analysis as a partial analysis instrument, is not capable of reflecting dynamic 
changes in the preferences over time (Tisdell 1991).  
CBA may not necessarily find the optimum level of pollution but can give information on the 
net benefits of different policy options (Hanusch 1987). This process can be described by 
comparing two points on the benefit and cost functions, where the shape of the curve is not 
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known but certain points can be described. It is more adapted to reality, where possible 
solutions to a problem are first developed within a political process. Only these prototypes are 
then assessed using CBA. 
As for soil conservation, Crosson (1984) posed the fundamental question of whether tolerable 
soil loss rates should be used and whether future generations should face higher costs. He 
pointed out that a loss in productivity can be levelled out by better technology at lower costs 
than investing everything in erosion control now. According to Crosson, “the key is the 
relative cost of these two alternatives”, which depends highly on the measures used and the 
economic damage caused by erosion. Therefore, one option is to not avoid erosion but to 
avoid the impact on valuable water bodies through measures like riparian buffer strips. 
The valuation of the costs and benefits has to be based on the opportunity costs of the 
produced and used goods and services, which make up three distinct groups (Clark 1996): 
• Traded goods for which a market price exists can be valued at their world market price 
(adjusted for the transport and distribution costs) 
• Domestic factors of production (i.e. land and labour) are valued with their marginal 
value product (e.g. market prices, market rents) 
• Non tradable goods and services should be split up into their tradable and non tradable 
components. The tradable parts can be valued at market prices, whereas the others are 
valued at the marginal value product or the marginal social benefit (e.g. willingness to 
pay). 
For some costs and benefits any evaluation is almost impossible. In these cases a qualitative 
listing and description is preferred over completely excluding these factors. 
The setting of the discounting rate and the time frame of assessment that is used to adjust 
future cost and benefits on a common basis is an important aspect in cost-benefit-analysis 
(Pearce and Turner 1990). It is crucial to explain the viewpoint of the analysis, whether it is 
from an individual or from society’s perspective. The discount rate is oriented either on a 
social discount rate (i.e. the opportunity costs of capital in the public sector) (e.g. (Abelson 
1979)) or higher discounting rates when the project is evaluated more from the viewpoint of a 
farmer that has to assume interest rates based on bank loans (Clark 1996) or flexible discount 
rates over certain time spans (Pearce et al. 2003) (see also Chapter 4.2.3.2). 
In environmental economics, valuation concepts are still being developed and improved so 
that the concept of standard cost-benefit-analysis for public projects may be extended (Turner 
et al. 2003). The evaluation of public goods produces theoretical difficulties because these 
goods are not usually traded on markets for the above mentioned reasons (e.g. non-
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excludability, non-rivalry of consumption) and even if they were, the prices would be 
distorted for the same reasons (Tisdell 1991). Therefore, more information needs to be 
gathered to define the value of a natural resource, so that the economic value of a natural 
resource may be found. 
Since the over-emphasis on measurable economic values of development projects was such a 
main criticized point in standard cost-benefit-analysis (CBA), and the more ecological, “soft” 
values were ignored, the Total Economic Value (see Chapter 4.1 p. 30) as a more comprising 
approach was introduced (Pearce and Turner 1990; Turner et al. 2003). In environmental 
economics, the range of values that must be taken into account had been more and more 
extended while more methods for measuring non-marketable values had also been developed. 
The actual estimation of these values is achieved with the help of valuation techniques such as 
the willingness-to-pay (WTP) or the willingness-to-accept (WTA), dependent on the 
distribution of property rights of the natural resource. Both methods are based on surveys of 
involved individuals to help find out the amount they are willing to pay to preserve or 
conserve a certain condition or to access a natural resource or if the property rights are 
distributed reciprocally, what amount they would demand as compensation for the loss in 
their property rights (quality of their property).  
Empirical methods used in this field are the travel-cost method, hedonic prices, conjoint 
analysis and contingent valuation (see Pearce and Turner 1990). 
An example of the application of contingent valuation to soil conservation is given in 
Colombo et al. (2003). In this study, the benefits of a soil erosion control program for the 
general public were estimated. The willingness to pay for erosion reduction in the specified 
area was estimated at around 42-72 €/hectare/year. Furthermore, the authors brought up the 
significant variability in the value placed on soil erosion control when the respondents were 
reminded about substitute environmental projects.  
This behaviour is one of the usually criticized points of most WTP approaches. Most studies 
focus on a single project, so the results are not related to the other expenditures of the 
individuals involved in the survey (Turner et al. 2003). Reminding the respondents of other 
options that also could use financial support will decrease the amount spent on a certain good 
(embeddedness) (Cummings et al. 1994; Edwards and Anderson.G.D. 1987). 
The described approaches and methods are focused on estimating the value of a certain 
resource. On some occasions, it can be assumed that society will assign a certain value to soil 
conservation in the form of preferences towards a specific policy.  
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The valuation techniques demand a lot of effort for collecting information on the willingness 
to pay or to accept but the results are still faced with criticism due to the shortcomings and 
variability of the used methods (see above, (Cicchetti and Wilde 1992; Lazo et al. 1992)).  
Although CBA for soil conservation programmes has the potential of providing useful 
information on the effects of a policy, the difficulties in estimating the total economic value of 
soil and soil erosion can create bias in the outcome of a CBA. Definition problems 
surrounding the range of affected individuals may add to the ambiguity. 
4.5.2 Cost-Effectiveness-Analysis based on a Safe minimum Standard 
The cost-effectiveness-analysis (CEA) is the appropriate tool for comparing different options 
for achieving a certain specified objective without the difficulties faced in cost-benefit 
analysis (interest rates, methodological problems finding the WTP) (Levin and McEwan 
2001). It is not possible to analyse, whether a project has a net benefit to society with CEA, 
but given a certain agreement within society that soil conservation needs public intervention, 
the most cost efficient solution can be found. 
There are approaches that theoretically lead to an optimal solution but lack in feasibility under 
real life conditions. However, an approach based on the works of Ciriacy-Wantrup (1963) 
must be emphasised, as it allows a theory-based application within cost-effectiveness-
analysis. Ciriacy-Wantrup (1963) developed this economic conservation theory, which he 
described as the “safe minimum standard” (SMS). The following chapters will outline the 
CEA and the concept of safe minimum standard.  
4.5.2.1 Characteristics of CEA 
For the CEA, not only are the net benefits (benefits minus costs) of two or more options 
compared, but also the costs that arise from achieving a certain goal. Therefore, the result of 
the CEA is the ratio of goal achievement in relation to the costs or vice versa. In the example 
of soil conservation, the cost-effectiveness shows how many tons of erosion are avoided per 
unit of money spent in conservation programmes or the costs of avoiding one ton erosion 
through a specific programme.  
 
Cost effectiveness ratio  = tons of erosion avoided   = tons/€/ha 
costs of programme per hectare 
 
Or:      costs of programme per hectare  = €/tons/ha 
tons of erosion avoided 
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The costs of a programme can be derived from the loss in the total gross-margin of a given 
area and/or the budget costs that arise from incentive payments. This study analyses the 
opportunity costs of farmers for providing or adopting soil conservation practices. In the case 
of incentive payments through a conservation programme, these costs have to be added to the 
gross margin changes of the region. The costs of erosion abatement can also be shown by the 
shadow price of one erosion unit in an optimization model, if the erosion variable is limited in 
a model through a restriction. 
4.5.2.2 Definitions 
There is a multitude of definitions for the terms effectiveness and efficiency; the differences 
in meaning within the English and German vocabulary only adds to the confusion. 
In order to avoid any confusion in the use of these terms, some working definitions for these 
terms are given below:  
Efficiency describes the economy of an action. The German Fischer economic dictionary 
(Rürup et al. 2002) defines efficiency as the “economic utility of a given situation; with 
efficient decisions the economic principle is implemented.” In the context of soil 
conservation, the economic efficiency describes how many tons of eroded soil can be avoided 
with a given budget or as mentioned above, a given protection level is implemented at a 
certain cost.  
Effectiveness describes the ability to achieve stated goals or objectives, judged in terms of 
both output and impact (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2006). The ecological effectiveness of 
soil conservation measures quantifies the ability or the degree of contribution of a measure to 
soil erosion prevention (e.g. in tons/ha/year). 
To clarify the terms for this study the term efficiency is reserved for the economic view, while 
effectiveness describes more the physical terms. Cost-effectiveness refers back to efficiency, 
as it describes the effectiveness of an action in monetary terms. It is the effectiveness of a 
certain measure related to its costs (Clark 1996; Levin and McEwan 2001). However, since 
cost-effectiveness-analysis is a commonly used term in economics, it will be used as it is. 
Efficiency is described as a cost-effectiveness ratio. 
4.5.2.3 The Theoretical Background of Safe Minimum Standard  
In Ciriacy-Wantrup’s book on the safe minimum standard of conservation (SMS) (Ciriacy-
Wantrup 1963), he underlined that uncertainties exist for the physical characteristics and 
behaviour of natural resources. Given this uncertainty, any optimization procedure would be 
only valid for one spot in a huge field of uncertain conditions. Therefore, it is justified in 
natural sciences to find a threshold or to formulate a goal for conservation, a safety zone 
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between the one spot optimal solution and the uncertainty of other outcomes. Ciriacy-
Wantrup stated in order to maximize welfare such resources cannot be managed based on an 
optimal management approach or a pure cost-benefit-analysis that reflect the discounted 
present value.  
Ciriacy-Wantrup (1963) defined the SMS as a physical term: “… as a flow rate, as specified 
physical conditions necessary for maintaining such a rate through unspecified conservation 
practices, or in terms of performance of specified practices. In this sense, the safe minimum 
standard may be regarded as a technological constraint in economic optimizing.”  
However, Ciriacy-Wantrup specified later that the SMS approach can also be defined as part 
of the “objective function” rather than part of the technical constraints. “In this respect the 
SMS is more akin to an institutional than a technological constraint” (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1963).  
Toman (1994; cited in Pezzey and Toman 2002) underlined the appropriateness of an 
extended SMS as a link between efficiency considerations in cost-benefit analysis for 
investments and ethical values that come into play with long term, intergenerational equity: 
“Standard trade-off [cost-benefit] analyses apply when the magnitude and duration of risks 
are not very large, so moral stakes also are relatively low; however, ethical norms become 
increasingly important complements to trade-off analyses as the stakes rise”. This is 
especially true for soils: the correlation of soil use and long term fertility of soils is affected 
with uncertainty, soil replenishment rate are not known. Therefore, a safety zone above an 
assumed “optimal” soil erosion rate is recommended. 
In other words, SMS might not be a “straight forward” economic tool, but it represents a 
behaviour that is very common in most decision making processes, namely the setting of 
binding limits, regulations and thresholds through a political process with the help of policies 
and laws. 
In Ciriacy-Wantrup’s (1963) argumentation, he wrote it is not a philosophical reason that calls 
for such a standard but the mere uncertainty that accompanies physical, biological and 
ecological processes. As has been described before, only risks can be approximately measured 
or defined, whereas uncertainty is beyond such measurability. Therefore, an economic 
valuation influenced by uncertainty would not deliver any useful results. 
Other authors had added further justifications for the use of SMS. Most of these authors 
developed the philosophical position that says there are limits beyond which utilitarian 
calculus ceases to be legitimate. Bishop (1978; 1979) assumed that planners are unaware of 
the probabilities of relevant events. Therefore a planner should follow a “minimax” strategy, 
which minimizes the maximum possible loss. “This strategy is tantamount to assuming the 
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worst possible outcome is a certainty, and will not in general maximize welfare” (Margolis 
and Nævdal 2004). 
Since it is mostly questionable as to where to draw the line for a safe minimum standard, 
Bishop (1978) introduced a decision rule, where the option for conservation should be 
maintained until the costs of conservation are prohibitively high. An extreme example would 
be that the extinction of any species is not acceptable, unless the survival of entire mankind is 
threatened (see also Bishop 1979; Crowards 1998).  
4.5.2.4 Implementation examples of a safe minimum standard 
Most empirical examples used with SMS deal with the extinction of species, e.g. a fish that 
became extinct after the building of a dam, or the last Californian Condors endangered by oil 
mining. However, Ciriacy-Wantrup (1963) explicitly gave the example of soil use regulations 
that were in fact functioning as a safe minimum standard. The implementation of a SMS is 
done by introducing either a threshold or a goal as an exogenous restriction in the decision 
problem, which in fact is applying (and socially accepting) the above mentioned technical 
constraint on the use of a resource.  
4.6 The application of CEA with a Safe Minimum Standard 
For this study, the Ciriacy-Wantrup statement of a safe minimum standard as a threshold or a 
safety zone between the one spot optimal solution and the uncertainty of other outcomes is 
rather adequate. As stated before, the replenishment and erosion rates of soils are 
characterized by uncertainty. Therefore, limiting soil use to a socially agreed-on standard is 
more advisable than finding an economic optimum that might bear the risk of complete 
destruction of the resource (Dabbert 1994). The use of a safe minimum standard that is not 
based on economic calculus but that allows the sustainable use of soils for more than one 
generation offers intergenerational equity without the question of finding the “optimal” 
interest rate for the discounting of future profits. Real world problems are never only a pure 
economic problem, since they usually involve legal and social spheres as well. These spheres 
are linked by institutions such as property rights, which govern the use of any resource based 
on traditions, laws and moral boundaries (Tisdell 1991) (see also Chapter 8).  
In the case of this study this approach translates into the limitation of soil run-off proposed by 
soil science, but which is assumed to be negotiated and implemented through a political 
system. The role of economics is then to analyse the costs that come with achieving such 
goals and find options that minimise these costs (cost effectiveness analysis). In other words: 
The approach used in this study starts at a point, where the need for conservation is revealed 
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by society through the time spent on the issue in a political process, the political will to 
formulate relevant regulations and public money provided for the management and support of 
soil conservation programmes. The task is then to find efficient implementations of 
conservation programmes for a given budget.  
The safe minimum standard can be used to define the goal to reduce soil erosion within an 
area to a specific amount (see chapter 7, p. 103). The SMS is then implicitly formulated by a 
maximum total sum of eroded soil that should not be surpassed within a region. The safe 
minimum standard can also be used as a selection criteria for eligible area (spatial targeting) 
for soil conservation programmes (see chapter 5.4.1, p. 74) when thresholds for potential soil 
loss are applied. 
4.7  The analysed implementation options 
4.7.1 Definition of instruments and measures 
Within this study, measures and instruments are distinguished following these definitions. A 
soil conservation measure defines the practical action or the production level of the farm 
(Bridges et al. 2001), while an instrument is the tool on the policy level that influences the 
farmer’s actions through financial incentives, legal regulations or farm extension to 
implement (or to avoid) certain measures (Weersink et al. 1998).  
The analysis of soil conservation measures must enable both predicates in terms of the 
ecological effectiveness and the economic efficiency. The effects of measures and instruments 
cannot be regarded in isolation from each other but instead must be combined into a 
consistent evaluation framework. Therefore, the economic analysis of both the measures and 
the assigned instruments is necessary.  
In the following, implementation instruments (the policies) and the on-farm measures will be 
described. Finally, among these alternatives an initial selection will be made for further 
analysis in the empirical part of this study. 
4.7.2 Instruments 
In Chapter 3.2 and 3.3 an overview of the available instruments for promoting environmental 
goals was given for Germany. Chapter 4.4.1 described these instruments from an economic 
viewpoint. 
Environmental economic instruments, which are applicable to the agrarian sector comprise 
legal regulations and prohibitions, incentives or taxes as well as certificates (Weersink et al. 
1998).  
Of the given alternatives, two general options will be analysed in this study: 
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1. an incentive option, using subsidies for certain conservation measures and 
2. a legal regulation option based on preventive prohibitions with allowed and 
prohibited measures on highly erosive land. 
The other options are not analysed for the reasons below: 
Planning instruments are not suitable since they are used more for general decisions 
concerning land use (i.e. zoning for residential or industrial areas). This instrument only 
applies on a much higher level from a hierarchical view on soil conservation approaches. 
Changing the shape of fields involves a much higher number of stakeholders than only the 
land users and the governmental agencies (Arzt et al. 2003). Especially in Eastern Germany, 
each field unit has more than one owner, even though the field is cultivated by only one 
farmer. Changes in the field shape or the set-up of hedgerows require the permission from 
several owners, which is unpopular and uncommon in this region (Arzt et al. 2002). 
Additionally, this option needs a different research approach which goes beyond the scope of 
this study. Regulations can have similar effects as planning instruments when they are used in 
a site-specific way. A regulation that prohibits soil damaging activities on highly erosive sites 
is indeed a spatial planning tool. For this study, these aspects are analysed in the example of a 
regulation instrument. The application of an environmental impact assessment is not suitable 
for soil conservation policies, since it is only used for the evaluation of environmental effects 
of large scale construction projects such as highways or electric power plants (Schmidt and 
Müller 1992). 
Thus, the two selected options represent appropriate ways in which soil conservation can be 
promoted under the conditions of a given set of property rights and within a short time 
horizon (Tisdell 1991). The incentive option functions in an indirect way as a negative tax in 
the Pigou sense. This can be seen as accepting the existing set of property rights combined 
with temporally selling the right of use, namely the right to use the resource in a formerly 
agreed-on way (Tisdell 1991). 
The environmental effect of a legal regulation might be clear and predictable. Depending on 
the authority’s capabilities in control, the compliance to such an instrument might be 
questionable (Latacz-Lohmann 2004). From a property rights point of view, a legal regulation 
is a partial transfer of property rights, i.e. the right of use is changed to less damaging level. 
Voluntary incentive options have less foreseeable effects, since the adoption of such 
instruments is dependent on many factors that go beyond the level of the given subsidy 
(Drake et al. 1999). However, the resistance against the implementation of such instruments is 
usually lower than those against legal regulations: if the instrument is not suitable, the farmers 
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will not adopt it (Falconer 2000; McCann and Easter 1999a). Economic factors related to 
adoption can be modelled based on average values (Baudoux 2001; Schuler and Kächele 
2003). Factors based on attitudes are difficult to model, they require empirical surveys (Drake 
et al. 1999; Falconer 2000; McCann and Easter 1999a). Such resistance will be addressed 
under the chapter on transaction costs (see Chapter 8).  
4.7.3 Measures 
The practical measures examined in this study that serve as variables for the prevention of 
soil erosion comprise: 
• the cultivation of crops with a lower erosion risk, 
• cultivation of cover crops, 
• under-sown crops, 
• reduced tillage systems. 
Crops themselves vary highly in terms of their erosivity. Highly erosive sites can be 
converted from arable land to grassland, which has the lowest soil erosion risk among all the 
production activities. Corn has higher erosion rates than winter wheat. Other options for 
reducing run-off from agricultural fields are the use of intermediate and under-sown crops. 
Reduced tillage systems leave the soil more covered with residues, thus reducing the risk of 
soil getting washed away by rainfall. The actual values for these production alternatives are 
shown later in a separate chapter (see Chapter 5). 
The re-designing of agricultural areas can also help prevent erosion enforcing field shapes 
(i.e. with long slopes). However, the change of field-size, shape or the building of terraces is 
not implemented in the model because such changes usually demand higher efforts in 
planning (see instruments) and are not comparable to on-site measures e.g. reduced tillage. 
The feasibility of such measures are usually challenged with strong resistance in the given 
property rights framework (Arzt et al. 2003). 
The final model set up will be described in more detail in Chapter 6. At this point, a 
theoretical approach will be developed, which will lead to a cost-effectiveness-analysis based 
on a safe minimum standard.  
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5 Soil erosion risk assessment of sites and cropping practices – 
the effectiveness of soil conservation measures 
For the cost-effectiveness-analysis of soil conservation measures, two parameters are used, 
which describe the soil erosion risk of each agricultural measure on different sites so that the 
performance of a measure is related to its costs. The two parameters for the erosion 
assessment are: 
1. a parameter describing the potential erosion risk of the agricultural land (erodibility) 
(Chapter 5.1), 
2. a parameter that describes the erosivity of each agricultural practice (Chapter 5.2), 
3. and a combination of both parameters showing the potential erosion risk of a specific 
practice on a specific site (Chapter 5.3). 
As a precondition, a model that provides this soil erosion risk assessment based on data that 
are easily available from GIS sources (which describe soil qualities, land use patterns and 
elevation maps) is needed.  
The soil erosion model itself provides in a first step separate values for the site erodibility 
(e.g. the natural conditions of the area and the corresponding risk) so that areas with an 
elevated erosion risk can be found (1). In the second step, the effects of management 
decisions such as the crops chosen and the tillage practices are evaluated with a more specific 
assessment model based on a fuzzy logic tool (see Sattler (2007)). This parameter describes 
the erosivity of each agricultural practice on a specific site serving as a parameter in the bio-
economic model (2). The combination of both parameters is shown in chapter 5.4. As an 
example, the effects of thresholds that were applied on the site specific soil erosion risk data 
for the selection of eligible areas in soil conservation programmes is described in chapter 5.4. 
5.1 The potential erosion risk of the agricultural land 
5.1.1 Erosion models for estimating soil erosion risk 
This study’s focus is on soil degradation caused by erosion through run-off. Therefore, 
information on the specific soil erosion risk is needed. Several models had been developed 
and applied to fulfil this task. Bork (1991) had distinguished these models into three groups 
according to the way soil erosion processes are described:  
1. Empirical soil erosion models 
2. Deterministic-analytical models 
3. Dynamic-deterministic-numerical models 
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More details will be shown in the following chapters. 
5.1.1.1 Empirical soil erosion models 
This group comprises pure empirical models that usually consist of simple regressions that 
describe soil erosion as a result of empirically measured soil losses, calculated with a limited 
number of parameters. These models are based on the correlation of measured erosion values 
and easily measured information i.e. precipitation, soil, slope, vegetation and tillage. Input 
data needs are rather low. Such models are generally only applicable in areas they are 
calibrated for, so the transfer of these models into other regions is not appropriate. Even 
though these models are rather simple and limited in their temporal detailedness of soil loss 
events (i.e. usually average values for one year), they are widely used to help choose eligible 
areas for soil conservation measures. Typical examples are the “Universal soil loss equation” 
(USLE) (Wischmeier and Smith 1978) and the German adaptation “Allgemeine 
Bodenabtragsgleichung” (ABAG) (Schwertmann et al. 1987). Even though these models were 
developed for use at the field scale level, they have been successfully applied for the soil 
erosion risk assessment of larger areas (Renard et al. 1991). The original USLE was later 
improved in some of its factors and named as the revised Universal Soil loss equation 
(RUSLE) (Renard et al. 1991). 
5.1.1.2 Deterministic-analytical models 
A second group of soil erosion models is described as deterministic-analytical models (Bork 
1991). These models are based on general rules (e.g. physics, chemistry) that are used to 
describe the erosion processes with simplified mathematical equations. An example of this 
model type is the Water Erosion Prediction Project (WEPP) (Laflen et al. 1991). Data needs, 
as well as the computational efforts for these models are higher. To some extent, the transfer 
of these models to other regions is possible. However, the high effort for model developing 
and validation, the huge data needs and the longer computation times outweigh the 
advantages provided by the models, when only an erosion risk assessment is needed. 
Furthermore, deterministic-analytical models are also empirical models but the theories and 
rules they are based on are not as simple as in regression models. 
Another model type that is widely used in bio-economic models (e.g. Barbier and Bergeron 
1999; Deybe and Flichman 1991; Donaldson et al. 1995) is the Erosion Productivity Impact 
Calculator Model (EPIC) (Williams et al. 1983); a model that includes a plant growth model 
in its erosion assessment. This plant growth model allows the implementation of the mutual 
effects of plant cover and soil erosion. Low soil depths decrease the fertility of soils but a 
dense plant cover of the soil slows down erosion processes. Nutrient loss through soil that is 
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washed from the fields is also considered. Soil properties are characterized by factors taken 
from the USLE. 
5.1.1.3 Dynamic-deterministic-numerical models 
A third group is described as dynamic-deterministic-numerical models (Bork 1991), which 
uses solving strategies from numerical mathematics. These models can give an almost exact 
description of the erosion processes but given the high data needs and the extremely high 
computational efforts, these models are only applicable for small parts of a landscape and are 
not yet suitable for the assessment of larger areas. 
5.1.2 The soil erosion risk model in this study - an adapted USLE approach 
For the assessment of the soil erosion risk of the study region an adapted approach based on 
the USLE, which was adapted to the specific research needs of this study was chosen (see 
Chapter 5.1.1.1) (German version: ABAG (Schwertmann et al. 1987)). The model was chosen 
for reasons of practicability and sufficient detailedness in the description of the soil erosion 
risk. 
The factors of the USLE can be divided into two groups (see Figure 7): 
1) site specific properties (e.g. soil condition, rainfall) and  
2) factors that are dependent on the land users’ actions and management decisions. 
 
A = R * K * LS * C * P
A = average annual soil loss in t/ha (tons per hectare)
R = rainfall erosivity index
K = soil erodibility factor
LS = topographic factor 
L = slope length
S = slope inclination
C = cropping factor 
P = conservation practice factor
Dependent on 
management 
decisions
Site specific 
properties
 
Source: own presentation; based on Wischmeier and Smith 1978 
Figure 7: Universal Soil Loss Equation: Explanation and classification of factors  
Of the factors in the second group in Figure 7, cropping factor C is the most crucial factor for 
this study since it reflects the decision variable within the modelling system, e.g. the crops 
used and the tillage system applied. 
Generally, the USLE is used to calculate site specific erosion values without the distinction of 
both groups. It is important to note that for this model, both groups are calculated separately 
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in order to distinguish between site specific erosion risk and the erosion risk that is caused by 
the management decisions. In the following, the site specific erosion risk will first be derived. 
After this, the influence of the cropping practices will be done. Finally, after the design of the 
bio-economic model, the combination of both groups will show the potential erosion risk 
based both on site conditions, crop selection and management effects. 
5.1.3 Erosion risk assessment of site conditions  
The site specific data was based on research done by Deumlich et al. (1996). Precipitation 
data is available for the region on a daily basis, soil data was taken from a meso-scale 
agricultural soil characterization map (Schmidt and Diemann 1981), a map that was used to 
describe soil quality, slopes, hydrologic properties of all agricultural areas of the former 
German Democratic Republic. The topographic factor for slope length and inclination was 
provided by a digital elevation model. Data resolution was based on a grid of 25x25 meter, 
(see also Sattler 2007). Forests and other non-agricultural area (e.g. settlements) were filtered 
within the GIS system on the basis of a biotope mapping approach (Landesumweltamt 
Brandenburg (LUA) 2002).  
For the purpose of a general assessment of the region’s erosion risk, the C-factor is fixed to 
the average value (C-factor = 0,11) of the usual crop share that is grown in the region, as a 
single value that represents the average risk of erosion for the whole region is needed (see 
(Deumlich et al. 1996)). Note, that this C-factor is replaced in Chapter 5.3 by the values that 
are derived in a separate process (Chapter 5.2).  
The values of the 25 x 25 meter grid cells in the soil erosion assessment map describe the 
potential soil erosion risk with a regional average rotation under current conditions in the 
study region (Deumlich et al. 1996) (see Figure 8). This procedure provides a standardised 
risk assessment of the area without the influence of differing C-factors (potential erosion risk 
under current agricultural practices). 
White areas are forests and settlements that have been excluded from the calculations. Note 
the heterogeneity of the landscape reflected in the scattered pattern of highly erodible land 
next to land with low erosion risk values. 
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Average soil 
loss [t/ha*a]
 
Source: Deumlich et al. 1996 
Figure 8: Erosion risk map of the study region grouped according to soil erosion risk categories from 
Table 6  
5.1.3.1 Selection of appropriate soil unit sizes 
In order to represent agricultural management units better and to reduce the computational 
efforts for a regional model, the site-specific erosion risk values based on the 25 x 25 meters 
cells within the GIS-database had to be aggregated.  
Therefore, the original grids were aggregated using three different scale levels. The first scale 
level was aggregated to grids of 100 x 100 meter grids, representing 1 ha of agricultural area, 
while a second scale used was formed by grids of 500 x 500 meters. The resulting size of 
25 ha is the typical field size in North-Eastern Germany (Werner 2006). Another aggregation 
method, which is based on GIS-shape files describing the spatial situation of aggregated EU 
administration units was additionally used (IACS; dt. INVEKOS9). These units summarise 
                                                 
9Integrated Administration and Control System. Combines the electronic coverage, processing, control and 
payment of EU subsidy application. Dt. Integriertes Verwaltungs- und Kontrollsystem.  
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actual land units (dt. Flur), which are stored in a database for administering EU-hectare based 
payments. The advantage of these units is that they are related to real field units, which would 
facilitate the possible implementation by agricultural administration agencies. Furthermore, 
data were available from the same source describing the crops grown on these units for the 
last two years (Matzdorf et al. 2003), based on aggregated project data). These data were also 
used to calibrate the economic model and validate its results (see chapter 7.4). 
5.1.3.2 Statistical choice criteria for the potential erodibility of aggregated grid cells 
For the aggregation of the basic 25 m-grid cells a statistical method is needed to give each 
aggregated cell a value for its potential soil erosion. GIS-software offers two methods for the 
aggregation of data: either the maximum or the mean value of a group of grid cells describes 
the aggregated value. 
An example for the aggregation options is demonstrated in Figure 9: While the ‘max’ 
command uses the maximum value of the grouped cells to define the resulting grid cell, the 
‘mean’ command gives the arithmetical mean to the aggregated cell. 
 
 1 1 
 
2 4 
4 4 
 
4 4 
blockmax resample 
 
4 
1 1 
 
2 4 
2 2 
 
2 2 
blockmean resample 
 
2 
 
Figure 9: Aggregation commands used in GIS; initial values transformed with ‘mean’ or ‘max’, then 
resampled to new grid cell (Sattler 2007) 
Figure 10 explains the reason why different statistical functions had to be taken into account. 
If a mean value over the sum of erosion risk values would be used, the erosion risk in an area 
with heterogeneous erosion risk values due to flat and hilly parts within it would be 
underestimated. The maximum value within a group of grid cells overestimates the risk. 
However, information that point out areas that show a high erosion potential within an 
aggregated cell is valuable and should not be allowed to get lost through averaging the risk. A 
possible solution is to split the aggregation into a labelling and a calculation step. The 
labelling step shows the method used to generate information regarding the contained 
aggregated cells (maximum or mean values), while the calculation step produces the expected 
soil erosion risk as a real value (e.g. tons per hectare). As a result, two types of aggregation 
were applied:  
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1.) The statistical mean generates the average value of an aggregated grid cell. This procedure 
accepts the potential levelling of erosion values between high and low erosion risk cells. Both 
labelling and calculation for the potential erosion level of an aggregated plot are done with the 
mean value. The option’s acronym is therefore “meme” (mean-mean), describing that the 
mean value is used for both the labelling and the calculation of the erosivity. The pure 
maximum aggregation method (see Figure 10, both labelling and calculation using the max 
value) was rejected since it overestimated the erosion risk in the region. 
 
Very 
high
low
high
none
Mean of  
risk 
values
Maximum 
value
Mean value 
plus 
information 
about 
Maximum
Real 
situation:
River valley 
with slopes
Erosion risk 
data:
GIS information 
based on small 
grid cells
GIS aggregation 
methods:
 
Figure 10: Aggregation methods for soil erosion risk information using different statistical functions 
2.) As a synthesis of both maximum and mean method, the second method uses the maximum 
option to mark cells with a high erosion risk, i.e. the maximum value among the cells that 
form one aggregated unit. This value is chosen to describe the whole unit as a specific erosion 
risk group. For the actual calculation of potential soil erosion caused by each cropping 
activity in the model, the mean value of each cell is used, in order to avoid the overestimation 
of potential soil depletion. This procedure prevents the levelling around the mean value and 
covering potential high erosion risk along steep topographic units such as river banks or steep 
hills, while still showing the actual erosion risk potentials. The option’s acronym summarises 
as “mame” (maximum-mean), where “ma-” stands for maximum value used to find high 
erosive units, and –me is used for calculating potential soil erosion. 
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5.1.3.3 Clustering into soil categories 
The resulting aggregated units were grouped into categories in order to further reduce the 
number of individual units. The site specific erosion risk values that were calculated 
individually for every single grid cell of the sample area were clustered in the first step to 
form 6 erosivity field types (see Table 6) that were based on expert opinion and reflect the 
heterogenous conditions of the case study area (Sattler 2007). A German study on water 
protection considered erosion risk of less than 2 t/ha*a as still very low (Frede and Dabbert 
1998). However, in this study the lower grouping levels were useful since the averaging effect 
of the applied aggregation method caused overall lower levels of erosion risk. 
Table 6: Categories of the site specific erosion risk for water erosion based on the ABAG-USLE 
assessment with a standard C-factor (0.11) 
Cat. Risk of water erosion  Soil erosion [t/ha*a]  
1 none 0 
2 very low 0,01 – 0,3 
3 low 0,3 – 1 
4 moderate 1 – 4 
5 high 4 – 8 
6 very high > 8 
Source: Sattler 2007 
 
Then, in the second step, three soil quality classes based on the German soil quality system 
(dt. Ackerzahl) were used to cluster the GIS-soil data of the region. The applied soil quality 
classes (25, 38, 50) represent the medians of the clustered soil classes. The later described 
farm model uses such soil fertility classes to distinguish the yield levels. Finally, the soil 
quality classes are combined with the erosion risk categories to generate 18 soil types (see 
Table 7). 
Table 7: Erosion risk–soil quality types as a combination of soil quality class and erosion risk category  
Soil qualiy class (AZKL) Erosion risk category (acc. to Table 6) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
25 25_1 25_2 25_3 25_4 25_5 25_6 
38 38_1 38_2 38_3 38_4 38_5 38_6 
50 50_1 50_2 50_3 50_4 50_5 50_6 
Source: Sattler 2007 
 
Table 8 summarises the possible combinations of the two statistical grid aggregation methods 
and the three land size categories. The first part of the resulting key describes the aggregated 
grid sizes followed by the key for the GIS aggregation method.  
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Table 8: Possible combinations of statistical grid aggregation and threshold values 
 GIS aggregation method 
Optional grid sizes mame meme 
option 100 
100 x 100 m = 1 ha 100_mame 100_meme 
option 500 
500 x 500 m = 25 ha (average 
field size of region) 
500_mame 500_meme 
option land unit FL_mame FL_meme 
Source: own presentation   
 
The aggregation method can therefore be a crucial point if GIS data is used for handing out 
payments for soil conservation programmes. For the further analysis in this study, a selection 
from these combinations had to be made because the use of all the combinations would be far 
too complex. Therefore, the option of a 100 x 100 meter grid with a mean aggregation method 
(100_meme) was chosen, since it provides the best available resolution of the three grid size 
options and reflects sufficiently the soil erosion risk based on the average of the aggregated 
cells. Even though the mean value method does cause some levelling of the values, the results 
are still easier to interpret compared to the combination of maximum and average values. 
5.2 Erosion risk assessment of cropping practices with a fuzzy-logic model 
It was stated in the introduction of chapter 5 that a parameter that describes the erosivity of 
each agricultural practice on a specific site serving as an indicator in a bio-economic model 
was needed. Within the cropping practice database of the later described model MODAM, 
every single work step of a cropping practice is described (ploughing, spraying of pesticides, 
harvesting etc.). This information can be used to generate such a cropping practice specific 
parameter. 
Because the management decisions (i.e. the chosen crops and tillage practices) have a high 
influence on the resulting erosion risk, the cropping factor (C-factor) within the USLE (Figure 
7, p.62) is calculated more specifically. In this step, the crop and management specific C-
factors are derived with a fuzzy-logic tool10 (Sattler 2007). For each soil category combined 
with a specific cropping system, a soil erosion risk value is calculated. This provides a 
comprehensive assessment of the soil erosion risk for all site categories combined with all 
                                                 
10
 Note that this fuzzy logic model is subject of another research project and was not developed by the author. 
The approach and all results generated concerning the soil erosion risk properties of cropping practices belong to 
the works of Sattler (2007), but are confirmed to be used in this study. 
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available cropping practices. The conservation practice factor (P-factor) is set as a fixed value, 
since there is no empirical data on site-specific conservation efforts in the region. 
Table 9 and Table 10 give an overview of the crop types and the corresponding cropping 
practices that are implemented in the model. For every crop, the possible cropping practices 
are described in the database. A cropping practice is generally defined as a combination of  
• the tillage system (plough or reduced),  
• whether intercrops or undersown crops are used,  
• the type of fertilizing and  
• whether by-products are harvested.  
Cropping practices that are not feasible for a certain crop based on expert knowledge are not 
included in the database (see Sattler 2007). 
The factors used for the evaluation of cropping activities are as follows (Sattler 2007): 
a) Water erosion in summer half-year 
• crop depending soil cover in summer half-year 
• type of cropping practice (plough, reduced tillage, integration of intercrops and 
undersown crops)  
b) Water erosion in winter half-year 
• crop depending soil cover in winter half-year 
• number of cross-overs during winter half-year  
• type of tillage during winter half-year depending on the grown crop 
• date of sowing for winter cereals (winter wheat, winter rye)  
This information is used within the fuzzy logic expert system, which provides the possibility 
of ranking the cropping activities according to their erosivity risk. In the second step, the 
dimensionless erosion risk values of the fuzzy logic expert system were calibrated to the 
values of known standard practices of each cropping activity (Sattler 2007). This allows the 
generation of approximated values even for cropping practices that had not been tested in 
field experiments. Furthermore, this procedure provides a consistent evaluation system for all 
cropping practices that have not been tested under the same conditions.  
All factors are introduced in a step wise procedure into the fuzzy-model that finally calculates 
a single value for each cropping activity, which represents approximately a cropping practice 
specific C-factor. In combination with the site specific erodibility values, a potential soil 
erosion risk in tons per hectare and year can be generated that is similar to the result from a 
standard USLE calculation (see the following chapter). 
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Table 9: Combinations of cropping practices implemented in the farm model 
Key Tillage Intercrops Undersown Manuring Harvest by-product 
00 Conventional Tillage no no no no 
01 Conventional Tillage no no no yes 
02 Conventional Tillage no no liquid no 
03 Conventional Tillage no no liquid yes 
04 Conventional Tillage no no solid no 
05 Conventional Tillage no no solid yes 
06 Reduced Tillage no no no no 
07 Reduced Tillage no no no yes 
08 Reduced Tillage no no liquid no 
10 Reduced Tillage no no solid no 
12 Conventional Tillage no yes no no 
13 Conventional Tillage no yes no yes 
18 Reduced Tillage no yes no no 
24 Conventional Tillage yes no no no 
25 Conventional Tillage yes no no yes 
26 Conventional Tillage yes no liquid no 
27 Conventional Tillage yes no liquid yes 
28 Conventional Tillage yes no solid no 
29 Conventional Tillage yes no solid yes 
48 Conventional Tillage (yes) no no no 
54 Reduced Tillage (yes) no no no 
Source: Zander 2003 
 
Table 10: Crop types implemented in the farm model 
 Cropping practice 
Crop type 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 10 12 13 18 24 25 26 27 28 29 48 54 
Uncropped arable land       x              x 
Peas x             x      x  
Yellow lupin, grain  x             x      x  
Oats  x x     x x   x x  x x       
Alfalfa x                     
Linseed/flax x             x        
Sunflowers  x             x        
Spring barley x x     x x   x   x x       
Potatoes x    x         x        
Corn, silage x  x  x  x  x x      x      
Set-aside x            x       x  
Spring wheat  x x                    
Triticale x x     x x              
Winter barley  x x x x   x x   x           
Rapeseed x      x               
Winter rye  x x x x x x x x   x           
Winter wheat x x x x x x x x              
Sugar-beets x x x x x x x       x x x x x x   
Source: Zander 2003 
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5.3 Combination of erosivity and erodibility values 
In the last step, the erosion risk value of a cropping activity (fuzzy calculated C-factor) is 
combined with the site specific erosion risk value (see Figure 11). This procedure ensures that 
each cropping activity is assigned with a specific soil erosion level on a specific soil type grid 
cell. A combination of a highly erosive cropping practice with highly erodible soils will result 
in a high erosion risk. Combinations of high erodibility with low erosive practice will only 
cause medium levels of erosion risk. Note that the resulting values are based on a cardinal 
scale, i.e. each combination has one specific value (tons/ha/year). The final evaluation table 
holds information for the combination of each cropping practice with each erosion risk–soil 
quality type. Given the number of crops, tillage systems and combinations of intercrops, a 
total number of 315 cropping activities were evaluated (see Sattler 2007), which were 
differentiated for the 18 soil categories for soil quality and erodibility. 
 
Erosivity of practice
Erodibility 
of soil high
low
medium
medium
 
Source: own presentation 
Figure 11: Schematic representation of the combination of erosivity (C-factor) and erodibility (soil 
properties) 
An example is shown in growing sugar beets using plough tillage without intercrops on a 
certain soil type combined with a slope and climate attribute. The same cropping activity 
showed a growing soil erosion risk (ton/ha/a) depending on the site specific soil erosion risk 
category, which was based on soil types and topographic factors (see Table 11), which ranged 
between 0 and 3.60 tons/ha/a. 
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Table 11: Potential soil erosion risk for sugar beets depending on the soil erosion risk category (standard 
practice: plough, no intercrop, no manure), soil type 38  
Erosion risk–soil quality types Potential soil erosion risk (tons/ha/a) 
38_1 0 
38_2 0.06 
38_3 0.18 
38_4 0.57 
38_5 1.40 
38_6 3.60 
Dataset: ZRU1100a AzKl 38 100 grid mean value (Sattler 2007) 
 
Figure 12 shows the example of different crops grown with a comparable standard tillage 
system (plough, no intercrops) on potential soil erosion rates. Corn showed the highest soil 
erosion risk (4.2 tons/ha/a), while set aside and alfalfa showed the lowest soil loss (<0.1 
tons/ha/a). 
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Source: Sattler 2007; own presentation 
Figure 12: Potential soil erosion rates of crops with comparable tillage system (plough, standard practice) 
on sites with the highest erosion risk (dataset: CF38_6, 100meme)  
Figure 13 shows the mean value of each crop as well as the maximum and minimum value of 
each crop. The figure demonstrates that crops with a high mean value (e.g. corn or sugar 
beets) cannot achieve values of low erosion crops, even when a conservation practice that 
provides the lowest erosion value for this crop is used. However, it also shows the bandwidth 
that is given for each crop through the change of the cropping practice.  
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Source: Sattler 2007; own presentation 
Figure 13: Mean of soil erosion risk per crop including minimum and maximum value (n= numbers of 
cropping practices per crop and soil category type) 
Discussion of the fuzzy assessment method 
A critical point of the fuzzy logic assessment method is (similar to all expert based evaluation 
systems) that the results are only partially based on empirically gathered data and derived 
from the experts’ rules and knowledge. The values can only be as good as provided by the 
experts that proposed the way each single work step should be evaluated. However, this 
approach reduces time and money spent on data gathering. The results are, at least for the 
standard cropping practices, calibrated on empirically derived C-factors and provide an easy 
to use database for a consistent ranking of the erosion risk of cropping activities (for more 
details see Sattler (2007). This approach bears an advantage over pure empirical models, as it 
allows the expansion of the scope of evaluated cropping practices within a consistent 
framework without the need for further field trials.  
5.4 The effects of erosion risk thresholds in soil conservation programmes 
This chapter gives an example of how different thresholds and aggregation options influence 
the size of eligible areas for soil conservation programmes. Three possible thresholds that can 
be used to select eligible land for soil conservation programmes will be described. Then, an 
example of how these thresholds are applied for a specific soil category derived in chapter 
5.1.3 is shown. 
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5.4.1 Threshold options for soil conservation programmes 
Firstly, some references from soil science regarding possible thresholds of tolerable soil 
erosion rates are shown. In soil science, the tolerable soil erosion rate is defined as the amount 
of eroded soil per year that is below or equal to the regeneration rate, which is the annual 
amount of new fertile top soil produced from underlying soil material (Schachtschabel et al. 
1992). This threshold is based on a strong sustainability criterion. Other thresholds based on 
political decisions might not meet such strong sustainability criteria. However, they have to 
be taken into account as the outcome of agreements or compromises between long-term 
sustainability and short-term decisions of farmers who have to consider competitiveness. For 
this study, three different thresholds were analysed with two of them based on scientifically 
derived thresholds given in the literature (Frielinghaus 1998; Schwertmann et al. 1987) and 
one as a possible agreement on the political level.  
5.4.1.1 Zero ton erosion threshold 
Frielinghaus et al. (1998) argued that for most soils the regeneration or new build-up of the 
top soil is too small to be measured. Therefore, they proposed a way of agricultural practice 
that avoids any erosion from agricultural fields.  
This can only be achieved through measures that go beyond simple changes in cultivation 
options like i.e. reduced tillage. The approach involves an individual screening or the audit of 
farms with specific consideration for the erosivity of each field. The proposed measures 
comprise also set aside and the change from arable to grassland for highly erosive parts of a 
field. 
In order to describe the aim of this approach accurately, the resulting tolerable erosion of any 
cropping activity is set at a threshold of less than one ton/ha/a for any field type. A threshold 
of zero would result in a non-feasible solution for a farm model, for any agricultural practice 
would result in at least some erosion (see Figure 13 p.73). Even though the authors tried 
generally to avoid discussions about thresholds (Frielinghaus et al. 1998), the proposed 
measures were aimed at levels of almost zero tons in erosion. 
5.4.1.2 Variable soil erosion threshold that is dependent on soil quality 
Schwertmann et al. (1987) proposed a tolerable erosion level that was dependent on soil 
quality. Soils of lower quality (e.g. sandy or low organic matter) are less able to tolerate 
erosion compared to loamy, more fertile soils. The authors developed a simple equation based 
on the German soil quality index (Ackerzahl) ranging from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the 
most fertile soils in Germany. This index divided by 8 represents a soil quality based 
threshold for tolerable soil erosion per ha and year (TSE). 
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TSE/ha/a = SQI / 8 
 
TSE = Tolerable soil erosion by water 
SQI = Soil quality index 
 
For this study, the tolerable soil loss results in the following calculated numbers, see Table 12.  
Table 12: Soil quality index classes used in the model and the respective tolerable soil erosion by water  
Soil quality index (SQI) Tolerable soil erosion by water (TSE) (t/ha/a) 
25 0.3 
38 1 
50 4 
Source: Schwertmann et al. 1987 
 
5.4.1.3 A Standard Soil Erosion Threshold 
Standard-based thresholds, which are discussed on the policy level more than promoted by the 
scientific world are tolerable erosion rates for specific regions issued by soil conservation 
authorities. Examples of these thresholds are values of maximum 7.4 tons/ha/year for Ontario, 
Canada (Stone 2000) or 10 tons/ha/year (Bayerische Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft (LfL) 
2004). Even though such high thresholds are questioned in soil science (Frielinghaus et al. 
1998), a standard threshold was used in the model to provide a value that might be of interest 
in a political process. Calculations were done with an eight ton threshold per hectare and year, 
representing the highest category chosen for the classification of water erosion risk in 
Brandenburg by Deumlich et al. (1996). 
This procedure was chosen because thresholds provided by scientists were usually questioned 
and not directly transferred into binding laws during legislation processes. This value can be 
seen as a scenario for the outcome of a policy making process that mostly does not reflect the 
most preferred solution from one part of the involved stakeholders. 
5.4.2 Applying erosion thresholds as a eligibility criteria 
Table 13 summarizes the threshold levels and their references. All thresholds are based on 
comprehensible criteria from a scientific or political viewpoint. However, in a political 
process, sustainability is only one criterion that influences decision-making. Therefore, none 
of these thresholds can be designated as the “true” value.  
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Table 13: Overview for different threshold levels for soil erosion and references 
Tolerable soil 
erosion (TSE) < 1t/ha*a 
Soil quality index / 8 
(t/ha*a) 8t/ha*a 
Notes Soil recovery or 
regeneration not 
measurable under 
normal conditions (< 
1t/ha*a), threshold < 
1 t/ha 
Tolerable soil run-off 
in ton/ha*a derived 
from formula: 
TSE/ha*a = SQI / 8 
a probable 
compromise, not 
sustainable, but still a 
limiting threshold on 
highly erodible fields 
References (Frielinghaus et al. 
1998) 
(Schwertmann et al. 
1987), p.12) 
e.g. (Bayerische 
Landesanstalt für 
Landwirtschaft (LfL) 
2004) 
 
If these thresholds are applied to the soil categories in chapter 5.1.3, which are based on a 
standard C-factor, the resulting area above such thresholds could vary extremely. Figure 14 
shows the share of “above threshold” soil category within the “100_meme” dataset. If such 
thresholds were to be used to select eligible land for soil conservation programmes, the share 
could vary between 8 percent (8ton/ha/a threshold) to 79 percent (1 ton/ha/a) of the total area. 
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Figure 14: Percentage of possible eligible land for soil conservation programmes depending on the 
threshold levels  
If a soil conservation programme is tied to a threshold level, the choice of the selection 
method is important for the size of the area that the programme is eligible for (Table 14). 
When a threshold of 1 tons/ha/a is chosen, at least 78.8 percent of the total area would be 
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selected. If the ‘mame’ method is used for aggregating the grid cells, at least 31.2 percent of 
the area would be above the threshold level, but the area could rise up to 100 percent. 
Table 14: Area with erosion above threshold depending on grid size, aggregation method and threshold 
levels  
Grid size GIS aggregation method threshold area above threshold 
% 
FL mame variable 100.0 
FL mame <1 100.0 
FL meme <1 100.0 
500 mame <1 99.8 
500 mame variable 99.1 
100 mame <1 95.8 
500 meme <1 94.5 
FL meme variable 94.3 
500 mame 8 86.8 
100 mame variable 84.6 
100 meme <1 78.8 
500 meme variable 70.8 
100 meme variable 63.1 
FL mame 8 34.8 
100 mame 8 31.2 
100 meme 8 8.2 
500 meme 8 5.0 
FL meme 8 1.1 
Source: own calculations 
 
The aggregation method, grid size and thresholds can therefore be crucial points, when GIS 
data is used to hand out payments for soil conservation programmes. By influencing the 
political process of threshold settings and area selection, stakeholders can vary the size of 
eligible land and the amount of possible payments per hectare in case such an implementation 
instrument was chosen. 
In order to reduce the computational efforts, only one GIS-dataset for the soil erosion risk 
assessment was chosen for the bio-economic model, which was derived in chapter 5.1.3. This 
chapter showed that the analysis of GIS data and the implementation of thresholds bear 
problems that need further research, but are beyond the scope of this study.  
The thresholds described in this chapter will serve as a benchmark for the modelling results of 
soil conservation policy options in chapter 7. They were not used directly as a selection 
criteria (target values) for certain crops or cropping practices because such a criteria would be 
too restrictive in a spatially detailed model. 
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6 A bio-economic model for the analysis of policy instruments 
and on-farm measures  
6.1 Review of economic models in the context of soil conservation 
6.1.1 Different ways of analysis 
Soil conservation has been approached economically in different ways. Furtan and Hosseini 
(2003) described attempts “from quantifying the national impacts of soil loss to identifying 
the factors which influence a farmer’s soil management decisions.” 
Some studies follow a clear CBA structure, (e.g. Abelson 1979), whereas others use dynamic 
modelling approaches in order to generate opportunity costs for CBA, (e.g. Lu and Stocking 
1998). All approaches use more or less explicitly a utility function either defined as society’s 
welfare (e.g. Abelson 1979) or the individual’s profit (e.g. McConnell 1983).  
Most of the research activities were done in the inter-temporal modelling of soil erosion 
because the impacts of soil loss are an inter-temporal problem (Furtan and Hosseini 2003).  
Generally, such models employ the optimal control theory of dynamic programming. These 
models allow decision makers (e.g. farmers) to make investment decisions with a definite 
planning horizon in mind. Information regarding land tenure, land quality, etc. can also be 
included in such models (Furtan and Hosseini 2003). Programming models usually try to 
simulate an individual behaviour of profit maximization, however they also can be used to 
optimize a social decision making process (Yang et al. 2003). Such models are used as one of 
the main methods for deriving the opportunity costs of specific conservation strategies. These 
models are used to derive an economic preferable solution for resource conservation. They 
can show the interdependencies between resource use and the economic performance of an 
individual or a region in different scenarios; e.g. soil erosion and the economic performance 
of a farm. This method can show trade-offs between resource use and commodity production 
that can be used as an efficiency scale. It also can also provide economic solutions based on 
the optimization of the resource use.  
6.1.2 Available modelling approaches 
There are numerous possibilities for modelling the economic behaviour of a region or a farm. 
One of the fundamental questions is whether an econometric model (Forster 2000; Forster and 
Rausch 2002) or models that follow a programming approach should be applied (e.g. Fox et 
al. 1995; Yang et al. 2003). 
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Given the fact that this study evaluates alternative policy designs and scenarios that describe 
the use of new agricultural practices, an approach is needed that allows for an ex-ante-
analysis.  
The results and behaviour of econometric models are usually based on reactions that have 
been observed in the past. Through the use of statistical tools the possible reactions to the 
change of exogenous variables are estimated. However, for this study the available empirical 
data was too sparse to base an econometric model on. Furthermore, the effort to get 
information on the production practices of every individual farmer is too costly. In addition, 
new instruments had been introduced and different sets of eligible land for soil conservation 
programmes were chosen, which have not been evaluated before in this context.  
Programming models are more suitable for analysing the economic behaviour of farms or 
regions because of the models’ inherent assumption of profit maximization by a farmer. This 
helps in analysing the adjustments of the model to any given scenario. Programming models 
are based on observed data and allow for an ex-ante-evaluation (Paris 1991). 
Linear programming models and other non-linear programming models had been used to 
optimize the solution of manifold planning problems for more than 50 years (Paris 1991). The 
simplex-algorithm developed by Dantzig (1963) is still being successfully used in many 
applications of this type. The fundamental idea in these models is still the same even though 
there had been some changes and improvements in the underlying functions and the software 
used (Arriaza and Gomez-Limon 2003; Umstätter 1999). One of the main improvements in 
this modelling approach is the improved calibration of these models using empirical data of a 
base period (Positive Mathematical Programming: PMP) (Howitt 1995; Paris and Howitt 
1998). LP models are used both to optimize farm enterprises and to simulate policy effects in 
support of decision making on the administrative and legislative levels (Heckelei 2002). 
6.1.3 An overview of policy relevant studies 
In the following, a selection of policy relevant models is presented. Some of the models use 
an optimization approach that ensures the socially optimal distribution of either public funds 
or the optimal selection of eligible land for conservation programmes (Fox et al. 1995; Yang 
et al. 2003; Yang et al. 2005a; Yang and Weersink 2004), while other studies analyse the 
efficiency of conservation programmes on the basis of empirical data. 
The model developed by Yang et al. (2003), designed to show cost-efficient ways for land 
retirement programmes, assumes a social planner that optimizes conservation policies in a 
watershed. However, it does not focus on optimal soil erosion rates in the sense of Welfare 
Economics but on a static optimal distribution of eligible land for conservation programmes. 
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It focuses on how existing pollution rates of a water body can optimally be reduced to a 
politically set goal achievement.  
The advantage of their model is that it can consider the spatial heterogeneity of the land’s 
quality in each watershed, as well as flow paths between the land parcels, but the land use 
options are restricted due to computational limits. However, from the viewpoint of an SMS-
approach, the pollution rates are seen as a given level. The model is used to find the optimal 
spatial allocation of the conservation programme. 
In an earlier study, Lintner and Weersink (1999) developed a model that combined economic, 
environmental and spatial analysis to examine policies for reducing nitrogen and phosphorus 
runoff. In their model, the agricultural land use of a whole watershed was optimized in terms 
of the flow of sediments into a river. The special feature of the model is that the transport 
coefficients from one cell of the system to the following are endogenous, i.e. the amount of 
sediment caused by the land use of farm A is known and kept in a cell and the amount that 
flows over to the next cell, probably owned by farm B is also known. The authors pointed out 
that this spatial set up bore a positive externality produced by the farms closer to the river, for 
their fields collected sediments produced by farms up the slope that had more profitable but 
also erosive practices. “Optimizing management choices and consequently endogenizing the 
transport coefficients, for all firms simultaneously remove the externality. An empirical 
application combines hydrological simulation models with an economic optimization model 
for nutrient pollution of surface and ground water within an agricultural watershed. Although 
firms are homogeneous in abatement costs, differences in spatial location leave uniform 
instruments unable to achieve the water quality goal efficiently (Lintner and Weersink 
1999)”. It is shown, that an ambient tax/subsidy scheme (see Segerson 1988) is more efficient 
in achieving better water quality. However, “the informational requirements will be excessive 
in most situations, where the transport mechanisms for residuals are dependent upon the 
practices of independent decision making units” (Lintner and Weersink 1999), which is 
usually the case under real farming conditions. The approach is capable of simulating the 
spatial characteristics of a pollution problem, which results in conclusions on a preferable 
policy instrument. 
Dabbert et al. (1999) developed a model on the landscape level that contained among other 
indicators, a soil erosion model as well. The economic effects of different scenarios are 
simulated with a Positive Mathematical Programming approach. 
From an analytical perspective, Hediger (2003) showed how a cost-effective scheme for the 
control of Phosphorous (P) runoff caused by soil erosion from agricultural land into a lake can 
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be set up within a dynamic optimization problem. He used an inter-temporal allocation model 
with on-site measures to control soil erosion and the resulting P runoff from heterogeneous 
agricultural land, and the lake-internal measures of water quality improvement. The model 
was an example for optimal control models, since it assumed complete information for the 
relation between production and pollution, and the possibility to trace where the phosphorus 
in the lake had originated. Given the uncertainty of such processes, the model is not 
applicable for soil degradation as a threat to long-term fertility. 
An example of an efficiency survey was given by Forster (2000), who analysed all soil and 
water protection programs for an entire water catchment area in North America based on a 
cost-effectiveness ratio (costs per ton of soil saved). In another paper, Forster and Rausch 
(2002) described the efficiency of government programs aimed at encouraging Lake Erie 
basin farmers to adopt practices that reduce water pollution. The evaluation was based on the 
cost effectiveness of program expenditures (i.e., cost per metric ton of soil saved). They found 
that the majority of Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) funds appeared to have been 
spent on less cost-effective practices. 
Nakao and Sohngen (2000) evaluated riparian buffer strips by exploring the relationship 
between buffer size, drainage area size, and effectiveness. Shankar et al. (2000) showed in the 
example of preventing nitrate discharges that sometimes win-win situations can arise, where 
both the water quality and the farmers’ income increased. Krayl (1993) submitted a study 
analysing measure-instrument combinations using the example of nitrogen leaching. 
In summarizing the aforementioned approaches, it can be said that they are either based on 
optimization models with partially rough assumptions of the erosive properties of crop 
practices or crop rotations, but good possibilities for creating scenario calculations for policy 
design, or the studies use a more empirical approach in order to analyse ex post the efficiency 
of conservation programmes. The objectives of the studies are either to find the optimal size 
of conservation programmes in terms of area covered or to find the optimal strategy for soil 
erosion prevention. 
From the viewpoint of this study, an approach that can finds a cost-effective policy that does 
not rely on or try to calculate an optimal erosion rate should be found. Moreover, the 
potentials of programming models should be used to simulate the behaviour of profit 
maximizing farmers, while being confronted with optional policies that provide a safe level of 
soil use. 
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6.2 The chosen model system MODAM 
The modelling system MODAM (Multi-Objective Decision support tool for Agro ecosystem 
Management) (Zander 2003; Zander and Kächele 1999) was chosen for this study because it 
met the needs of this study best. The following chapter describes briefly the structure of the 
model and shows how the economic analysis is done with a Linear-Programming model that 
simulates the reactions of a regional farm towards different frame conditions. The data 
structure is described later in chapter 6.4. For further details regarding the model approach, 
see (Zander 2003; Kächele 1999).  
The different parts of the assessment, as well as the activities and constraints are brought 
together in this model (see Figure 15): 
• the soil conditions are classed using an adapted version of the Universal Soil Loss 
Equation (USLE), 
• the environmental evaluation for the cropping activities being based on the fuzzy-logic 
tool,  
• descriptions of plant and livestock production activities, 
• the policy framework comprising EU-payments and regulations, 
• the farm assets (e.g. land, labour, machinery), 
• and prices. 
Plant production activities Livestock activities
Farm assets
Climatic and soil conditions 
MODAM
Farm model
Prices
Policy framework
 
Source: own presentation 
Figure 15: Data types used in the MODAM farm model  
Exogenous variables in this model are the soil conditions, the descriptions of plant and 
livestock production activities, the policy framework, the farm assets and in- and output 
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prices. Endogenously calculated variables are the environmental and economic assessments of 
the cropping practices (soil erosion risk and gross margins). 
The on-farm costs of erosion preventing measures are one of the crucial points when 
governmental administrations try to develop soil conservation policies. On the one hand, 
doing field trials is time consuming and expensive, on the other hand, individual farm data 
from case studies are often biased and not representative (Vereijken 2001). The objective of 
this model is to generate with acceptable effort, on-farm costs using average or prototype data 
from farming activities.  
The modelling system MODAM is appropriate for meeting such needs. MODAM (Zander 
and Kächele 1999) comprises two parts: a bundle of large databases, describing the regional 
agricultural practices in great detail and a linear programming tool to simulate decision 
behaviour when farmers produce economically under the conditions of soil conservation 
policies. The tool can be used for evaluating agro-economic scenarios with respect to their 
regional effects. For a list of further applications of this approach see (Zander 2003). 
Furthermore, the underlying ACCESS-database system allows one to work with large, highly 
detailed datasets and generates much bigger matrices than in the case of the usual 
spreadsheet-tables. The exchange between other software such as fuzzy tools for the 
evaluation of the environmental impact is facilitated. 
In order to outline the on-farm costs and the environmental effects of soil conservation 
measures at the field level, the agricultural practices need to be described in the model in a 
very detailed way. The model itself consists of hierarchically linked modules, which are 
grouped into three main steps (Figure 16). Step 1 describes the farm or region with its 
production capacities and activities. In step 2, a partial evaluation of the economic and 
ecological effects is performed (i.e. the gross margin and ecological evaluation of agricultural 
activities). In step 3, the economic behaviour of the farmer is simulated by a linear 
programming module, which ensures that production factors are allocated according to their 
best factor utilisation. 
Step 1: 
Information on the farming activities is based both on expert knowledge and interviews. The 
production factors (e.g. labour) correspond to actual situations or are adjusted according to 
available statistical data. The descriptions of standard and adapted cropping practices are 
based on expert knowledge resulting from research at the Centre for Agricultural Landscape 
and Land Use Research (ZALF) (Meyer-Aurich et al. 1998; Zander 2003). Livestock 
practices are formulated on the basis of standard data tables (KTBL 2000).  
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Figure 16: Three level, integrated economic and environmental analysis of agricultural land use systems 
with MODAM  
These sets provide information on the on-farm demand and supply of dairy, pork, chicken and 
sheep production, which are already assembled for livestock farm types at different levels of 
productivity (Kächele 1999). (The used data for the regional model will be further described 
in chapter 6.3.) 
In the MODAM database, every measure or work step in plant and in livestock production is 
described in great detail. This provides information about any specific pesticide application, 
fertiliser usage or the time periods when a work step is done on a field. This information may 
be used for further ecological evaluation of environmental objectives, which is one of the 
main differences from other models and databases used for the assessment of agro-
environmental issues (Roedenbeck 2004).  
For several production intensity levels, either for crop or animal production, a specific set of 
input combinations is generated for each product, corresponding to different points on a 
hypothetical production function. For a list of the contained crops and cropping practices see 
Table 9 and Table 10. 
Step 2: 
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The economic assessment of the crop, forage and animal production practices takes place in a 
separate database. Costs are calculated with respect to the farm machinery, interest costs and 
price levels, as defined for the specific scenario. Economic yields from all sold outputs are 
based on the scenario-specific prices. Energy consumption and required labour per 
management operation are derived from standard data tables (KTBL 2000). The results are 
summarised in detailed tables characterizing each production technique with different cost 
categories, its yields and its gross margin. The environmental assessment of agricultural 
practices can be based on either relatively simple, statistical tools (see Meyer-Aurich 2001) or 
on more detailed fuzzy tools, but both are based on expert knowledge. For this study the fuzzy 
logic approach was chosen (see Sattler 2007 and chapter 5.2), so that it was possible to assign 
values of environmental performance (i.e. soil erosion potential) directly to cropping 
practices.  
The value of each practice for a specific environmental good is expressed by continuous 
assessment values. Here, it is expressed as a value of potential soil erosion risk in tons per 
hectare, describing the potential erosion effect of a specific cropping activity on a specific 
type of soil (see chapter 5.2), see also (Zander 2001).  
Step 3: 
The behaviour of farmers must be described so that the model can incorporate the effect of 
regulatory conditions like subsidies or regulations. This is done through a Linear 
Programming tool with the assumption that farmers’ profit maximizations are subject to 
certain restrictions. Although farmers obviously have objectives other than profit 
maximization, these are neglected for reason of simplicity. It is assumed that most of farmers’ 
decisions are based on economic rationality (Kächele 1999, p. 4). The optimization process 
simulates the farmer’s decision in the production of a set of possible crops and livestock with 
given prices, labour force and field sizes. Crop rotation effects are described by the share of 
each crop grown on one field type (more details in chapter 6.3). Although most applications 
of the model use a static version, the model can also be run as a dynamic recursive version 
(Zander 2003). 
In a general way, the model can be described as follows (Paris 1991): 
 Max TGM = j
n
j
j xc∑
=1
 
subject to  ,
1
ij
n
j
ij bxa ≤∑
=
  i = 1,..,m 
 ,0≥jx  j = 1,...,n 
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with:  
TGM =  total gross margin 
cj  =  unit gross margin of commodity j 
aij  =  amount of input i necessary for the production of one unit of commodity j 
bi =  total available quantity of input i 
xj =  quantity of commodity j produced using the technological process j 
The soil conservation effect is introduced to this equation as the “production of environmental 
goods or bads”, in the case of soil erosion the “production of soil erosion”. The production of 
each commodity j is linked to the production of the environmental commodity kj.. This 
production of k is inserted into a restriction, which can be interpreted as a minimum 
environmental threshold or standard. This standard could, for instance be defined by reference 
to a “good technical practice” or a safe minimum standard. This value can be parameterized to 
build scenarios of increasing demand for environmental goods like soil conservation. The 
activity’s value per field type can also be used as an indicator of the environmental 
performance in this specific area.  
This additional environmental constraint can be written as follows: 
subject to  ,
1
kj
n
j
kj exd ≥∑
=
   k = 1,..,o 
dkj  = amount of output k associated to the production of one unit of commodity j 
ek  =  minimum amount of environmental quality k 
This soil erosion restriction in the model can either be set for the whole region or specifically 
for each soil and erosion category. This allows one to analyse the region as one regulation 
area or to focus on targeted areas with a higher erosion risk.11 
If the model is run in a parameterized version, the results can be visualised in the form of 
trade-off functions between different environmental and economic goals. Also, abatement 
cost functions can be derived.  
                                                 
11
 With MODAM, it is generally possible to calculate scenarios both for different goal achievement levels (goal 
driven scenarios, GDS) and for different policy instruments (policy driven scenarios, PDS) (Zander 2001). A 
GDS would consist of a stepwise variation of the above mentioned environmental restrictions. A PDS can be 
attained by change of prices and subsidies, the introduction of quotas (change of input or output quotas) and 
legal interventions changing the possible production practices. In this study, one goal driven scenario is 
calculated in order to serve as a reference scenario for policy options (assuming optimal control). Furthermore, 
several policy driven scenarios are analysed, that consist of different procedures of area selection and variation 
of policy instruments. 
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In order to outline the model briefly, the main characteristics are again summarized as 
follows: 
1. The MODAM approach is based on a linear programming solver that optimizes 
the total gross margin of a farm or a region  
2. The calculated scenarios in this study are comparative-static, dynamic effects are 
neglected.  
3. The agricultural activities need to be described in high detail (i.e. each work step 
is described and includes time span, machinery used, labour time) in order to 
allow for an ecological evaluation (i.e. soil erosion risk). 
4. The model system consists of hierarchically linked databases that facilitates the 
generation of huge LP-matrices. 
6.3 A choice between programming models 
The following paragraphs will discuss other mathematical programming approaches and 
compare them to the chosen approach.  
When focussing on different mathematical programming models, the question of what 
specific type of this model family should be used arises. The scope goes from the basic linear 
programming approach (Dantzig 1963) to the recent positive mathematical programming 
(PMP) models (Howitt 1995; Röhm 2001). Furthermore, the used functions that define the 
economic activities can be linear or quadratic. Quadratic functions limit the model’s tendency 
to overspecialize. Some authors also used Cobb-Douglas functions or CES function (Constant 
elasticity of substitution), but the use of these functions is still limited (Röhm 2001) and 
therefore will not be discussed further here. 
In the search for an appropriate model approach, the PMP model type was considered a 
possible option for this study instead of the standard linear solving algorithm that is used in 
the described MODAM model system. 
Röhm (2001) and Umstätter (1999) discussed the advantages of positive mathematical 
programming in comparison to the Linear Programming approach. By using the calibrating 
procedure with additional marginal cost functions in the PMP approach, the typical 
disadvantage of the standard LP model is eliminated. Standard LP-models tend to skip 
between extreme solutions after little changes (e.g. in- or output prices) in the model 
parameters are made, which finally leads to over-specialized model results. In some cases, the 
standard LP-model is only limited by a few extremely binding restrictions. Usually, 
calibration restrictions are introduced to fit the model to a base period. By using these 
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restrictions extensively, the model is finally fixed on the base period solution. Even though it 
is not obvious, a PMP model is also fixed on a basic period, although the approach allows 
some flexibility towards other solutions. 
In the MODAM approach, over-specialization is avoided through the high number of 
activities competing for the production factors and detailed breakdown of restrictions, e.g. 
time spans, fodder restrictions. Therefore, the solution space of the analytical problem is 
much wider than that for a model with only few activities and restrictions. 
Models of the PMP type are more or less inflexible when new activities, which have not been 
used in the basic calibration period need to be introduced in the model (Röhm 2001; 
Umstätter 1999). The estimated (invisible) high costs that had impeded farmers in the basic 
solution from using these activities, finally make it very unlikely for the model to use these 
new activities. As a result, the over-flexibility of the standard LP-model with its unstable 
solutions is converted into an overly-binding PMP model that only changes among the 
activities that where used in its basic solution. 
This disadvantage is crucial for the choice of model to be constructed in this study: Many of 
the soil conserving cropping activities had hardly been used so far and, more importantly, 
relevant data on reduced tillage is not available (KASSA 2006). Usually, only data on the 
crops grown in a region are available, but it would require too much effort to find in 
percentage the crop cultivation activity for every variant (e.g. conservation tillage vs. 
conventional tillage). The result of the model would finally be biased by whether a cropping 
activity had been used or not, because the additional costs in PMP modelling of a cropping 
variant depend only upon whether a cropping activity was used or not. Furthermore, finding 
consistent empirical costs for these practices will be even more difficult. The workarounds to 
counter these effects usually bring about other disadvantages, which will not be discussed 
here (further reading: (Röhm 2001; Röhm and Dabbert 2003). 
Another disadvantage of the PMP models is the use of shadow prices for calculating the cost 
coefficients for the calibration functions, which is based on the assumption that shadow prices 
reflect the actual opportunity costs of each activity (Umstätter 1999). In a low regulated 
agricultural environment this assumption might be true, but in the case of EU regulated 
markets with subsidies and production quotas, shadow prices hardly reflect the true price or 
cost of a certain good or activity. 
Considering the above arguments, the advantages from the detailed resolution of the 
modelling system MODAM simply outweigh the concerns that come with the use of the 
solver type (PMP). Therefore, the use of MODAM for this study is seen as appropriate. In 
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comparison to other models that evaluate economic and ecological effects, the number of 
possible cropping activities in MODAM is higher. This allows the model to find solutions 
among manifold possibilities. The huge number of environmental and farming restrictions 
contained in the MODAM model creates results that are not as specialized as those produced 
when a standard LP-model with a low number of activities and restrictions is used. 
6.4 Modelling the agricultural sector of the study region 
The farms in this region were aggregated into one regional farm, using both the above 
mentioned empirical data for describing the assets of the region and calibrating the model, 
and statistical data from representative cropping and livestock activities. The following 
chapters give an overview of the type of data (modules) used to describe the region and how 
the data were transferred into LP-structure. 
MODAM consists of data bases that generate activities, restrictions, cost variables and 
transfer variables of the LP-table. If a specific group of variables is not needed (e.g. if a farm 
does not have livestock), the module can be omitted from a query list or if further restrictions 
or other parts of the model have to be changed, only parts of the whole LP-table is 
recalculated, which helps reduce time used (effort) in the model building phase. 
The modules used in this model version and some explanations for each group are shown in 
Table 15.  
6.4.1 Costs 
The cost module generates the objective function of the LP module. It provides all costs for 
the farm’s activities (be it the costs of plant or livestock production, labour or land costs) and 
the possible positive yields generated by selling activities. MODAM follows a disaggregated 
approach, i.e. the optimum solution is not based directly on the activities’ gross margins but 
on the optimization of the variable costs and the possible yields of certain cropping activities. 
This allows for example, for cereals to be sold or to be used on the farm as fodder.  
The entire model searches for the optimal solution by maximizing the total gross margin of 
the region. Prices are based on 2002 data and are adjusted where appropriate (see following 
chapters). 
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Table 15: LP modules used in the model 
Module Description 
Costs 
Objective function 
The model is optimized by minimizing the total costs, i.e. 
maximizing the total gross margin of the region 
Land data(Surface of field types) Provides area for cropping activities and pasture 
Labour supply 
Provides labour input for both cropping and livestock 
activities. For the cropping sector, the labour module is divided 
into time steps, in order to describe time requirements during 
peak seasons.  
Policy conditions for crops EU payments for crops 
Policy conditions for livestock EU payments for livestock sector, changed according to the EU-Reform 
Crop production Yields, work steps, inputs of cropping and pasture activities 
Soil erosion Soil erosion module describing the effects of cropping 
activities on specific soil categories 
Crop rotations Crop rotation limitations based on good management practice 
Cropping restrictions due to 
quotas and delivery rights 
Manually set restrictions. In the case of the model, potatoes 
and sugar beets are restricted to the empirically found value, 
since both crops are only grown when delivery rights exists  
Livestock systems incl. feeding 
Livestock system with all categories described above 
(reproduction, labour needs, buildings etc.) 
Feeding demands from livestock systems and provision of 
nutrients by cropping and pasture activities 
Manure management Module for the management of supply and uptake of manure 
Source: own presentation  
 
6.4.2 Land data 
As described before, the agricultural land of the model region was selected from GIS land use 
data (see Chapter 5.1). The arable land was grouped into three soil quality categories that are 
based on the German fertility index (dt. Ackerzahl). Each 100 x100 meter grid cell of the soil 
data base was assigned with the aforementioned soil erosion risk value. Finally, all grid cells 
were subdivided into erosion classes from Table 6. Grasslands were not included in the 
erosion assessment since only limited erosion is expected on pasture land. As a result, 18 soil 
types were grouped and 2 grassland types are available in the model. 
Table 16 shows the distribution of land within the different categories. Each subgroup 
describes a separate land supply in the regional model, so that the land use on each soil type 
can be analysed separately. 
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Table 16: Surface distribution of different site qualities and erosion classes in the model region; example 
for a 100 meter grid model (for erosion classes: see Table 6)  
Soil quality category Erosion class Surface ha ∑ ha 
25 1 10  
 2 87  
 3 444  
 4 714  
 5 112  
 6 20  
   1387 
38 1 39  
 2 163  
 3 1379  
 4 4168  
 5 1438  
 6 808  
   7995 
50 1 35  
 2 106  
 3 724  
 4 2673  
 5 871  
 6 329  
   4738 
Grasslands Low quality - 500  
Grasslands High quality  - 1850  
∑   2350 
Total  16470  
Source: Sattler 2007 
 
6.4.3 Labour supply 
Labour supply is introduced in the model as an unrestricted resource, which can be hired on 
an hourly basis. Given the high unemployment rate in the region especially among former 
farm workers, it can be assumed that skilled farm hand labour force is easily available. Some 
farms in the region hire part of their employees only during the work intensive periods of the 
year and release them during winter months. Labour costs are based on the average hourly 
wage for skilled workers in 2002 (€7.41/h) (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2006). 
6.4.4 Policy conditions 
The model was developed based on the Agenda 2000 policy conditions (European 
Commission 2006; Uthes 2005) (see Table 17), with area payments for specific crops, animal 
specific subsidies, milk quota, set aside obligations etc. Since the policy change that finally 
took place in the beginning of 2005, the old policy framework is no longer valid. However, 
the calibration of the model could only be done using data from before the policy change. The 
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recent reform of the Common Agricultural policy (CAP) (BMVEL - Bundesministerium für 
Verbraucherschutz 2005; European Council 2006c) was adapted by using the Agenda 2000 
region model data with a different policy framework. The policy framework describes the 
2003-CAP reform, which contains decoupled standard area payments. This model uses a 
regional average payment per hectare, which is planned to be realised in 2013. Since the new 
CAP-reform payments are handed out on a regional level and are no longer coupled to a 
specific crop production, all former production based payments were deleted from the model 
(Agenda 2000). Except for a slightly higher premium for protein crops, farmers have no more 
incentives to orientate their production on the different levels of subsidies. Furthermore, the 
individually calculated payments based on former livestock production cannot be simulated 
on a regional level. However, this is not necessary, since the payments too are not related to 
production.  
The level of the subsidy used in the model corresponds to the envisaged standard area 
payment in Brandenburg for arable and pasture land. 
The only condition for receiving one payment unit through the CAP reform is to work on one 
hectare of agricultural land that had been enrolled in an EU-database. Therefore, these 
payments can be seen as money transfers to land users or in the long term, transfers to land 
owners, since most land owners will try to gain back most of the rent that can be generated by 
their land. Given the decreasing supply of agricultural land due to other land uses, the position 
of land owners is likely to put them into a position to gain an increasing share of this rent. 
However, given the static approach of this model, the payments are still included separately. 
The model cannot reflect this process of rent transfers between land users and land owners. In 
the long run this could lead to a decrease in profits for land users but it is assumed to have no 
distorting effect on this study, since the relative preferability is constant for the different 
production practices. 
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Table 17: Subsidy levels in Agenda 2000 and the CAP-reform of July 2003 
 Agenda 2000 
Subsidies and Regulations 
for Brandenburg 
CAP 2013 
decoupled payments and estimates 
for the amount of individual 
payment per ha in region 
Area payments  
Grandes cultures (cereals) 285 €/ha  290 €/ha 
Protein crops  328 €/ha  290 €/ha + 55,57 €/ha (coupled 
share of payment) 
Oil seeds 343 €/ha  290 €/ha 
Pasture (starting with 98 €/ha in 2005)  -  290 €/ha 
Set aside 285 €/ha  290 €/ha (with a slightly higher payment for additional set aside) 
Set aside regulations 
Minimum size per application/farm 0,3 ha 0,3 ha 
Minimum size per plot to be set aside 0,3 ha  0,1 ha and >10m wide 
Obligatory set aside per farm 
minimum 
maximum  
 
10 % 
33 % 
 
8,73 % 
not limited 
Livestock payments and regulations 
Special male premium (cattle)  210 €/head (bulls)/ 150 €/head (ox) 
Suckler cows incl. Heifers premium 200 €/head 
Extensive livestock husbandry  100 €/head 
Slaughter premium for adult bovine animals 80 €/head 
Calf slaughter premium  50 €/head 
Additional payments cattle slaughter 
premium 23 €/head 
Milk premium  8,15 €/t 
Additional milk premium  3,66 €/t 
All livestock related payments 
including milk premiums are no 
longer paid based on production 
levels. Instead, payments from a 
reference period (2001-2003) are 
used to calculate individual 
payment titles on a per hectare 
basis that can only be activated 
when one hectare of agricultural 
land is used. 
These payments will decrease by 
2013, when the pasture land 
payment is fully implemented. For 
this model, a complete decoupled, 
equal payment is assumed. 
Source: own presentation; adapted from Uthes 2005 
 
6.4.5 Crop production 
The database in MODAM contains cropping activities for all crops grown in the region. 
IACS12 data for the years 2000 and 2001 were available for the federal state of Brandenburg 
(Matzdorf et al. 2003), aggregated project data), which show the crop shares grown in the 
region on precise field levels. For this study it could be referred to data that had been 
aggregated on the municipality level. The crop shares were similar for both years. The table 
below shows the numbers for the study region in 2001 (see Table 18). In order to validate and 
                                                 
12
 Integrated Administration and Control System. IACS is used as EU-wide for the administration of EU area 
based payments. 
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calibrate the regional model, the study region crop shares were compared to the crops 
produced in the status quo model result (see chapter 7.4). 
Table 18: Crop shares on arable land of study region in 2001 based on aggregated project data 
Crop Share in percent 
Winter wheat  32.59 
Winter rye  6.08 
Winter barley  10.61 
Oats  1.06 
Corn silage  6.58 
Rape seed  15.69 
Potatoes  0.01 
Triticale  11.02 
Peas  0.45 
Lupines  0.04 
Set aside without non-food crops  4.45 
Set aside with non-food crops  4.37 
Sugar beets  3.97 
Other crops 3.08 
Total: 100 
Source: Matzdorf et al. 2003  
 
A multitude of cropping practices (see Table 9 and Table 10 p.70) is described for all crops in 
the database containing the information on work steps and the machinery needed (see Figure 
17). This allows for both a detailed economic analysis and a well founded soil erosion risk 
assessment. 
Machinery
• Technical equipment 
and used machinery
• based on KTBL data 
(normative data on 
agricultural technology)
What are the inputs and outputs?
• Number of input or output of 
production
• Application of active agent (e.g. kg 
N, ml of pesticide)
• Real amount of input being 
transported to the field(e.g. metric 
tons of fertilizer)
• Labour
Worksteps 
• Number of work step practice
• Work steps including assigned 
machinery
• Frequency of a work step during a 
year (e.g. fertilizing)
Timing
•Year when the work 
step is down
•Year of harvest/cash 
return
•Time span: When is a 
workstep done during a 
year? 
Detailed 
description of 
cropping practices
 
Source: own presentation  
Figure 17: Description of cropping practices in the MODAM database 
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The standard practice is based on tillage with plough, no intercrops or under-sown crops, no 
organic fertilizer application (manure) and not harvesting by-products such as straw. Yields 
are based on soil quality and precipitation with precipitation being equal for the whole region 
(see the following equation).  
 
Crop yield = f (crop, soil quality, cropping practice, preceding crop, precipitation) 
 
Each cropping activity is defined for the three soil quality groups in the study region to reflect 
the increasing yields that depend on the soil quality. Table 19 gives an example for winter 
wheat with three assigned yield classes. For more information see Zander (2003). 
Table 19: Crop yields for winter wheat depending on soil productivity class 
Crop Soil productivity (AZ) dt/ha 
Winter wheat, standard practice, plough 25 32.3 
 38 57.0 
 50 71.9 
Source: Zander 2003 
 
For the grassland activities, both an intensive and extensive variation are implemented. The 
model describes activities for hay, silage, grazing and forage based on two site-specific yield 
expectations (Kächele 1999). 
For the Linear Programming matrix, a cropping activity is described with its costs, yield, 
labour and area requirements, EU area payments, rotation restrictions, manure uptakes and 
soil erosion properties. Table 20 gives an example of the transfer variables for one cropping 
activity (winter barley, plough, soil fertility class 38, organic fertiliser used). 
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Table 20: Example: Variables for the activity “winter barley” in the LP-matrix 
Category Unit Value 
Labour needs (March-May) Hours per hectare and year 0.12 
Labour needs (May-July)  Hours per hectare and year 0.12 
Labour needs (July-August)  Hours per hectare and year 1.19 
Labour needs (August-September)  Hours per hectare and year 2.63 
Labour needs (September-October) Hours per hectare and year 0.95 
Labour needs (October-November) Hours per hectare and year 0.53 
Phyto-sanitary restrictions Membership term indicating that crop 
belongs to a specific rotation group 
1 
Uptake organic manure: Nitrogen kg 100 
Uptake organic manure: Phosphate kg 50 
Uptake organic manure: Potassium kg 137.5 
Yield grains dt/ha 40.57 
Yield straw dt/ha 10.69 
Area demand for one unit of activity ha -1 
Area payment demand factor -1 
Area payment restriction (oil seeds) Percentage of land with crops eligible for 
payments 
-0.08 
Set aside maximum Percentage of land with crops eligible for 
payments 
0.33 
Set aside minimum Percentage of land with crops eligible for 
payments 
0.10 
Potential soil erosion Tons/ha/year 0.22 
Activity key: CFWGE1102aCF38_5 Source: own presentation 
 
6.4.6 Soil erosion  
The site specific soil erosion parameters from chapter 5.2 were introduced into the LP model 
in an activity for soil erosion, which allows one to read the total amount of erosion in the 
region from the calculated value of this variable (see Figure 18). Each cropping activity in a 
specific soil category delivers its soil erosion value into the erosion restriction row which is 
fixed to zero. A transfer variable of the value 1 writes the sum of erosion created by the 
cropping practices into the erosion activity column. As a result, each cropping practice that 
contributes to the total gross margin of the model (active in the LP-model), is counted with its 
erosion value in the erosion activity column. This module was also extended to a site specific 
level: since the erosion coefficients were available for each soil category, it was possible to 
split the erosion activity into soil categories. For each soil category a specific soil erosion 
amount is generated. A maximum limit on the erosion activity variable allows for the 
calculation of scenarios with exogenously reduced levels of soil erosion. 
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   Erosion activity Cropping activities 
    wheat rye sugar beets 
Unit   tons ha ha ha 
Activity   13 5 3 2 
Erosion restriction 0 = 1 -0.9 -0.3 -3.8 
   Transfer variable Erosion coefficients 
Source: own presentation 
Figure 18: Example layout of the LP-erosion module 
6.4.7 Crop rotations 
MODAM contains phyto-sanitary crop rotation restrictions for all crops that are based on 
Good Technical Practice and expert knowledge (Zander 2003). For each main group of crops 
(e.g. cereals, oilseeds) a maximum share is given. Within the main groups, single crops have 
more specified values. Table 21 shows the values for the main groups and crops used in the 
study region.  
Table 21: Crop rotation restrictions based on Good Technical Practice  
 Max. share in rotation in % 
Crop Main group 
value Crop value 
Cereals, general 0.75  
Wheat  0.25 
Rye  1.00 
Barley  0.50 
Oats  0.25 
Triticale  0.33 
Oilseeds 0.50  
Rapeseed, mustard  0.25 
Sunflowers  0.20 
Linseed, flax  0.20 
Root crops 0.50  
Potatoes  0.25 
Beets  0.20 
Corn  0.50 
Legumes (large grain) 0.25  
Peas  0.20 
Beans, lupines  0.25 
Soy beans  0.25 
Fodder legumes (general) 0.50  
Alfalfa  0.33 
Source: Zander 2003 
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6.4.8 Quotas 
Since quotas for sugar beets are not known, an overall production quota is assumed for the 
region based on the average yield on soil group 50 multiplied by the area used in 2002 for 
growing sugar beets, resulting in a quota of 23320 tons for the study region. This procedure 
ensures that not more sugar beets are grown than in 2002. For the scenarios under CAP 
conditions, quotas are no longer distinguished between A- and price reduced B-quotas, 
therefore prices for sugar beets are at the level of B-quota.  
A further restriction was introduced for potatoes which are usually not grown without 
contracts with processing companies. Therefore, the share for potatoes is also limited to the 
area found in 2002 (16.47 ha).  
In the milk sector a quota was introduced that covers the current yearly milk production of the 
milking cow numbers. 
6.4.9 Livestock systems 
The livestock sector in MODAM is described by complete husbandry systems that comprise a 
detailed description of stable type, milking systems, feeding needs, yields and labour 
requirements (for a detailed description, see Kächele 1999). Figure 19 gives an overview of 
the different data types that describe a livestock system. The costs in the different livestock 
systems that are used in the LP module are derived from this data. Furthermore, a cost optimal 
feeding plan is calculated in the LP based on the nutrition needs of each animal group in a 
livestock system and the available feeding crops.  
Fodder is supplied through the different pasture and cropping practices. The relevant nutrients 
that are used for the ration calculation are protein, energy and a minimum share of fibre. A 
further restriction limits the total amount of fodder that can be consumed per day (dry matter). 
Nutrient demands per animal are taken from standard feeding tables (DLG 1997, KTBL 
1998). A feeding ration is optimized in the LP based on the yields of crops and pasture grown 
in the region.  
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Replacement system:
Number of calves
heiffers
bulls
Herd size:
Actual number of animals
Technical size of stables
Animal housing system
Feeding system 
Manure system
Milking system
Yield class:
breed
yield
Grazing periods
Feeding needs:
Energy
Protein
Roughage
Max. uptake
Livestock
Labour
 
Source: own presentation 
Figure 19: Data describing a livestock system in MODAM 
Table 22 shows an example for the transfer coefficients of one milking cow in the LP-table 
(e.g. nutrition demand of a dairy cow, labour, products). 
Table 22: LP-coefficients for a dairy cow in the LP-model  
Description unit value per 
year 
per day 
labour time needed hours per year / min per day 33.95 5.58 
protein needed g 747999.95 2049.31 
crude fibre kg 1144.00 3.13 
dry matter kg 5720.00 15.67 
energy (specific for lactating cows) MJ NEL 34335.98 94.07 
manure kg 6883.74 18.86 
stock replacement (0,25 per year) kg 130.00  
milk production kg 7000.00  
milk quota needed kg 7000.00  
offspring male (0,5 calf/year) kg 21.83  
offspring female (0,5 calf/year) kg 21.83  
carcass kg 137.50  
stable need # 1.00  
Source: KTBL 1998 
 
The livestock number is assumed to have an upper limit in terms of total animals kept but 
there is no minimum level of livestock production. This is done to simulate the short or 
medium term reactions of farms that might produce less at lower prices but are not able to 
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produce more at higher prices because of restricting stable capacities (investment activities 
are not taken into account). The numbers are shown for each livestock type in the following 
tables. 
For the description of the region’s livestock capacities, statistical data describing the livestock 
numbers in the Uckermark administrative district was used (Landesamt für Verbraucherschutz 
und Landwirtschaft Brandenburg 2003a), see Table 23.  
Table 23: Livestock numbers for the district of the model region  
Livestock per 100 ha agricultural area as of May 1999  
Administrative 
district 
Horses Cattle Pigs Fowl 
  total thereof 
milking 
cows 
total thereof 
sows 
Sheep 
total thereof 
laying hens 
1/2 year 
and older 
Geese Ducks 
Uckermark 0.6 36.1 11.8 42.0 5.4 9.5 4.2 4.0 0.1 125.1 
Source: Landesamt für Verbraucherschutz und Landwirtschaft Brandenburg 2003a 
 
The animal counts per 100 ha of this survey were used to describe the livestock sector of the 
model by multiplying these stocking rates with the model region’s agricultural area (16470 ha 
agricultural land). This procedure was chosen since the share of agricultural land for the 
district is similar to the study region’s share (see Table 1) with the assumption that stocking 
rate is evenly distributed over the district. 
In order to simplify the model, horses, sheep and poultry were not included in the model. A 
feeding pig system was used to simulate total swine production and manure quantities. Cattle 
production was divided into a milking cow and a bull fattening part. The livestock systems 
used for the model are shown in the tables below. 
The dairy sector of the regional model was separated into different age steps (see Table 24). 
Male calves were assumed to be sold after 4 months. Part of the female calves are used for the 
replacement of older cows, the other part may be sold as well. The number of animals for the 
region was adjusted to the empirical value of milking cows (Table 23) using an integer 
number of model stables (see below) that was added to the model. 
The average amount of milk produced per cow was adjusted to 7000 litres/cow/year to 
correspond to the average of the administrative district (Landesamt für Verbraucherschutz und 
Landwirtschaft Brandenburg 2003b). 
Each model dairy farm consisted of 200 cows including the reproduction needed. In order to 
reach the region’s livestock number ten dairy farms were assumed.  
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Table 24: Animal groups in a dairy cow system of the model region 
Animal Number of 
animals per 
stable 
Resulting 
animals per 
100ha 
Total number 
of stables 
Total number 
of animals 
Calf female < 4 months 32 1.0 10 320 
Calf male < 4 months 32 1.9 10 320 
Calf female < 0.5 years  16 1.9 10 160 
Heifer; 0.5 to 1 year 48 2.9 10 480 
Heifer; 1 year to 18 months  48 2.9 10 480 
Heifer; 19 to 27 months. 73 4.4 10 730 
Dairy cow 200 12.1 10 2000 
Source: own calculations     
 
The bull fattening system (see Table 25) was represented by units of stables that produce 50 
bulls per year. The system was also separated into four different age steps. 15 stables of this 
type were needed to meet the region’s livestock number for cattle other than dairy cows. 
Table 25: Animal groups in the bull fattening system of the model region; own calculations 
Animal Number of 
animals per 
stable 
Animals per 
100 ha 
Total number 
of stables 
Total number 
of animals 
Calf male < 0.5 year 11 1,0 15 165 
Bull 0.5 to 1 year 32 2,9 15 480 
Bull 1 to 1.5 years 32 2,9 15 480 
Bull 1.5 to 2 years 26 2,4 15 390 
Source: own calculations     
 
Pork production in the model region was represented by units of 500 pigs per farm (see Table 
26), with piglets bought outside of the region. Nutrition demands were based on energy, 
digestible protein and lysine. These data were also taken from standard nutrition tables (DLG 
1991; DLG 1993). An upper limit for total uptake per animal was introduced as a restriction.  
Table 26: Hog production system in the model region; own calculations 
Animal Number of 
animals/stable 
Animals 
number/100 ha 
Total 
number of 
stables 
Total number 
of animals 
Hogs (Feeding pigs) 500 42.5 14 7000 
Source: own calculations     
 
6.4.9.1 Costs for stables and labour input 
The costs of investments in buildings for livestock were taken from the KTBL data (KTBL 
2000). These costs were then divided by the number of animals kept per building. In the LP-
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matrix it is possible to exchange places for animals of the same livestock system (i.e. within 
cattle or pigs). This allows for changes in the number of animals if it is economically more 
preferable to increase numbers in one age class and reduce in another. 
The labour needs of the livestock system for feeding, manure management and milking were 
also taken from the KTBL data (KTBL 2000). All data were adjusted to the livestock system 
size. 
6.4.9.2 Manure management 
All livestock in the model are mainly based both on liquid manure and dung systems. 
Livestock systems deliver nutrients into a manure equation, while manure based cropping 
activities take nutrients from it. The main plant nutrition elements nitrogen, phosphorus and 
potassium were introduced in a manure restriction module, with nitrogen as a fixed restriction 
that balances the production of nitrogen by animals and the possible uptake by crops. 
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7 Results of the economic and ecological evaluation of soil 
conservation policies 
7.1 Finding relevant options for policy analysis 
A clear framework is important for the selection of appropriate policy options, for the 
possibilities of combinations are too complex for all options to be calculated. Following such 
a framework for scenario design reduces the number of options to be calculated and makes it 
possible to focus on options that follow more or less common sense considerations. 
It is important at this point to think again of the main goal of this study. It is not the aim of 
this study to find the optimal level of pollution (amount of soil eroded) i.e. an optimal solution 
for a social decision problem is not what is searched for here. However, the model can be 
used as a guideline on how the optimal management of soil conservation should be, when soil 
conservation is an exogenous restriction in the linear programming model. Therefore, in order 
to provide the optimal low-cost solution for a comparison, a stepwise optimization scenario 
(“social planner”-scenario) that generates results under optimal control conditions is added 
i.e. it is assumed that the maximum amount of soil erosion could be limited to a certain safe 
minimum standard directly through the decisions of the land users for the whole region. 
As a main result, estimations for the costs of different soil conservation scenarios and the 
effectiveness of certain options should be available for decision makers. The aim is to find the 
total farm and budget costs of different approaches in soil conservation, mainly on the basis of 
the level of incentives that should be given (or not be given at all) and the measures that are 
supported. The efficiency criterion for the analysis of policy options is, as derived in chapter 
4.5.2, a cost-effectiveness ratio, i.e. the costs of an option as a loss or gain in the gross-margin 
of the regional farm in the sample area. Within this approach, both budgetary and on-farm 
effects were analysed. 
In the following, the specific options are outlined. The main variables that influence the set of 
options are:  
• on-farm measures, 
• policy instruments, 
• targeting policies on the eligible area and 
• transaction costs. 
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The main question is how soil erosion can be avoided or reduced in an economically efficient 
way with the help of on-farm measures such as reduced tillage systems or other soil 
conservation measures (see Chapter 4.7.3).  
Policy instruments to enforce these measures are e.g. incentives or legal regulations. The 
reasons for focussing on these two options are outlined in Chapter 4.7.2. One of the most 
relevant variables on the instrument level, given their importance in the EU legislation are 
either incentives or legal restrictions for specific activities (Huylenbroeck and Whitby 1999). 
Subsidies for reduced tillage practices are offered in the model for all crops on all soil types. 
This option is often applied in the European Union agri-environmental programmes, so it 
reflects a common strategy for limiting soil erosion processes (Hartmann et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, the variable share of the eligible land area for certain specific programmes (see 
Figure 14), is an issue that allows for more targeted soil conservation programmes compared 
to non-targeted conservation programmes, which are widely used in Germany today. The 
scenarios should comprise a comparison of a non-targeted scheme and a targeted scheme with 
focus on highly erosive field types, so that both methods may be analysed. 
Therefore, on the policy level the analysed options are: 
1. an incentive option, 
2. a regulation option, 
3. a targeted option. 
For a comparison of different policy options, a similar level of erosion risk reduction is 
needed. In order to attain an obvious reaction of the model, different levels of reduction were 
tested under different policy conditions (see also Chapter 7.2). As a result of this process, a 
range of reduction of between 30 to 40 percent of the actual situation should be achieved for 
all policy options. This is assumed to be the safe minimum standard that society has agreed 
on and serves as a goal for policy comparison. A reduction range was chosen because the 
outcome of policies cannot be targeted to one specific number without changing the 
behaviour of the model. In the second step, the threshold suggestions from chapter 5.4.1 were 
used to benchmark the specific soil erosion risks of each crop that was found in each model 
solution. Thresholds (in terms of tons per hectare) for specific practices were applied in the 
regulation option that would ban high erosive crops from highly erodible field types.  
The following definitions should clarify this: 
Safe minimum standard = general goal to be achieved through different policy options 
Threshold      = benchmark for the result of a specific policy option  
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For the incentive options, an appropriate amount for the subsidy has to be calculated, while 
for the regulation options the choice of crops and eligible areas is the most important. The 
approach will be further described in the relevant chapters. 
The degree to which targeting policies for the eligible area influences the efficiency of such 
a policy is the third issue. Chapter 5.4 describes options of how to define eligible areas and 
discusses the affect of different threshold on the size of an area that is eligible for soil 
conservation programmes.  
From the soil category options, one approach was selected as the underlying soil database 
(Chapter 5.1.3.3, p.67). The soil data used was based on a 100 meter grid using the average 
for labelling and calculating the aggregated grid cell (100_meme).  
Finally, on a separate level the influence of transaction costs is discussed (see Chapter 8).  
Most of the analysis is based on a with-without comparison, where a status quo scenario 
without specific soil conservation measures is compared to scenarios containing a variation of 
some variables.  
7.2 Brief description of the analysed policy options 
First, a status quo solution (AG2000) based on the policy conditions of Agenda 2000 was 
calculated to generate a starting point solution of the model, as a way to check the model’s 
plausibility against the original data. Based on these results a new scenario (CAP2013) was 
designed that contained the main policy changes that were introduced in the 2003 CAP-
Reform (see p. 93). For this scenario, the conditions of the year 2013 were applied in order to 
avoid the implementation of the transitionally paid farm specific payments. A short outline of 
all scenarios is given in Table 27. 
Then, a scenario that approaches the issue from a social planner viewpoint with complete 
information on soil erosion rates for all cropping practices was analysed. This “social planner 
scenario” allows one to limit the maximum amount of soil erosion in a stepwise manner to a 
certain threshold for the whole region (“social plannner”-scenario). This procedure provides 
information about the least cost solution for a soil conservation policy, including the 
generation of shadow prices of certain levels of soil erosion abatement. This “external 
knowledge” approach provides the “optimal” abatement price of each erosion level, which 
can serve as a benchmark for second best policies. 
The other three policy options are based on the assumption of differing property rights with 
regards to the right to cause soil degradation through soil erosion.  
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Table 27: Description and abbreviations used for the analysed scenarios 
Key Scenario type Remarks 
AG2000 Status quo Basic scenario for validation of model against empirical 
data; Policy framework based on Agenda 2000 settings 
CAP2013 Basic scenario Basic scenario without specific soil conservation policies 
based on terms for the year 2013 
Social planner Optimization Erosion level is lowered stepwise - knowledge of total 
information on erosion rates of cropping practices 
assumed (social planner view) 
Inc Incentives 
untargeted 
Incentives are given out to farmers for soil conserving 
practices 
Inctar Incentives 
targeted 
Incentives are given out only on highly erodible field 
types (category 4, 5, 6) 
Crop restrict Crop restrictions 
targeted 
Crops with a high erosion rate are restricted on highly 
erodible field types (category 5, 6) 
 
Assuming that the right to degrade soil to a certain extent belongs to the land user, then an 
incentive option (“inc”-scenario) would be the more realistic option. In this scenario, an 
incentive is given for specific soil conserving cropping activities (i.e. reduced tillage); an 
instrument that is already being used in some federal states in Germany (Hartmann et al. 
2006). In the terms of a Pigouvian approach, these incentives support practices with fewer 
externalities. The level of the incentive is also important for the adoption of a voluntary 
measure. It has to be high enough for a sufficient area to be enrolled in such an incentive 
scheme. In terms of efficiency (budget) it should be low enough to not result in too many 
windfall gains among the participants. 
Then, the effects of a targeted incentive scheme were analysed (“inctar”-scenario) with the 
assumption that discrimination among land users was accepted. For this policy option, the 
incentives described above were targeted only towards field types with a high erosion risk 
instead of all field types. This option is considered more efficient since it concentrates 
incentives on erosive sites and reduces the risk of windfall gains on less erodible field types.  
The level of both incentive options is calculated on the basis of a sensitivity analysis. 
The last option is based on a similar set of property rights, but with the limitation that 
damages on soils through soil degradation can be prohibited by society, i.e. society claims the 
rights on the long-term fertility of soils and can therefore assign a specific use of the resource. 
This option is described by a restriction on crops (“crop restrict”-scenario) with a high erosion 
rate (higher than 2.5 t/ha/year, see Figure 12 p.72), which are banned from highly erodible 
field types. Row crops such as sunflowers, corn, potatoes and sugar beets are not allowed to 
be grown on these field types, regardless of the tillage technique used. This is based on the 
observation that such crops still have high erosion values even when a soil conservation 
practice is used (see Figure 13, p.73). This option could be combined with a compensation 
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payment, but in this example only the command-and-control aspect of the policy was 
analysed.  
7.3 Indicators 
Table 28 gives an overview of the indicators that were analysed in the scenario calculations. 
The standard indicators for each analysed scenario are the total gross margin of the model 
region, the crop shares, changes in cropping practices, spatial changes where crops are grown, 
total erosion within the region, the ratio of changes in gross margin (i.e. costs of erosion 
control) and total erosion of the region as a cost-effectiveness indicator.  
The average site specific erosion values and the individual crop erosion risk values show 
through the thresholds from chapter 5.4.1 whether the cropping practices used on such field 
types are still maintaining the long-term sustainability of soil use. By using the erosion risk 
values, one can check whether the crops do or do not exceed the weakest suggested threshold 
of 8 tons/ha/year of soil erosion risk. Each policy option is evaluated for whether it achieves 
this criteria. 
Table 28: Analysed indicators in each scenario  
Indicator Remarks 
Erosion level  Total amount of erosion within the region (sum of estimated erosion 
rates of all grown crops) 
Erosion reduction Reduction as compared to the CAP-scenario 
Site specific erosion rates Erosion rates per crop and site 
Gross margin incl. Subsidies 
(GM) 
Total gross margin of the model region as the aggregated result of all 
activities (max of objective function) 
Area under conservation scheme Area receiving payments or under regulation 
Budget costs (BC) Payments to farmers for soil conservation programmes 
Net Gross Margin (GM-BC) Total gross margin of the model region minus budget costs 
On-farm costs (Net GM change) Net changes in gross margin after policy change without payments 
Total costs (BC+GM Change) The social costs of a policy as the sum of budget costs and on-farm 
costs 
Total cost-effectiveness (reduced 
erosion) 
Ratio of changes in gross margin (i.e. costs of erosion control) and 
total erosion of the region 
Cost effectiveness based on 
budget costs 
Effectiveness related only to the budget costs 
Cost effectiveness based on-
farm costs 
Effectiveness related only to the farm costs 
Crop shares Total crop shares for the whole region 
Changes in cropping practices Even if crop shares do not change, changes are still possible in the 
way crops are cultivated (plough, no tillage, reduced tillage) 
Spatial changes where crops are 
grown 
In order to meet soil erosion reduction goals, the model can place 
activities on less erodible areas 
 
Chapter 7 – Results of the economic and ecological evaluation of soil conservation policies 
108 
Furthermore, the shadow price of the erosion restriction, generated in a parameterized erosion 
level scenario, can be used to calculate the regional farm’s marginal abatement costs at each 
specific level of erosion.  
Budgetary and on-farm costs are differentiated in order to show the costs that arise from a 
policy option. Therefore, in scenarios that implement incentive payments for soil conserving 
practices, these payments are subtracted from the region’s total results for the calculation of 
the net gross margin. The difference between the status quo gross margin and the net gross 
margin after policy adoption describes the on-farm costs of a policy. 
The sum of the budget costs and the on-farm costs of a policy makes up the total costs of a 
conservation policy. The budget costs are borne by society, while the on-farm costs are 
opportunity costs borne by the farmers that are to be compensated by the subsidy payments. 
Without the subsidy payments farmers would produce on a higher level of productivity. 
For each scenario, the results concerning this framework will be given.  
7.4 Status quo scenario: Agenda 2000 
In the following, the modelling results based on the Agenda 2000 policy conditions are 
described und discussed. The crop shares of the model results of the region should match the 
data available for the region. However, differences can partly arise from the fact that the 
model does not take into account factors such as risk reduction through the planting of a wider 
variety of crops. Other deviations of the model from real data can be explained by unknown 
costs asserted to production (Howitt 1995) or differences in on-farm transaction costs that 
make farmers choose other options. 
The comparison of the actual and modelled crop shares of the region shows certain 
differences (see Table 29). The shares of cereals differed both when compared as individual 
crops and as a group. More rapeseed was grown in the actual situation while set aside was 
used to a much higher extent in the model than in reality. The first explanation for the 
difference is the divergence of the model region from the source region, for the real data is 
based on a much bigger administrative district. Even though the model region was selected as 
a smaller sample of the total area of the district, some deviation can occur in terms of soil 
quality and other natural site conditions. This has effects on the preferability of some crops 
for certain parts of the region.  
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Table 29: Modelled and actual (2001) crop shares in percent on arable land  
  
Actual values of the 
district (Uckermark) 
Modelled values in  
test region 
Crop group Crops Share by 
crops (%) 
Grouped 
(%) 
Share by 
crops (%) 
Grouped 
(%) 
 Winter wheat  32.59  22.55  
 Winter rye  6.08  19.44  
 Winter barley  10.61  3.09  
 Triticale  11.02  6.32  
 Oats  1.06    
Total cereals   61.36  51.41 
Corn Corn silage  6.58 6.58 3.67 3.67 
Rape seed incl. non food crops Rape seed  15.69  7.97  
 
Set aside with non-
food crops  4.37    
   20.06  7.97 
Peas, lupines Peas  0.45    
 Lupines  0.04    
Legumes   0.49   
Sugar beets Sugar beets  3.97 3.97 3.98 3.98 
Potatoes/others Potatoes  0.01 
 
0.12 0.11 
 Others 3.08 3.09   
Set aside  4.45 4.45 32.86 32.86 
Total   100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Matzdorf et al. 2003, based on aggregated project data and own calculations 
 
Another reason for the difference is the economic characteristic of LP-models that has led to 
the extended use of the set aside option; most of the poorer soils in the modelled result are not 
used as cropland. In reality, other non-economic reasons are preventing farmers from using 
this option at the optimal level even though it would economically be the better alternative. 
Since the LP model chooses generally for the set aside activity, the estimated overall erosion 
will be rather low. When less erosive crops such as cereals, rape seed and set aside are 
grouped together, both sides of the table show more or less the same share (> 80 % of arable 
crops). For potatoes and sugar beets, restrictions were introduced in the model with the 
assumption that restrictions are in the actual situation determined by quotas and contracts with 
processing factories. 
Given these results, the starting point in terms of expected erosion amounts had to be analysed 
to ensure that the initial erosion rates in the modelled scenario are plausible. Therefore, the 
erosion rates of real and modelled crop shares were compared. 
Table 30 shows the comparison of the expected average soil erosion risk per hectare of the 
highest soil erosion category (6) based on average crop shares found in the real and modelled 
data sets. This is a very rough approximation since the spatial location of the real crops is not 
known. However, for illustration needs this calculation is sufficient. The shares of the crop 
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types were assigned with the soil erosion rate for a standard cropping practice. The resulting 
values for the average soil erosion risk show the erosion reducing effect of the set-aside 
option in the modelled result (1.23 t/ha/a as compared to 1.68 t/ha/a in the real crop 
distribution). The lower share of cereals, corn and rape seed in the modelled scenario caused 
less overall erosion in this soil category compared to the actual data. Note that this calculation 
is only a rough approximation of the underlying effects. 
Both average soil erosion rates were above the strictest threshold of 1 t/ha/a. The soil erosion 
rates for corn exceeded a 4 t/ha/a threshold partially, which would be too high on a “25” soil 
quality type if the flexible threshold, which depends on soil quality is used. 
Table 30: Average erosion risk based on actual and modelled data on highly erodible field type “6” 
Crop types  
Actual 
share 
% 
Modelled 
share 
% 
Soil erosion 
rate t/ha/a 
Rate*actual 
share 
Rate*modelled 
share 
Total cereals*  61.36 51.41 1.55 1) 95.11 79.69 
Corn  6.58 3.67 4.25 27.97 15.60 
Rape seed   20.06 7.97 1.35 27.08 10.76 
Legumes   0.49 0.00 0.69 0.34 0.00 
Sugar beets   3.97 3.98 3.60 14.29 14.33 
Potatoes   0.01 0.11 2.60 0.03 0.29 
Others  3.08  1.00 2) 3.08 0.00 
set aside  4.45 32.86 0.07 0.31 2.30 
Average soil erosion t/ha/a  1.68 1.23 
    
1)Winter wheat  
2) assumed average 
Source: own calculations 
 
Overall, the results of the model are satisfactory and sufficient as a starting point for further 
scenarios despite some disparity between model and reality. 
The basic economic and soil erosion results of the Agenda 2000 scenario including the yields 
from livestock activities is €386 per hectare (total area of region) with a total erosion amount 
of 2680 tons and an average soil erosion rate of 0.18 tons/ha/a (see also Table 31). 
Conventional and reduced tillage were equally distributed in this scenario.  
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Table 31: Indicator values for the Agenda 2000 scenario 
Average gross margin (Euro/ha) 386 
Total erosion in region (t) 2,680 
Average amount of soil erosion within the region (t/ha) 0.18 
Conventional tillage (ha) 7,008 
Reduced tillage (ha) 7,112 
No undersown crops (ha) 9,423 
Undersown crops (ha) 4,640 
Intercrops (ha) 56 
Source: own calculations  
 
Note that these numbers are based on the overall region that includes pasture with very low 
soil erosion and therefore do only reflect the rates fairly for highly erodible field types. 
However, the comparison of this value to other scenarios serves as a benchmark for other soil 
conservation options.  
Furthermore, the region has generally low average erosion levels but shows high values in 
some spots. This characteristic is illustrated in Table 32: When areas with the highest erosion 
risk and the highest quality (50_6) were analysed, an average soil erosion risk of 1.18 
tons/ha/a would be found if all crops had the same share on this field type (1.23 t/ha/a for the 
modelled crop shares). Nevertheless, sugar beets showed a maximum value of 15.08 tons/ha/a 
in some spots of the erosion risk assessment, which is above any of the suggested thresholds 
in Chapter 5.4.1. The maximum values were taken from the original database where values 
were calculated for each single aggregated grid cell (see chapter 5.2). Less erodible areas 
level out hot spots even in the highest erosion class. Therefore, the maximum values found in 
this class should be given some considerations. 
Table 32: Average and maximum soil erosion risks for crops on soil category 50_6 in the Agenda 2000 
scenario (highest erosion risk, best soil quality) 
Crop 
Average soil 
erosion rate of 
crop (t/ha/a) 
Maximum soil 
erosion found in 
original database 
(t/ha/a) 
Tillage type 
Rapeseed 0.72 3.47 Reduced 
Winter rye 0.68 3.29 Conventional 
Winter wheat 0.89 4.25 Reduced 
Sugar beets 3.61 15.08 Conventional 
Average 1.18   
Source: own calculations 
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7.5 Basic scenario CAP2013 (CAP reform with decoupled payments) 
The basis scenario serves as a reference scenario for the soil conservation policy options. In 
terms of property rights for soils, soil degradation is only restricted to good technical practice. 
Therefore, all common agricultural practices can be used by farmers. The scenario can also 
show, what influence a policy change from the Agenda 2000 conditions to decoupled 
payments under the CAP reform can have. Table 33 shows the total gross margin of the basic 
CAP2013 scenario is 445 €/ha, the total erosion amount is (4107 t) and the average amount of 
soil erosion within the region is 0.29 t/ha/a.  
Table 33: Indicator values for CAP2013 scenario 
Average gross margin (Euro/ha) 445 
Total erosion in region (t) 4,107 
Average amount of soil erosion within the region (t/ha) 0.29 
Conventional tillage (ha) 10,757 
Reduced tillage (ha) 3,362 
Undersown crops (ha) 5,384 
Intercrops (ha) 0 
Source: own calculations  
 
On high erodible soils (50_6) an average of 1.6 t/ha/a was estimated by the model (see Table 
34), with sugar beets at 3.61 t/ha/a and sunflowers at 2.75 t/ha/a for average soil erosion risk 
rates. Both sugar beets (15.08 t/ha/a) and sunflowers (11.67 t/ha/a) showed high maximum 
erosion risk rates on specific grid cells in the region. 
Table 34: Average and maximum soil erosion risks for crops on soil category with highest erosion risk 
and best soil quality in the CAP2013 scenario 
Crop Average soil erosion rate 
of crop (t/ha/a) 
Maximum soil erosion 
found (t/ha/a) Tillage type 
Winter barley 0.57 2.81 Conventional 
Rapeseed 0.72 3.47 Reduced 
Winter wheat 1.48 7.73 Conventional 
Sunflowers 2.75 11.67 Conventional 
Sugar beets 3.61 15.08 Conventional 
Weighted average 1.60   
Source: own calculations 
 
The comparison of the Agenda 2000 scenario and the decoupled CAP2013 scenario showed a 
higher average gross margin for the CAP2013 scenario (see also Figure 20). The reason for 
the greater gross margin lies in the higher direct payments for pasture land, which 
overcompensate the loss of the direct livestock payments. Furthermore, even the formerly 
unused pasture land can now be used under the minimal care option (mulching). In the 
Chapter 7 – Results of the economic and ecological evaluation of soil conservation policies 
113 
Agenda 2000 scenario some pasture land was not used due to the low profitability of this land 
type within the modelled region.  
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Figure 20: Gross margin (€/ha) and total erosion (tons) in model region - comparison of the Agenda 2000 
and the CAP2013 scenario with decoupled payments  
The increase in total erosion in the region of almost 55 percent can be explained by the higher 
share of row crops in the CAP2013 scenario (see Table 35). Note that this table includes the 
share of pasture land, which was not included in Table 29; the crop shares are therefore 
slightly different. The share of set-aside was even increased under the conditions of the 
CAP2013 scenario. Oilseeds such as rapeseed and sunflowers also had increased shares. 
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Table 35: Comparison of crop shares between Agenda 2000 and CAP2013 in percent of total area  
Scenario 
Crop 
AG 2000 
% 
CAP2013 
% 
Corn silage 3.1 1.9 
Hay 2 cuts 0.3 0.3 
Non used pasture 4.7 - 
Potatoes 0.1 0.1 
Set aside 28.2 32.7 
Set aside pasture - 4.0 
Silage 2 cuts 9.2 9.9 
Sugar beets 3.4 3.1 
Sunflowers - 20.1 
Triticale 5.4 - 
Winter barley 2.7 1.6 
Rapeseed 6.8 18.6 
Winter rye 16.7 0.6 
Winter wheat 19.3 7.2 
sum 100 100 
Source: own calculations 
 
Figure 21 demonstrates that sunflowers, potatoes, corn silage and sugar beets sum up to more 
than 25 percent of the total crops of the region, with sunflowers contributing the most to this 
change. 
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Figure 21: Share of high erosion crops (sunflowers, potatoes, corn silage and sugar beets) in the Agenda 
2000 and the CAP2013 reform scenario  
Furthermore, the share of reduced tillage practices was decreased in the CAP2013 scenario 
compared to Agenda 2000 from 10754 to 3362 hectares because the higher profit crops were 
less suited for reduced tillage (e.g. sunflowers).  
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Livestock production was also affected by the policy change (see Table 36). While the 
number of milking cows was reduced, more heifers were produced in the CAP2013 scenario. 
Bull fattening was no longer profitable without the per head subsidies of the Agenda 2000 
support scheme. Pork production was reduced to 15,767 units in comparison to more than 
20,000 (Agenda 2000). 
Table 36: Livestock production in Agenda 2000 and CAP2013 scenario 
Animal type Agenda 2000 CAP2013 
Milking cows 1,995 1,974 
Heifers 1,537 2,190 
Bulls, 1 to 1.5 years 914  
Fattening bulls, 1.5 to 2 years 914  
Hogs 20,223 15,946 
Source: own calculations   
 
As a result, the comparison of the Agenda 2000 and the decoupled CAP2013 reform scenario 
in the model region showed that an increase in soil erosion is possible. Given the risk 
assessment results for the other crops, even reduced tillage options for sunflowers would be 
unlikely to reduce the erosion risk to the levels found for rapeseed or cereals(see Figure 13, 
p.73).  
The erosion rates for high erodible soil types are partly over a 1 ton/ha/a threshold but higher 
rates can be expected for specific spots (see Table 34, p.112). 
7.6 Social planner scenario 
7.6.1 Scenario description and trade-off curve 
For this scenario, it is assumed that a social planner equipped with full information (and with 
no transaction costs involved) could change the level of erosion through optimal control 
techniques. The erosion rate is then a variable within the model that is directly influenced by 
the choice of crops and cropping practices assuming that complete information regarding the 
relations between cropping practices and the erosion output is known. Therefore, the model 
will most likely find the most cost-efficient solution for reducing the soil erosion risk. 
This scenario is achieved through a stepwise limitation of the model’s erosion restriction in 
parameterized runs. The total amount of erosion in the region was reduced within 20 steps to 
a level where the sum of estimated erosion caused by the cropping practices in the region was 
zero. The LP-model is programmed to find economically optimal solutions that meet the 
targeted lower erosion level for the region. As a result of this, a trade-off curve can be drawn 
showing the relationship between the economic performance of the region and the related soil 
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erosion rates. Figure 22 shows that for a wide erosion range the reduction of the gross margin 
is very limited and only decreases at drastically lowered erosion levels. The underlying 
adjustments within the model that caused the shape of this trade-off curve will be analysed in 
the following. 
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Figure 22: Trade-off curve between total erosion levels and total gross margin in region based on a 
parameterized model run with increasing limitation on the erosion level  
The corresponding share of reduced tillage decreased paradoxically with increasing erosion 
reduction levels (Figure 23); one of the reasons for the huge decrease of reduced tillage is that 
set-aside in this model was established using plough tillage for phyto-sanitary reasons. 
However, set-aside has one of the lowest erosion risk potentials and was therefore used 
mainly to achieve the lower erosion values.  
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Figure 23: Share of reduced tillage with increasing levels of soil conservation in the model region (social 
planner scenario) 
Set aside increased continuously throughout the scenario runs from 30 to almost 70 percent at 
the lowest erosion level (Figure 24).  
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Figure 24: Share of set aside with increasing levels of soil conservation in the model region (social planner 
scenario) 
In the basic scenario, only the soils with the lowest fertility were used for set-aside, as it 
would be the most profitable land use for this soil type. However, with higher levels of 
erosion control, set-aside became a measure for meeting this goal (even on better soils). 
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Table 37 gives a complete overview of the crops shares grown in the selected scenarios of 
erosion prevention. Rapeseed, sugar beets and sunflowers shares decrease, while winter rye 
share increases when the erosion risk is to be reduced. However, set aside is the only way for 
the model to achieve the highest levels of soil conservation. Generally, the erosion reduction 
effect of a crop with a naturally lower erosion rate is usually stronger than the effect of a high 
erosive crop cultivated with a soil conservation measure (see also Figure 13, p. 73). 
Therefore, the erosion reduction effect of crop selection overweighs the effects of most 
conservation practices. 
Table 37: Crop shares within the study region for selected levels of erosion in the social planner scenario 
  Total amount of erosion (tons) 
Crop  200 1000 2000 2600 3000 4000 
Set aside  % 69 52 44 39 36 33 
Grassland silage  % 14 11 10 10 10 10 
Winter rye  % 7 6 5 2 1 1 
Rapeseed  % 1 18 19 19 19 19 
Corn silage  % 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Mulching Grassland  % 0 3 4 4 4 4 
Potatoes   % 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Winter wheat  % 0 4 4 7 7 7 
Hay 2 cuts  % 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sunflowers   % 0 1 7 12 17 20 
Winter barley  % 0 1 2 2 2 2 
Sugar beets  % 0 2 3 3 3 3 
Not used  % 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: own calculations  
      
 
Figure 25 shows the shift of erosive crops from the most to the least erodible soil types when 
a higher soil conservation level is set through the erosion restriction. In the basic solution 
(4000 tons, on the left side of the x-axis) both soil types carry the same share of high erosive 
crops, such as sunflowers, potatoes, corn silage and sugar beets. When the restriction on soil 
erosion forces the model to adopt a slightly higher soil conservation level, high erosive crops 
from other soil categories shifted to the less erodible soil type, while the most erodible soil 
type kept its share of high erosive crops (2600 tons). At 2400 tons, the share of high erosive 
crops on the most erodible soil type had to be reduced in order to meet the even higher 
conservation level. Starting at 2000 tons, high erosive crops were not grown anymore on 
highly erodible soil types, while the less erodible soil type still kept a high share of 87 
percent, a limit which was set by phyto-sanitary restrictions. At 600 tons, this share was 
reduced down to 62 percent, while at an erosion level of 200 tons only 50 percent of high 
erosive crops comprised mostly of corn silage were grown on the low erosive field type 
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within the region. This example describes the general shift of high erosive crops to less 
erodible soil types during the parameterization runs. 
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Figure 25: Share of high erosive crops on high and low erosion risk field types on selected levels of erosion 
in the social planner scenario 
In general, the behaviour of the model when faced with an exogenous reduction of erosion 
levels can be summarized as followed: 
1. places high erosive crops in less erodible soil categories 
2. replaces high erosive crops with less erosive ones 
3. sets aside highly erosive field types 
Reduced tillage plays only a minor role, when erosion has to be limited for the model region 
(see Figure 23, p.117). A certain share is generally adopted because of economic advantages 
(less labour needed).  
The low impact on the economic situation of the model region towards even higher limitation 
of the overall erosion is mainly related to the flexibility of the model to shift crops between 
field types within the region. The re-organisation of crops at zero costs is only possible in a 
model. In reality this would cause coordination problems among different farms. Furthermore, 
given the general low soil qualities of this region, the gross margin for set aside is actually 
close to crops like winter wheat, so the exchange of crops on medium quality soil types does 
not cause drastic changes in the total gross margin. 
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7.6.2 Calculation of a shadow price for soil erosion 
In LP-models, the calculated shadow price per unit of a scarce resource is the price a producer 
would pay for this resource if he had the option to buy more of this input. Figure 26 shows 
how the shadow price rises with higher levels of erosion reduction, which corresponds to the 
trade-off curve in the chapter before.  
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Figure 26: Marginal costs per ton of reduced erosion in the region; based on the shadow price per ton of 
reduced total erosion at each step of total erosion restriction 
The reason for the non-linear increase of the shadow price is that highly erosive crops are 
only placed on less erodible field types, since this option is available at almost zero costs, 
abstracting from the fact that coordination efforts for the shifting of crops would occur in 
reality. If the region has to meet higher levels of erosion reduction, more expensive soil 
conservation measures would have to be applied. More profitable crops would only be banned 
from the region if erosion has to be absolutely avoided. Deriving an abatement cost function 
of soil erosion would be the basis for an economically driven choice of the optimal erosion 
level based on the theory of environmental economics. However, the direct adjustment of 
erosion rates is just not possible in real life. Therefore, in this example the shadow price 
serves only as a benchmark for other policy options, where the more efficient solution lays.  
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7.6.3 Results of the benchmark scenario 
The results of the scenario run with an erosion level of 2600 tons in the region will be used 
for comparison with the policy scenarios. This level represents the range of 30 to 40 percent 
of the actual situation, which is stated as the goal of erosion reduction. 
Table 38 shows the indicators of this scenario in comparison to the results of the basic 
scenario. The comparison of gross margins shows that only a small change in the gross 
margin is needed to reach a much lower level of soil erosion risk. Reduced tillage and 
undersown crops increase slightly but the shifting of erosive crops to less erodible soils has a 
considerable effect (see Figure 25 p.119). Table 37 (p.118) illustrates the crop shares for the 
2600t level in comparison to the 4000t scenario. Main changes are in the increase of set aside 
and winter rye, and the reduction of sunflowers to achieve a lower erosion level. 
Table 38: Indicator values of the social planner scenario (2600 tons erosion level) compared to the basic 
scenario (CAP2013) 
Indicator Social 
planner 
CAP2013 
Average gross margin (Euro/ha) 444 445 
Total erosion in region (t) 2,600 4,107 
Average amount of soil erosion within the region (t/ha) 0.18 0.29 
Conventional tillage (ha) 10,655 10,757 
Reduced tillage (ha) 3,465 3,362 
Undersown crops (ha) 6,450 5,384 
Intercrops (ha) 0 0 
Source: own calculations   
7.7 Policy scenario results 
In the following chapters, the basic results of the policy scenarios described before 
(comprised of an untargeted incentive scheme, a targeted scheme on more erodible soil types 
and a targeted scheme on the restriction of high erosive crop types) are described. After a 
brief description of each scenario result, a comparison of the scenarios is done, since most 
information is gained through the analysis of the changes that come with them. As mentioned 
before, all policy options were designed to improve the soil erosion situation found in the 
basic CAP2013-Reform scenario by at least 30 percent, which represents the assumed safe 
minimum standard. 
7.7.1 Untargeted Incentive Scheme 
7.7.1.1 Scenario description 
In this scenario, a subsidy for the reduced tillage practice is offered in the model for all crops 
on all soil types. This option is often applied in the European Union agri-environmental 
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programmes, so it reflects a common strategy for limiting soil erosion processes (Hartmann et 
al. 2006). The level of the payment is derived through a sensitivity analysis of the level of the 
incentive payment, so that the amount of payment which reduces erosion to the targeted 
amount of at least 30 percent may be found (see Chapter 7.1 and Chapter 7.7.1.1). The 
resulting effects of this payment level are then described based on the aforementioned 
scenario indicators. 
For each new step in the sensitivity analysis, a value slightly higher than the upper limit of the 
reduced tillage incentive payment is used as the new value for the next run. This procedure is 
repeated until at least a 30 percent reduction of the total soil erosion in the region is achieved. 
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Source: own calculations 
Figure 27: Effect of the payment level for reduced tillage on the area under the conservation scheme and 
the total erosion in the region; each payment level corresponds to the upper limit of the 
sensitivity analysis of the preceding calculation step 
Figure 27 shows that the reduced tillage payments do not influence the amount of erosion 
until the payment reaches a level over 60 €/ha. This amount more than doubles the area 
covered by the scheme from 3570 to 9224 ha. However, the corresponding amount of erosion 
only drops to the targeted amount when a payment level of 68 €/ha is chosen. 
The result shows that a certain share of reduced tillage practices is already being used in the 
basic CAP2013-solution. Payments for the further expansion of this practice only force the 
model to adopt the reduced tillage practice for crops that do not improve the overall situation 
of soil conservation. Only payments over 68 €/ha cause the switch of another share of crops to 
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reduced tillage. Therefore, this scenario describes how reduced tillage payments would affect 
a region, where reduced tillage is already a partly adopted cropping technique. 
7.7.1.2 Basic results  
As a result of the incentive option with the payment of 68 €/ha for reduced tillage practices, 
almost 12000 ha of the region got included under the reduced tillage practice and would 
therefore be enrolled in this conservation programme. The area covers 85 percent of the arable 
land in the region. In the basic result (CAP), only 3362 ha were cultivated with reduced tillage 
practices.  
Table 39: Share of reduced tillage in the untargeted incentive scenario (68 €/ha for reduced tillage) 
compared to the CAP2013-scenario 
Tillage type CAP2013 Incentive 
untargeted 
Reduced tillage (ha) 3,362 11,597 
Source: own calculations   
 
The total erosion in the region was reduced by almost 1600 tons. The gross margin rose to 
€7.6 M because of the high amount of subsidies received (€788,574). When the budget costs 
(payments received in the region) were subtracted from the total gross margin, a net gross 
margin of €6.8 M remained. This is about €0.5 M less than in the basic solution with standard 
CAP conditions (CAP2013). This difference is defined as the on-farm costs, since these costs 
describe the opportunity costs of the agricultural changes in the region due to the adoption of 
the policy. 
 The sum of on-farm costs and budget costs describes the total costs of a policy from society’s 
viewpoint. These total costs are used with the erosion reduction in the region in the cost 
effectiveness ratio. As a result, €805 per one ton of avoided soil erosion were spent in this 
scenario. 
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Table 40: Indicator values of the untargeted incentive scenario (68 €/ha for reduced tillage) compared to 
the CAP2013-scenario 
Scenario  CAP2013 Untargeted Incentives 
Erosion level t 4,107 2,510 
Erosion reduction t 0 1,597 
Gross margin (incl. Subsidies) (GM) € 7,330,440 7,621,731 
Area under conservation scheme ha 0 11,597 
Budget costs (BC) € 0 7,88,574 
Net Gross margin (GM-BC) € 7,330,440 6,833,157 
On-farm costs (Net GM change) € 0 497,283 
Total costs (BC+GM Change) € 0 1,285,857 
Total cost-effectiveness (€/t reduced erosion) €/t 0 805 
Source: own calculations    
 
Table 41 gives an overview of the changes in crops grown in the model region. Major 
changes were seen in the reduction of sunflowers, since the reduced tillage option for this 
crop is not possible both in reality and in the database. This crop was therefore replaced by 
other reduced tillage crops. Set aside had even more increase to the level of almost 44 percent. 
Small changes also occurred in the production of cereals, where winter barley increased 
slightly, while winter rye and winter wheat held more or less the same share. Rapeseed and 
sugar beet shares also increased slightly in the region. 
Table 41: Changes of crop shares in the untargeted incentive scenario (68 €/ha for reduced tillage) 
compared to the CAP2013 scenario 
Crop  CAP2013 Untargeted Incentives  
Set aside grassland % 4.01 4.72 
Hay, 2 cuts % 0.34 0.34 
Sunflowers % 20.09 7.19 
Potatoes % 0.10 0.10 
Corn, silage % 1.85 2.35 
Silage, 2 cuts % 9.92 9.21 
Rotational set-aside % 32.69 43.89 
Winter barley % 1.63 2.08 
Rapeseed % 18.56 19.33 
Winter rye % 0.55 0.36 
Winter wheat % 7.19 7.19 
Sugar beets % 3.06 3.24 
Source: own calculations 
 
The comparison of crop share changes on highly erosive field types induced by policy options 
will be shown in an overall discussion along with the other policy options (see Chapter 7.8). 
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7.7.2 Targeted Incentive Scheme 
7.7.2.1 Scenario description 
This scenario shows the effect of a soil conservation programme that uses targeted incentives 
for the adoption of soil conservation measures in areas with an elevated erosion risk. In this 
scenario, the same subsidy (68 €/ha) as in the untargeted scheme was only available on field 
types of the groups 4, 5 and 6 (higher erosion classes), making more than 11,000 ha of the 
region eligible for the subsidy payment. A test run with only soil groups 5 and 6 was also 
done, but the eligible area combined with the potential of the conservation measure was not 
large enough to reach a comparable erosion reduction of 30 percent. Like before, the measure 
to be performed for this scheme comprises all crops grown with a reduced tillage system. 
7.7.2.2 Basic results 
The total erosion potential in the region was reduced by more than 38 percent compared to the 
CAP2013 scenario, while the total gross margin increased up to €7.57 M. In this scenario 
9421 ha of the possible 11,000 ha were under the conservation scheme. The budget costs 
added up to €640,639. The net gross margin (Total gross margin minus budget costs) was also 
lower than in the CAP2013 scenario. This led to on-farm costs of €401,409. Due to the on-
farm costs, the total costs of the targeted scheme were €1.04 M, which led to the cost-
effectiveness of €557 per ton of reduced erosion. 
Table 42: Indicator values for the targeted incentive scenario (68 €/ha for reduced tillage) compared to 
the CAP2013-scenario 
Scenario  CAP2013 Targeted Incentives  
Erosion level t 4,107 2,531 
Erosion reduction t 0 1,576 
Gross margin (incl. Subsidies) (GM) 
€ 7,330,440 7,569,671 
Area under conservation scheme ha 0 9,421 
Budget costs (BC) 
€ 0 640,639 
Net Gross margin (GM-BC) 
€ 7,330,440 6,929,032 
On-farm costs (Net GM change) 
€ 0 401,409 
Total costs (BC+GM Change) 
€ 0 1,042,048 
Total cost-effectiveness (€/t reduced erosion) 
€/t - 661 
Source: own calculations    
 
The crop shares in the targeted incentive scenario developed as follows (Table 43). 
Sunflowers were reduced by more than 50 percent, while the share of set aside increased. 
Other crops showed only little changes towards this policy option.  
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Table 43: Crop shares in the targeted incentive scenario (68 €/ha for reduced tillage) compared to the 
CAP2013-scenario 
Crop  CAP2013 Targeted Incentives  
Set aside grassland % 4.01 4.72 
Hay, 2 cuts % 0.34 0.34 
Sunflowers % 20.09 9.73 
Potatoes % 0.10 0.10 
Corn, silage % 1.85 2.35 
Silage, 2 cuts % 9.92 9.21 
Rotational set-aside % 32.69 41.66 
Winter barley % 1.63 1.92 
Rapeseed % 18.56 19.19 
Winter rye % 0.55 0.39 
Winter wheat % 7.19 7.19 
Sugar beets % 3.06 3.21 
Source: own calculations    
 
The underlying shifts of the cropping practices will be discussed in the overall comparison of 
the policy options.  
7.7.3 Targeted crop restrictions  
7.7.3.1 Scenario description 
This scenario analyses the effects of restriction on highly erosive crops on targeted high 
erodible sites. It follows the assumption that most reduced tillage practices do not reduce the 
risk of erosion as well as change in crop selection (see Figure 13). Therefore, this scenario 
should prove whether it is more preferable to restrict the choice of certain crops by law as 
opposed to voluntary approaches such as subsidies on reduced tillage. 
In the scenario, row crops such as corn, sunflowers, potatoes and sugar beets were not 
allowed on the field types 5 and 6, which cover 3,578 ha of the region. The limitation on these 
field types was proven to be sufficient in meeting the goal of a minimum 30 percent reduction 
in soil erosion risk. No other policy restrictions were implemented. 
7.7.3.2 Basic results 
Table 44 shows the results of the row crop restriction scenario. With the application of this 
policy option the reduction of 1,505 tons was achieved as compared to 4,107 tons in the 
CAP2013-scenario within the region. The total gross margin of the region was reduced by 
€14,340. Budget costs in terms of payments to farmers did not occur in this scenario and 
administration costs were not accounted for in this analysis. However, assuming the 
compensation for the on-farm costs had to be decided in a political process, the amount of 
compensation does not affect the resulting land use, since the restriction of crops is a 
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mandatory regulation. Therefore, the amount of compensation would be part of a negotiation 
process during the implementation process. 
 The on-farm costs are therefore equal to the reduction of total gross margin (€14,340). The 
cost-effectiveness in terms of reduced soil erosion is then 10 €/ton. 
Table 44: Indicator values for the row crop restriction scenario with restricted cultivation of row crops 
on highly erodible field types compared to the CAP2013-scenario  
Scenario  CAP2013 Row crop 
restrictions 
Erosion level t 4,107 2,602 
Erosion reduction t 0 1,505 
Gross margin (incl. Subsidies) (GM) € 7,330,440 7,316,100 
Area under conservation scheme ha 0 - 
Budget costs (BC) € 0 - 
Net Gross margin (GM-BC) € 7,330,440 7,316,100 
On-farm costs (Net GM change) € 0 14,340 
Total costs (BC+GM Change) € 0 14,340 
Total cost-effectiveness (€/t reduced erosion) €/t - 10 
Source: own calculations    
 
Compared to the CAP2013-scenario, only sunflowers were reduced in a noticeable way (from 
20 % to 15 %) (see Table 45).  
Table 45: Crop shares for the row crop restriction scenario (restricted cultivation of row crops on highly 
erodible field types) compared to the CAP2013-scenario 
Crop CAP2013 Row crop 
restriction 
Set aside grassland 3.91 % 3.91 % 
Hay 0.34 % 0.34 % 
Silage 10.02 % 10.02 % 
Sugar beets 3.06 % 3.06 % 
Sunflowers 20.09 % 15.44 % 
Potatoes 0.10 % 0.10 % 
Corn silage 1.87 % 1.87 % 
Winter barley 1.58 % 1.96 % 
Winter rye 0.58 % 2.02 % 
Winter wheat 7.19 % 7.19 % 
Rapeseed 18.56 % 17.98 % 
Set aside 32.69 % 36.10 % 
Source: own calculations   
 
Other crops such as winter barley, winter rye and set aside took over the share of the reduced 
sunflower area. For all other crops, almost similar results were achieved in this scenario, since 
only a smaller share of the agricultural area was affected by the crop restriction. This allows 
for the spatial compensation of the restriction effects through the switching of crops between 
field types. 
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The share of reduced tillage decreased slightly in this scenario to 3,281 ha compared to the 
CAP2013-scenario. 
7.8 Discussion of the modelling results 
7.8.1 Overall comparison of scenarios 
This chapter compares the results of the analysed policy scenarios using the indicators that 
were derived in the chapters before. This comparison serves as the basis for the discussion of 
the results and as a starting point for the application of a new institutional economics analysis 
in the following chapters. 
Table 46: Overview of indicator values of the different policy scenarios (CAP2013, Untargeted 
Incentives, Targeted Incentives, Row crop restrictions, Social planner) 
  CAP2013 Untargeted 
Incentives  
Targeted 
Incentives 
Row crop 
restrictions 
Social 
planner 
Erosion level t 4,107 2,510 2,531 2,602 2,600 
Erosion reduction t 0 1,597 1,576 1,505 1,507 
Gross margin (incl. Subsidies) (GM) € 7,330,440 7,621,731 7,569,671 7,316,100 7,319,301 
Average GM/ha total area € 445 415 421 444 444 
Area under conservation scheme ha 0 11,597 9,421 0 0 
Budget costs (BC) € 0 788,574 640,639 0 0 
Net Gross margin(GM-BC) € 7,330,440 6,833,157 6,929,032 7,316,100 7,319,301 
On-farm costs (Net GM change) € 0 497,283 401,409 14,340 11,139 
Total costs (BC+GM Change) € 0 1,285,857 1,042,048 1,4340 11,139 
Total cost-effectiveness (reduced erosion) €/t 0 805 661 10 7 
Cost effectiveness based on budget costs €/t 0 494 407 0 0 
Cost effectiveness based on-farm costs €/t 0 311 255 10 7 
Source: own calculations       
 
The results for the selected policy scenarios show that all three options achieved a similar 
reduction in soil erosion compared to the CAP2013 scenario, which was the target range for 
soil erosion reduction. Both incentive options lowered the erosion level of the region with 
only little advantages for the targeted version, while the targeted row crop restriction showed 
slightly higher but comparable results (see Figure 28 and Table 46). Note that the erosion 
level was not fixed in the model but was aimed at with several tests through the adjustment of 
the incentive level or the size of the area that is affected by the row crop restriction. 
Therefore, the levels varied slightly between 1,500 and 1,600 t in the region. 
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Source: own calculations 
Figure 28: Total soil erosion in the model region under different policy options 
Due to the incentives for reduced tillage practice in the “Incentive” scenarios, both scenarios 
of this kind showed unsurprisingly high increases in the share of reduced tillage for the region 
(see Table 47). The row crop restriction scenario achieved the erosion reduction only through 
the shift of erosive crops to less erodible field types, while the share of reduced tillage 
practices was even lower than in the CAP2013-scenario. The social planner scenario 
increased the reduced tillage slightly compared to CAP. 
Table 47: Share of reduced tillage in the different scenarios 
 CAP2013 Untargeted incentives 
Targeted 
incentives 
Row crop 
restrictions 
Social planner 
Reduced Tillage (ha)  3,362 11,597 9,421 3,281 3,465 
Source: own calculations 
 
Table 48 gives a summary of the crop shares grown in the different policy options. While the 
share of grassland was constant with only slight changes in its usage, the share of row crops, 
sun flowers in particular varied strongly. In the CAP2013 solution sunflowers reached a share 
of 20 percent but decreased to almost seven percent in the untargeted incentive scenario. Set 
aside increased in all conservation scenarios with a maximum share of more than 43 % in the 
untargeted incentive scheme. Other crops showed only small shifts in their shares. 
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Table 48: Overview of crop shares under different policy options 
 
 CAP2013 Untargeted incentives 
Targeted 
incentives 
Row crop 
restrictions 
Social planner 
Set aside grassland % 4.01 4.72 4.72 3.91 3.91 
Hay, 2 cuts % 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Sunflowers % 20.09 7.19 9.73 15.44 12.22 
Potatoes % 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Corn, silage % 1.85 2.35 2.35 1.87 1.87 
Silage, 2 cuts % 9.92 9.21 9.21 10.02 10.02 
Rotational set-aside % 32.69 43.89 41.66 36.10 39.17 
Winter barley % 1.63 2.08 1.92 1.96 1.72 
Rapeseed % 18.56 19.33 19.19 17.98 19.19 
Winter rye % 0.55 0.36 0.39 2.02 1.56 
Winter wheat % 7.19 7.19 7.19 7.19 6.69 
Sugar beets % 3.06 3.24 3.21 3.06 3.21 
Source: own calculations 
 
To analyse the costs of the three policy options (see Table 46), a distinction was made 
between the on-farm costs that stem from losses on the farm due to changes away from an 
optimal solution (opportunity costs) without any policy intervention and the budgetary costs 
of a policy which comprise only the expenses of incentives paid to the farmers for reasons of 
simplicity. As described before, compensation payments might be possible in a legal 
restriction scenario but such compensations are not crucial for the outcome of the policy 
option (see Chapter 7.7.3.1). 
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Figure 29: Costs of different policy options 
Figure 29 illustrates the highest costs for an untargeted incentive option both for the on-farm 
costs as well as the budget costs (see also Table 46). The higher on-farm costs for the 
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untargeted compared to the targeted option can be explained by the bigger leeway the targeted 
option has in the use of highly profitable crops for reducing on-farm costs. Since payment is 
available on all field types in the untargeted option, there is no need to consider whether a 
ploughing tillage system is more profitable. However, from a regional farmer’s viewpoint, the 
policy with the highest total gross margin, which is the untargeted incentive scheme, is 
preferable. For the row crop restriction option, no direct budget costs arise under the given 
assumptions, so that only on-farm costs are realised through a change of production practices. 
This holds true as well for the social planner scenario, which caused almost similar on-farm 
costs as the row crop restriction scenario. 
The cost-effectiveness of the different policy options can be based either on the total costs 
(the sum of on-farm costs and budget costs) or separately on the possible budget costs and on-
farm costs for each option in relation to the physical output (erosion reduction) the policy 
option provides. Both alternatives (either as total costs or itemized costs) are either biased 
towards the incentive or the restriction option. However, the comparison of both cost types 
also provides valuable insights, for it shows where the costs occur. For now, both options 
serve as appropriate indicators for the effectiveness of a policy. 
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Figure 30: Cost-effectiveness of different policy options based on total costs 
Using the total cost-effectiveness ratio for each policy, it is shown in Figure 30 that a targeted 
row crop restriction scenario is more efficient than both incentive options. It is remarkable 
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how close the row crop restriction came to the cost-effectiveness of the social planner 
scenario that optimised land use while taking the total erosion risk into account. 
Figure 31 shows the partial cost-effectiveness related to budget and on-farm cost. When only 
the budget costs were considered, the row crop restriction showed through definition “no” 
costs, while the targeted incentive scenario was proven the second best option. When the on-
farm costs were compared, the row crop restriction option showed again the lowest distortion 
effects in terms of adaptation costs to a policy.  
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Figure 31: Partial cost-effectiveness of policy options based on budget costs and on-farm costs  
7.8.2 Analysis of erosion levels on high erodible soil types 
The applied bio-economic model provided detailed information on the crops grown on 
specific soil types. In the following paragraph the crop rotations selected by the model are 
described for the soil category with the highest soil quality type and the highest erosion risk 
(50_6) for the four analysed policy options and the social planner scenario.  
Figure 32 shows the erosion risk values of the crop rotation of this category broken down to 
individual crops. The crop shares are a result of the optimization. The figure shows both the 
average value (columns) and the minimum and maximum value of each crop that was found 
in the soil erosion risk assessment database for the model region. Due to the different slope 
types in the soil categories, some grid cells showed erosion risk of up to 15 tons/ha/year.  
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Figure 32: Erosion risk of crops on high erodible field types for different scenarios shown as average 
(columns) and minimum and maximum values as found on single grid cells  
For all policy options except for the row crop restriction, crops with a high erosion risk 
potential were also found on highly erodible soil types. High soil quality prevents the 
adoption of the reduced tillage options, which have in fact less variable costs but are less 
adopted for reasons of manure management within the model region13. Even though sugar 
beets were cultivated with the reduced tillage option, the average erosion risk was still at 2.0 
t/ha with a maximum of 9.8 t/ha. This example shows that all the scenarios have a comparable 
erosion reduction over the region, but the extremes vary. High values of erosion risk can be 
found even in the social planner scenario for these soils. The reduction of soil erosion risk is 
achieved at this level of erosion prevention on less fertile soil categories. 
A final analysis was done on the spatial positioning of crop types. Table 49 shows the crop 
shares on the highest soil erosion risk soil type with high soil quality under soil conservation 
policies in comparison to the CAP scenario (see also Figure 32). Sunflowers kept the same 
share, except for in the restriction scenario, where row crops are not allowed on this field 
                                                 
13
 Both sugar beets and corn silage are suitable for high manure uptakes. The reduced tillage options are 
designed for lower levels of manure application. 
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type. Corn silage was only grown in the targeted incentive scenario, while the rapeseed share 
increased in all conservation scenarios. Sugar beets were not reduced in the incentive 
scenarios but were not allowed in the restriction scenario. Rye served as the dominant crop in 
the restriction scenario. The share of winter wheat was not affected by the policies.  
Table 49: Crop shares on highly erosive field type with good soil quality 
Crops  CAP2013 Untargeted Incentives  
Targeted 
Incentives  
Row crop 
restrictions 
Social 
planner 
Sunflowers % 25 25 25  25 
Corn silage %   17   
Rapeseed % 25 25 25 25 25 
Winter barley % 17 17   42 
Winter rye %    50  
Winter wheat % 25 25 25 25  
Sugar beets % 8 8 8  8 
Source: own calculations 
 
7.8.3 Thresholds results  
In order to find out which scenario meets the threshold suggestions of chapter 5.4.1, the 
modelling results were compared to the respective threshold values. The analysis was 
focussed on the soil erosion risk of the specific crops, to see whether values that surpass the 
demanded level of the threshold could be found. Table 50 lists the scenarios and the threshold 
values and indicates which scenario could meet a threshold. The threshold is not met, if one 
crop shows higher erosion rates than the benchmark of the threshold. For a more specific 
distinction, the maximum erosion risk found within the region data was also used for 
comparison. All scenarios were able to meet the 8t/ha/a threshold, since it was even meet by 
the CAP2013-scenario. No scenarios could meet the 1t/ha/a threshold, for at least one crop 
(mostly sugar beets) would have higher levels of erosion. Only the CAP and the untargeted 
incentive option could meet the soil quality related threshold.  
When the maximum values found for erosion risk were used for comparison, even the 8t/ha/a 
threshold became a difficult level to reach. Only the row crop restriction and the social 
planner scenarios were able to keep erosion risk values below 8t/ha/a. 
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Table 50: Soil erosion risks of crops in scenarios compared to the threshold values for soil erosion risk 
(++ = below threshold for maximum values, + = below threshold for average value, - = above 
threshold for average value) 
 Tolerable soil erosion (TSE) < 
Scenario 
1t/ha*a 
Soil quality 
index / 8 
(t/ha*a) 
8t/ha*a 
CAP2013 - - + 
Untargeted incentives - - + 
Targeted incentives - + + 
Row crop restrictions - + ++ 
Social planner - + ++ 
Source: see Table 13 and own calculations 
 
7.8.4 Spatial analysis of erosion rates under different policy options 
The linkage of soil categories in the bio-economic model to the GIS-data allows the 
illustration of resulting erosion rates for each soil category in a map based on the average soil 
erosion risk for the region. For each category formed by the soil quality and erosion risk type, 
an average erosion value was calculated on the basis of the resulting crop rotation in this field 
type. Figure 33 shows the average erosion risk under the CAP2013 conditions. The map 
shows elevated erosion levels scattered over the whole region, reflecting the heterogeneity of 
soil erosion risk in the region, which was also shown in the initial map on soil erosion risk of 
the region (Figure 8, p.64). Note that the map in Figure 8 is based on an estimated average 
crop rotation and does not take into consideration, the fact that farmers may select the crop 
rotations according to the soil quality. Since the model calculated mostly set-aside for poor 
soil types, these soils showed a relatively low soil erosion risk even on high erodible sites. 
The highest average erosion rates were found on sites with high soil quality and high natural 
erosion risk due to slopes. Under the CAP2013 conditions these soils types were partly grown 
with sunflowers and sugar beets (see Table 49). 
The untargeted incentive option (see Figure 34) lowered the erosion risk in the region. The 
highest erosion risk sites under the CAP2013 conditions improved under this option to less 
than 1.5 t/ha/year of erosion risk. The map shows an overall reduction in soil erosion risk for 
most sites as a result of the increase in reduced tillage practices. 
Under the conditions of targeted incentive payments on reduced tillage the reduction of soil 
erosion risk is achieved in a different way (see Figure 35). Some hot spots still show erosion 
rates of the highest class, even though the total erosion amount was reduced to the same level 
as in the untargeted payment option. One reason for this is the cultivation of reduced tillage 
corn silage on the soil category with highest quality and highest erosion risk (see Table 49). 
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The restriction of row crops on high erosion soil categories resulted in the cut back of soil 
erosion risk on all sites (see Figure 36). No soil category exceeded the average soil erosion 
risk of 1 t/ha/year.  
If a soil conservation policy that prevents any sites from still showing elevated soil erosion 
risk is needed, then row crop restriction would be more effective. However, if only an overall 
reduction within the region is aimed at, then all of the policies would be effective. 
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Source: own presentation 
Figure 33: Average soil erosion risk for the region under the CAP2013 conditions 
 
 
Source: own presentation 
Figure 34: Average soil erosion risk for the region under untargeted incentive conditions 
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Source: own presentation 
Figure 35: Average soil erosion risk for the region under targeted incentive conditions 
 
Source: own presentation 
Figure 36: Average soil erosion risk for the region under conditions of row crop restrictions 
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7.8.5 Changes in livestock production and labour needs 
The conditions in the scenarios also have effects on the livestock production and labour 
needs. The dairy sector was only moderately affected, i.e. the amount of milking cows kept in 
the region stayed the same for all scenarios except for a small increase in the restriction 
scenario. The fattening bull sector, which was completely given up under the CAP2013 
conditions, did not receive any incentive through the soil conservation scenarios to start 
producing again. As for pork production, the scenarios showed diverse results: Under the 
CAP2013 conditions, almost 16,000 pigs were produced in the region. The incentive 
scenarios changed the opportunity costs for this livestock system in such a way that pork 
production became less profitable. In the row crop restriction scenario, the production of pork 
increased by almost 5,000 units as compared to the CAP2013 scenario (see Table 51). 
Table 51: Animal numbers in the scenarios 
Scenario  CAP2013 Untargeted Incentives  
Targeted 
Incentives 
Row crop 
restrictions 
Cows numbers 1,973 1,973 1,973 1,995 
Fattening bulls numbers 0 0 0 0 
Pigs numbers 15,947 6,007 5,446 20,223 
Source: own calculations 
 
The effects of the scenarios on the labour demand in the region also varied. Table 52 shows 
the labour demand under the different scenarios itemized by plant and livestock production. 
All reduced tillage scenarios showed a decrease in labour demand compared to the CAP 
scenario, due to the reduction in pork production, while the row crop restriction option 
provided more labour opportunities. However, it is not possible to conclude that agricultural 
labour demand could be directly increased by soil conservation policies. The effects on 
livestock production are not related directly to the policy, but rather based on the opportunity 
costs of pork production in these examples. Pork prices vary for many reasons, so the effect of 
such conservation policies would instantly be counteracted. 
Table 52: Labour demand in the scenarios 
  CAP2013 Untargeted Incentives  
Targeted 
Incentives  
Row crop 
restrictions 
Labour plant production numbers 27 27 26 28 
Labour livestock production numbers 51 43 43 54 
Source: own calculations      
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7.9 Conclusions 
7.9.1 Policy options 
The effects on soil erosion risk and the economic situation of a region was shown in the 
preceding chapters using examples of selected soil conservation policies. Based on the 
conclusion of market failure, a policy intervention was justified. A cost-effectiveness-analysis 
was applied following a safe minimum standard approach so that an efficient solution to 
reduce soil erosion risk may be found.  
The examples showed that policies based on reduced tillage incentives can positively 
influence the erosion situation in a region. However, given the voluntary nature of the 
incentive policies, the actual uptake of such programmes is subject to the surrounding 
conditions (e.g. relative prices, attitudes of farmers), which might even cause adverse effects 
on such policies. The row crop restriction option also achieved similar erosion risk reductions. 
When the costs of policies were examined, the restriction option was proven to be highly 
effective in terms of on-farm costs, while budget costs could not be considered in this 
framework. Incentive based options showed high total costs due to both budget and on-farm 
costs. 
When looking specifically at the cost-effectiveness of these policies, row crop restriction 
seems to be advantageous over the other options. However, since the costs of policies in this 
framework were restricted to on-farm and budget costs (representing the sum of payments for 
certain measures), the result was therefore biased in favour of row crop restriction. 
Compensation payment to farmers for losses through such a policy would also increase the 
budget costs for the row crop restriction policy. 
When the on-farm costs induced by the policies were compared to the benchmark scenario of 
the social planner, the row crop restriction scenario came very close to this result. However, 
the changes induced by each scenario were different. While the row crop restriction banned 
all the high erosion crops from high risk spots, the social planner option only shifted certain 
crops but still kept certain highly profitable crops on the high risk areas. 
Note that the policy scenarios are not driven by the goal “soil erosion risk reduction” but by 
the maximization of the rent that could be achieved through the reduced tillage incentive or 
by the minimization of the negative effects of a crop restriction on the total gross margin. As a 
result, even adverse effects that were not intended by the design of a policy can occur. 
This outcome shows a dilemma that holds true for many agri-environmental policies: if a 
policy cannot specifically target a certain improvement of an environmental situation, the 
policy maker has to rely on a correlation between an agricultural measure and the 
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environmental effect. Therefore, all action-oriented policy instruments face the risk of not 
having direct influence on the environmental objective, but only influence on a specific 
agricultural measure, which is only to a certain extent correlated with the improvement of the 
environmental situation. This effect could turn the policy instrument into a policy failure, 
depending on the level of desired outcome achieved. 
The high budget costs for the incentive based policies allowed for the large windfall gains for 
reduced tillage practices that were already in practice under the CAP2013 scenario. 
Additionally, the effect of reduced tillage practices on erosion reduction is actually rather 
limited compared to crop change. Therefore, almost three quarter of the area had to be made 
eligible in order to meet the envisaged erosion reduction level which resulted in the extremely 
high budget costs. Furthermore, there were crop types used that were rather unsuitable for 
reduced tillage. 
The difference between the budget and farm costs in the incentive policies shows to a certain 
extent, the overcompensation from the incentive payments. In the single field example, 
incentives are truly needed to compensate for the use of less profitable cropping practices on 
the single field. However, a single field example does not take into account a farm’s ability to 
compensate for the loss from conservation practices with its other fields. Therefore, windfall 
gains are more or less unavoidable. 
Based on the cost-effectiveness criteria and on the assumptions of the modelling framework 
row crop restriction was shown to be the preferable policy among the tested policy options 
even if compensation payments for the on-farm costs would be paid.  
However, in reality additional costs will arise for all policies. It can be expected that control 
costs will arise for all three options. The proper execution of reduced tillage has to be 
monitored for the incentive options, while the row crop restriction policy is only dependent on 
the appropriate control mechanism of such a regulation. Such costs can affect the overall 
effectiveness in terms of money spent per ton of reduced erosion and therefore need to be 
considered in the analysis of policies. The relevance of such costs that go beyond the basic 
on-farm and budget costs will be discussed in Chapter 8.  
Further conclusions on the theoretical concept are drawn in Chapter 9.1. 
7.9.2 The modelling system 
The application of the chosen modelling system helped show the resulting on-farm costs and 
budget costs for all policy options based on the underlying assumptions. It was able to show 
the effects of both the soil conservation policies and the effects of the general policy changes 
(from the conditions of Agenda 2000 to the new CAP reform).  
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The indicators chosen in this approach were helpful in the analysis of the effects of policy 
changes. The basic indicators “total gross margin” and “soil erosion risk levels” provided 
general information on the conditions following the implementation of new policies. The 
derived indicator “cost-effectiveness of soil conservation policies” shows clearly which policy 
spends the least money for the reduction of soil erosion in a region, where these costs occur 
and the form they take (either as on-farm or as budget costs).  
The availability of the complete range of cropping practices for each crop in the model is very 
important. If certain crops are not defined with reduce tillage options, the model results can be 
biased. 
Reduced tillage practices are in general more profitable in terms of lower labour costs. High 
incentives for such tillage systems create unrealistic combinations in the resulting model 
solution. Given a soil conservation measure with slightly higher costs (e.g. zero tillage in 
combination with specific machinery) than a standard measure, the model can be expected to 
increase the area of reduced tillage from very low to much higher levels. 
The degree of detail in the modelling system allows for the specific analysis of the crop shares 
grown, the spatial distribution of certain crops as well as the indirect effects on livestock 
production and labour demand. Therefore, the model approach can help as a decision support 
for policy makers.  
The model describes changes in behaviour based only on the assumption of profit 
maximization, while other motives of an entrepreneur are not taken into account. Risk 
minimization, social influences within the community of the region and personal preferences 
can change the reaction of farmers in comparison to the model results.  
Furthermore, the model was not based on a dynamic approach, so the financing costs of 
investments in new machinery for soil conservation measures are not modelled as clearly as in 
a dynamic model. In order to avoid the strong influence of these effects, only measures that 
could be realised with standard farm equipment were modelled. 
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8 Transaction costs, property rights and soil conservation 
8.1 Background 
In the preceding chapter, the implementation of soil conservation programmes was analysed 
through cost-effectiveness with regards to on-farm costs and direct budget costs of incentive 
payments. The implementation of these agri-environmental policies raised further questions 
regarding which instrument is preferable from a transaction costs and property rights 
perspective.  
In this chapter, such questions are discussed so that a synthesis of the modelling results and 
the application of a wider economic framework can be found. 
8.2 The scope of analysis 
In the case of governmental intervention justified by market failure, governments have to 
decide which policy should be promoted to meet society’s needs for soil protection, be that 
more extension services or the financial support of certain cropping systems. Furthermore, 
they have to decide, whether the programmes should be targeted at certain sensitive areas or if 
the programmes should apply to every farmer within a country. Regardless of the decision, 
each choice brings further costs with it that consist not only of the money paid to the farmer 
for compensation or as an incentive. There are also administrative costs, i.e. the programmes 
have to be implemented, controlled and fraud has to be prosecuted (McCann et al. 2005). All 
these hidden costs are summarised under the term transaction costs that was initially 
characterized by Coase (1937) as the main determinant for allocative decisions within 
economic systems. In the same context, it is important to know the distribution of the property 
rights for the relevant goods, since their allocation is a crucial point in whether a programme 
will be successfully accepted (Challen 2000). 
Transactions costs and property rights are terms commonly used in the context of New 
Institutional Economy. This chapter gives a brief overview of some of the economic theories 
from this branch of economics that can be used to explain the problems that evolve from the 
design and implementation of more sustainable policies. Furthermore, the use of these 
theories within this study is described in the examples of soil conservation policies.  
The emphasis is on the evaluation of the administrative part of transaction costs, which is 
often neglected in the process of designing agro-environmental programmes (Falconer and 
Whitby 2000). Given the constraints in time, the optimal allocation of property rights cannot 
be evaluated within this study. This is also because fundamental changes in property rights 
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without compensation require a lot of time for the legal preparation within a democratic 
system and will face high resistance among the affected groups: either as a result of rent-
seeking processes (Buchanan et al. 1980) or as an outcome of the given distribution of 
political power (Knight 1992). Within the short-term process of policy-making an 
uncompensated change of property rights is a difficult task.  
Therefore, for the following discussions it is assumed that decision makers develop policies 
based on a given set of property rights, using moderate tools such as legal restrictions 
accompanied by compensations or financial incentives for certain measures to induce 
behaviour change instead of a strict redistribution without compensation through legislative 
orders. Hence, the focus of this study is to find out, how the total costs of soil conservation 
programmes (i.e. including transaction costs) can be minimised for specific scenarios of 
reduced erosion levels.  
8.3 A brief overview on New Institutional Economics 
8.3.1 Transaction costs 
Transaction costs are the basic subject in most theories of New Institutional Economics. 
Transaction costs determine the behaviour in or between organisations.  
Some definitions for transaction costs are (all citations from Hubbard 1997): 
• the costs of arranging a contract ex ante and monitoring and enforcing it ex post 
(Matthews 1986) 
• costs of running the economic system (Arrow 1969) 
• the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems (Williamson 1985). 
A very general, but precise definition was given by Allen (1991): “(…) I define transaction 
costs as the cost of establishing and maintaining property rights. This definition illustrates that 
these costs arise out of more than information costs, that they are not just like taxes, and that 
they are necessary to explain any distribution of property rights.” Furthermore he stated that 
“incomplete property rights and transaction costs are two sides of the same coin.” 
8.3.2 Property Rights 
Characteristics of a property right are the right to manage a defined object, the right to receive 
income from using the object and the right to alienate or sell the object (Scott 1989a; Scott 
1989b; cited in Challen 2000). 
Bromley (1989) used the term property right very broadly and linked it to the term institution 
in the economic sense: property rights do not only define the ownership of a person to an 
object. According to his definition, property rights include use rights, exchange rights, 
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distribution entitlements, management systems and systems of authority and enforcement. 
Property rights incorporate all the institutional rules that govern the ties between an 
individual, the society and a certain object.  
Challen (2000, p. 15) described “property rights as the subset of institutions for the regulation 
of behaviour and social interactions with respect to objects of value. In an institutional 
context, property refers to the rules of behaviour rather than the object.” Bromley (1989; cited 
in Challen 2000), also stressed the meaning of property rights more as the “social relation 
amongst individuals within a society than a relationship between an individual and a 
particular object of value.” 
The economic definition of institutions as “the rules of the game” (North 1990) or “social 
rights and obligations” (Hubbard 1997) comprises also the term “property rights” as a certain 
form of institution. Transaction costs are used in this context to describe the allocation costs 
of property rights. 
One of the objectives of NIE is to analyse the social rights and obligations (institutions). The 
central point is the draw up, monitoring and enforcing of contracts. All this is reflected in 
transaction costs as the extent of imperfect information (Hubbard 1997). 
 The time dimension is important in NIE, since institutions can only be appropriate for a 
certain time, but will change under the pressure of different scarcities. In short, NIE attempts 
to show why neoclassical economics often fails to explain real world economics (Hubbard 
1997). 
The given distribution of property rights is of some relevance, since transaction costs can vary 
highly if property rights on certain attributes can be transferred to or shared between different 
agents (Lippert 1999; Lippert 2005). 
In the context of soil conservation, the property rights on the land used by farmers play an 
important role. If farmers own the full set of property rights of the their land, i.e. the right to 
use it, sell it and even destroy it, then all the efforts to limit soil erosion would have to be on a 
voluntary basis, aimed at the limited purchase of certain parts of the property rights. However, 
these property rights are usually limited by public interest represented by jurisdiction or based 
on agreements between land users. Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop examined the institutional 
performance of common property institutions and concluded that there are many examples 
where these tools could serve adequately in the management of public property. However, 
they warned against the dangers of neglecting the distinction between common property 
institutions and the absence of rights to property (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975). 
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Furthermore, if the use of soil harms other members of society, it is very likely that a 
negotiation process would be started, where the benefit the farmer has from using the soil and 
the harmful effects the neighbours will suffer from are discussed like in the ideal case 
described by Coase (1960). Under real world conditions this negotiation process would take 
time and may not be as clear cut as Coase proposed. In addition, society could in fact cut the 
full range of property rights by dispossession, should farmers jeopardise the long term food 
security of a country.  
One of the main conclusions of Coase’s work is that property rights have to be clearly defined 
and allocated, be it for the pollutant or the person suffering from pollution. If the interest of 
one of the parties is important enough a process would be started so that a solution where both 
are better off could be reached (see Chapter 4.4.2.2). 
8.3.3  An overview of the basic theories 
The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of some basic theories of New 
Institutional Economics (Hubbard 1997): 
• Theory of the firm (transaction costs): 
Based on the article “The nature of the firm” by Coase (1937), transaction costs determine 
whether a firm or the market is the better institution for organizing economic behaviour. High 
transaction costs within a market due to high risks, uncertain conditions and low trust between 
market partners, is more likely to result in a higher percentage of resource allocations within a 
firm. Later, the article “The Problem of Social Cost” (Coase 1960) introduced transaction 
costs in a wider context of property rights, compensation and negotiations in the attempt to 
achieve a pareto-optimal solution (see Chapter 4.4.2.2). 
• Theory of the markets (imperfect information): 
Focussing more on the organisation of markets than on the relations between markets and 
firms, this theory attempts to find explanations for non-market solutions between economic 
organisations. Due to imperfect, asymmetric information and malfunctioning markets, non-
market solutions are chosen for the co-ordination of economic transfers. Markets cannot 
develop within very weakly manifested institutions such as in developing economies or when 
the risk of economic action is not sufficiently covered by the price (Stiglitz 1974; Stiglitz 
1986). 
• Theory of politics (institutions used to favour interest groups): 
This theory outlines the influence of politics on the distribution of property rights. Small but 
powerful interest groups of producers are able to exert more on economic decisions than e.g. 
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consumers. This “dark side” of pure economy allows the initial distribution of wealth and 
power underlying allocation decisions ((Bates 1989; cited in Hubbard 1997)). 
White (1993) defined four sources of power in the economic performance of a society as: 
state, collective action by market actors, market structure and socially embedded power 
through birth or status.  
• Theory of history (institutional change): 
This theory analyses the influence of society’s economic and institutional history on the status 
quo of institutions and the performance of economic behaviour. Societies evolve new rules to 
reduce transaction costs as they move along the path of development. When production costs 
decrease, transaction costs would rise as a result of more risk and uncertainty. New rules can 
reduce transaction costs just as technical progress decreases the costs of production. 
According to this theory, the actual situation of the economy is influenced by historically set 
path effects (North 1990). 
8.4 Transaction costs in the context of soil conservation programmes 
8.4.1 Transaction costs in policy evaluation 
The act of measuring transaction costs in soil conservation programmes requires a definition 
of transaction costs that is more suitable for the evaluation of policies. A definition that leads 
further in the context of soil conservation programmes was given by Thompson (1998): 
“Institutional transaction costs (ITC) include the costs of enacting a policy by a legislature, 
and the costs of implementing and enforcing that policy by administrative agencies and the 
courts.” Here, the institutional character of transaction costs becomes apparent. Transaction 
costs are always related to institutional arrangements, but in the Thompson example, 
institutions were defined more in the organisational meaning, focussed on the political context 
of transaction costs. A more precise description of this type of transaction costs are setup and 
administrative costs. 
The following chapters describe the design of a framework for estimating transaction costs of 
soil conservation programmes.  
8.4.2 Boundary issues 
The first question leads to the institutional boundaries of the analysed policies (McCann and 
Easter 2004): How far does a policy change influence the set-up of property rights? 
Figure 37 describes the different institutional areas that may be relevant in the measurement 
of transaction costs. 
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B) Development of Market 
Enabling Institutions 
C) Changes in the Institutional 
Environment, Legal System 
A) Market Transactions 
 
Source: McCann and Easter 2004; own presentation 
Figure 37: Boundary issues related to transaction costs stemming from market transactions, market 
enabling institutions and changes in the institutional environment and legal system 
The area ‘A’ corresponds to the pure “market” transactions for a policy, i.e. the monetary 
exchange of taxes or subsidies and the resulting change in production practices. The authors 
claimed that focussing only on these costs would be too limiting. Most policy 
implementations are accompanied by the development of specific institutions such as 
regulations, controlling agencies and set-up costs in the political process. Therefore, in order 
to measure the transaction costs of a policy, at least both cost types (areas A and B) would 
have to be considered. If the policy requires change in the institutional arrangements or a new 
legal system, the field of transaction costs would be even wider (area C). In such cases, costs 
for all the areas would have to be analysed. 
8.4.3 Stakeholders and transaction costs 
Given the institutional boundaries, the analysed soil conservation policies often do affect a 
wide scope of stakeholders. Thompson (1998) provided a list of actors affected by transaction 
costs as follow:  
• legislators,  
• interest groups, 
• administrative agencies,  
• courts and  
• the private individuals regulated by the policy. 
An overview of the involved agents’ functions and some examples are shown in Table 53.  
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Table 53: Functions and examples of agents involved in the implementation of a soil conservation policy 
Function of agent Agent(s) 
Legislators 
EU-Council 
German Federal Government (Bundestag) 
Federal state governments (Landtag) 
Interest groups 
Farmers’ Union 
Environmentalists 
Soil science experts 
Administrative agencies  
EU-Commission 
Soil agency 
Regional enforcement agencies 
Courts  Constitutional Court 
The private individuals 
regulated by the policy 
farmers 
persons affected by off site damages caused by erosion (i.e. residents along 
farmland, fishermen, power stations and recreational users of water courses) 
Source: own presentation based on Thompson 1998 
 
The role of the different stakeholders will be further discussed in Chapter 8.5.2 
8.4.4 Forms of transaction costs  
For the analysis of transaction costs in agri-environmental policies (i.e. soil conservation 
policies), it is helpful to categorize them into specific groups. Furthermore, the occurring 
costs can be assigned for different purposes. McCann et al. (2005) expanded on a framework 
of the different forms of transaction costs based on the initial design by Thompson (1998). 
This Institutional Transaction Costs framework (ITC) describes also behavioural assumptions 
of all actors involved in the policy making process. It gives a guideline for setting up policy 
analyses of different policy options.  
Table 54: Typology of transaction costs associated with public policies and parties incurring costs  
Type of transaction costs Incurred by 
Thompson 1998 McCann et al. 2005 Legislature/ 
courts Agencies Stakeholders 
 Research and information + ++ + 
Enactment  Enactment or litigation ++ + ++ 
Implementation  Design and implementation o ++ + 
Compliance   o o ++ 
 
Support and 
administration o ++ + 
 Contracting o + ++ 
Detection  Monitoring/detection o ++ + 
Prosecution  Prosecution/enforcement + ++ + 
(o) Negligible transaction costs; (+) low transaction costs; (++) high transaction costs. 
Source: McCann et al. 2005, Thompson 1998; own presentation 
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Table 54 combines the categories from the frameworks provided by McCann et al. (2005) and 
Thompson (1998). The costs describe types of transaction costs accrued on the different 
stages of the development and implementation of policies. In the following explanations, an 
approach based on Thompson’s theory will be used, for the categories are simpler and more 
helpful for the rough distinction of cost types. 
It is difficult to assign research and information to a specific policy. Therefore, according to 
the authors, only research that is directly related to a policy design should be accounted for. 
This aspect however, will not be further analysed in this study. 
The enactment costs can be taken as a lump sum, for the number of Parliament members does 
not change with policy changes. The same might be true for lobby groups. However, these 
costs are beyond the scope of this study.  
Implementation costs involve the determination of both its goals and means through an 
administrative agency. Such costs vary highly depending on the precision and site-specificity 
of the chosen instruments. 
Thompson (1998) proposed a group of compliance costs for stakeholders that are part of 
enactment and contracting costs in the McCann categories. The compliance costs of farmers 
related to a certain policy scheme are defined as the additional organisational effort in labour 
time for participating in a programme or complying with a regulation (e.g. applying for 
programmes, information gathering on regulations). 
Detection and monitoring activities provide information on whether participants follow the 
new regulations of the policy and comply with the contracted management agreements.  
Prosecution costs arise when agencies have to enforce a policy i.e. in the case of the violation 
of policy regulations by the affected stakeholders.  
Falconer et al. (2001) provided a more detailed categorisation of transaction costs adapted for 
the voluntary environmental stewardship schemes in Great Britain, which are usually site 
specific and negotiated individually (i.e. ESA – Environmentally Sensitive Areas). Table 55 
shows the level transaction costs are expected to occur, the actors that will be affected and 
whether the transaction costs are dependent on the size of the supported area or the number of 
participants. This framework can also be transferred to categorize the different options of 
voluntary soil conservation programmes. 
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Table 55: Categories of transactional costs incurred in the implementation of voluntary schemes based 
on compensated management agreements and cost incidence  
Main 
Category Sub Category State Agency Costs Participant costs 
 
 
Fixed at the 
level of the 
scheme 
Variable 
with no. 
of partici-
pants 
Fixed at the 
level of 
Participant 
Variable, 
e.g. with 
hectares 
entered 
Information 
Survey of designated area 
Designation of area and prescription 
design 
Re-design/re-notification of 
prescriptions 
X 
X 
 
X 
   
Contracting 
Promotion of scheme to farmers 
Negotiation between organisation and 
farmer 
Administration of contract (including 
making payments to farmers) 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Policing Enforcement of farmer compliance  X X X 
Evaluation Environmental monitoring and scheme 
evaluation X    
Source: Falconer et al. 2001; own presentation 
 
The first step at the implementation level is gathering information on the area and the suitable 
measures for conserving certain attributes in this area. The increase in knowledge regarding 
the area or the environmental good could create the need for redesigning the conservation 
measures. This part creates only more costs on the government side. 
When contracts are negotiated or placed with farmers, the possible participants have to be 
informed, the payments have to be negotiated (in case it is a very individual contracting 
scheme) and the whole programme has to be administrated. Even voluntary programmes with 
a fixed payment require a certain amount of promotion, since the participation depends on 
information provided to the farmers. At this stage, costs can arise on both government and 
farm side. 
The policing category comprises costs that arise from enforcing farmer compliance. The state 
agency faces costs that vary with the number of participants. A participant on the other hand, 
might have variable compliance costs depending on the amount of land entered into the 
scheme. 
The evaluation of the environmental effects of conservation programmes creates costs only on 
the governmental level. According to the authors, these costs are fixed at the level of the 
scheme. This means that a large number of participants with only small shares of land in the 
scheme would create higher monitoring costs than monitoring the effects on a piece of land 
that is owned by one individual farmer. 
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Both approaches use similar categories with overlaps in certain parts. The analysis in this 
study will be based on the categories by McCann et al. (2005) and Thompson (1998). 
Another issue in the policy developing process is time. Transaction costs do not occur at the 
same time and constantly over time (McCann et al. 2005). Some policies might have high set-
up costs but low costs after implementation, while other policies cause a steady flow of costs 
(e.g. permanent control costs). 
8.4.5 Recent attempts in measuring transaction costs of environmental policies 
There had only been a few attempts to categorize and measure transaction costs of agri-
environmental programmes. Falconer et al. (2001) and Falconer and Whitby (1999) estimated 
the transaction costs of implementing countryside stewardship programmes in the United 
Kingdom and in Europe. Westra et al. (2002) analysed the transaction costs of policy options 
for phosphorus reduction in the watershed of Minnesota River. McCann and Easter (2004) 
proposed two ways of measuring transaction costs of environmental programmes: either 1) by 
surveys or interviews to estimate transaction costs or 2) based on government expenditure 
reports. 
Surveys or interviews are time consuming and thus costly (McCann and Easter 1999b) but 
they make it possible to obtain information on the full range of relevant costs and implicit as 
well as explicit costs.  
Transaction cost measurement based on government expenditure reports, (e.g. Falconer et 
al. 2001, Falconer and Whitby 2000, McCann and Easter 2000), has the advantage of 
representing actual expenditures and not requiring surveys or interviews. However, the 
authors did also list a number of disadvantages (McCann and Easter 2004): governmental data 
do not completely cover the costs desired by researchers or they cannot by assigned to 
specific policies. The agencies have to cooperate with the research project and spend effort to 
get data together. Data can be confidential and/or is only available after the policy has been 
implemented. 
When transaction costs are measured a trade-off exists between precision and measurement 
costs: if only available data are used and relevant and difficult to gather data are neglected, the 
analysis would fail (McCann et al. 2005). As the authors stated, “an initial screening across 
policy instruments, rough “orders of magnitude” may be good enough and would represent an 
improvement over current practice” (McCann et al. 2005), p.521). 
A final problem arises from the fact that either implicit or explicit costs occur: family labour 
has differing opportunity costs within seasons and according to the personal interest of a 
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farmer. The reallocation of a staff that is already working in an environmental agency causes 
implicit costs while hiring new personal creates explicit expenses (McCann et al. 2005). 
If transaction costs cannot be measured, a description of the involved cost types can at least 
help in improving the design of a policy (McCann and Easter 2004). 
In general, the above mentioned rough orders of magnitude help give one an idea of the types 
of costs that can occur with the implementation of new conservation programmes. Therefore, 
this study will only aim at a qualitative, cardinal evaluation of the involved transaction costs. 
The result of this approach is not a monetary assessment of the transaction costs of a policy. 
Due to the difficulty in measuring transaction costs, a more descriptive approach will be 
followed to provide information on the feasibility of soil conservation programmes. 
8.4.6 Suitable reference values for soil conservation policies 
The measuring and analysing of transaction costs require first of all a specific reference value 
for the comparison of different options. Some authors suggested comparing the share of 
transaction costs to the total spending of a policy (McCann et al. 2005).  
However, this is only possible if the policies are comparable in terms of compensation levels 
and policy design. For the policy options compared in this study, this dilemma is obvious for 
budget and on-farm costs. If the incentive based programme is compared to the regulation 
option with no direct payments to farmers, the regulation approach would consist totally of 
transaction costs according to the above definition of institutional transaction costs. 
Nevertheless, the regulation approach could be cost-efficient in terms of total costs of the 
policy.  
Besides, if a low TC share of the total budget is assumed to be efficient, this would imply that 
the higher the payments to farmers are, the more efficient this policy would be. Again, this is 
only true when similar policies with equal budgets are compared. 
Other indicators such as transaction costs per single contract or per hectare of contracted plots 
could face similar difficulties if the type of compared policy is too diverse. If transaction costs 
of different policy types are to be described, the ideal indicator is to relate the transaction 
costs to an environmental result. In the case of soil conservation, a certain reduced level of 
erosion per hectare would be the most appropriate indicator.  
This is in line with Falconer and Whitby (2000) who stated that the overall efficiency of a 
policy should be the aim of the analysis, i.e. the total costs per indicator value should be 
looked at, which include transaction costs and payments to the farmers. 
For this study, the potential amount of erosion of a region, which is derived by the bio-
economic modeling in the previous chapters, or the potential average soil erosion per hectare 
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serve as appropriate indicators for soil erosion for the comparison of the different policy 
options.  
Excursus: The influence of attitudes 
It must not be forgotten that attitudes towards conservation programmes play an important 
role in the participation of farmers in environmental conservation programmes (Drake et al. 
1999; Falconer 2000; McCann and Easter 1999a). More detailed information regarding the 
reason for nature or soil conservation can influence attitudes towards these programmes. 
Negative attitudes towards these programmes are often caused by a lack of information. 
However, the distribution of information is not a costless effort either. There is a trade-off 
between lowering the uptake costs for farmers and raising costs on the administration side 
through the provision of information.  
However, attitudes were not analysed within this study. Attitudes can vary among farmers and 
explain participation in environmental programmes individually. For a regional modelling 
approach, attitudes are unlikely to be describable. 
8.4.7 Attributes of an environmental good and transaction costs 
Each environmental good can show characteristics that can have an influence on the potential 
transaction costs and the appropriate instrument for its promotion. Weersink et al. (1998) 
outlined that there is no overall first best instrument for the promotion of all environmental 
goods that are demanded by society. An appropriate policy minimises (the sum of) the 
environmental costs of the external effects of agricultural production (residuals), as well as 
the abatement costs of the producers and the administrative costs for regulation, monitoring 
and enforcing compliance. 
Falconer et al. (2001) related the appropriateness of an instrument to the variability and 
heterogeneity of the participating farmers including the properties of their farms (in terms of 
their opportunity costs) and to the variability of the environmental good. The higher the 
variability of costs and goods, the more individually negotiated are the agreements (Table 56).  
Table 56: Appropriate instruments depending on the variability of the environmental good and 
producer/Production type  
  
Variability of producer ( in terms of agricultural 
opportunity costs) 
 
 Homogeneous  Heterogeneous 
Variability of agri-
environmental good Homogenous 
Standard contracts and 
payments for specified goods 
and services 
Auctions 
 
Heterogeneous Site-specific management agreements and payments 
Source: Falconer et al. 2001 
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Falconer and Whitby (1999) gave a more detailed classification of policy options and their 
administrative costs to promote agri-environmental goods (Table 57). It was stressed that 
depending on the type of policy approach chosen, different administrative costs will occur. 
However, the general framework from rather voluntary to more restricting measures, 
changing the distribution of property rights fundamentally, is still the same. 
Table 57: Policy approaches and administrative costs  
 
Information, set-up, 
promotion Contracting Policing 
Persuasion and Advice X   
Regulation X   
Market mechanisms (e.g. taxes) X   
Tradable permit schemes X X X 
Voluntary management agreements X X X 
Public purchase of land X X  
Source: Falconer and Whitby 1999 
 
8.4.8 Research on transaction costs in environmental policies 
The following paragraphs show examples for quantifying transaction costs in environmental 
policies and list arguments brought up in the discussion of environmental programmes from a 
transaction cost perspective.  
An attempt to calculate transaction costs was made with the comparison of the transaction 
costs of organic farming to those of a set of voluntary standard environmental programmes 
with comparable effects (Hagedorn et al. 2004; Tiemann et al. 2005). Organic farming was 
proven to be a policy option that decreases transaction costs compared to single measures 
when administrative costs were analysed.  
Falconer and Saunders (2002) compared the scheme-related transaction costs of individually 
negotiated and standard management agreements in a long term nature conservation scheme 
for sites of special scientific interest in the North of England. They showed that in the specific 
case of these programmes, individually negotiated agreements bore less transaction costs than 
standard management agreements. 
A study was performed to measure the magnitude of transaction costs associated with policies 
to reduce agricultural nonpoint source pollution to specified levels in the Minnesota River 
(McCann and Easter 1998; McCann and Easter 1999b). Interviews with staff from 
governmental agencies were conducted to estimate the associated transaction costs. The 
results showed that the tax policy on phosphate fertilizers had the lowest transaction costs, 
followed by educational programs on best management practices, the requirement for 
conservation tillage on all cropped land, and the expansion of a permanent conservation 
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easement program. The requirement for conservation tillage on all cropped land was less cost-
effective due to the high control costs of the command and control approach (McCann and 
Easter 1999b). 
Westra et al. (2002) reported lower transaction costs for targeted as opposed to non-targeted 
policy options for phosphorus reduction in the watershed of Minnesota River. With 
transaction costs taken into account, the costs of a targeted programme could be outweighed 
by a higher cost-effectiveness (Westra et al. 2002). 
In general, some decision rules for the choice between voluntary and regulation approaches 
should be considered: 
High heterogeneity of an environmental good justifies extra efforts for spatial targeted 
programmes (Falconer et al. 2001). 
The severity of a soil erosion problem can be the trigger for one of the options. If soil 
degradation is developing at an alarmingly high rate, a command and control strategy would 
be preferred by governments and uncertain voluntary adoption may be avoided (Oates and 
Portney 2001). However, high rates of soil degradation could also increase the awareness of 
land users and support voluntary adoption of soil conservation measures, as stakeholders 
would be more involved in the resource problem (Ostrom 1991). Additionally, the threat of 
implementing mandatory regulations could also force land users to adopt voluntary 
programmes in order to avoid more drastic measures from a command-and-control policy 
(Segerson and Miceli 1998). 
Latacz-Lohmann (2001) underlined that voluntary approaches create the notion of fairness. 
The award of windfall gains from conservation programmes to participants with low 
compliance costs can be avoided through a regulation policy with least cost compensation 
payments. 
Even though property rights were assumed to be similar for all policies (if a compensation 
payment was considered in the regulation approach), the political price of changing the 
institutional arrangement of soil conservation attempts can vary between the options analysed. 
A mandatory regulation usually faces higher resistance compared to a voluntary approach 
(Latacz-Lohmann 2001). Therefore, the feasible option becomes clearer through the political 
process of discussion and testing of options by the involved stakeholders. 
Altogether, these results show that transaction costs depend on several factors such as 
targetedness, economies of scale, specificity of the programmes and the selected instrument 
itself. These factors are also reflected in the following analysis. 
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8.5 Qualitative analysis of transaction costs of soil conservation policies 
The aim of this chapter is to derive the magnitude of transaction costs for the administrative 
part of policies and to point out the differences between the three policy options analysed.  
In contrast to the on-farm costs, the estimated transaction costs related to the different 
scenarios are much more of a qualitative nature. Due to the different levels of detail, 
measurability and quality, it would not be accurate to sum up the results of the modelling 
approach with the following qualitative considerations.  
In the following, the different aspects from Chapter 8.4 are discussed using the specific 
example of the above analysed soil conservation policies. 
8.5.1 Boundary issues 
The soil conservation policies analysed in this study were based on a given set of property 
rights, i.e. it is assumed that the right to use soil is either claimed directly by the farmers (in 
the incentive option) or purchased partly by offering incentives. Or, in the case of a 
regulation, the change in property rights must be compensated to the owners of the soil. 
Therefore, using the terminology of chapter 8.4.1, the set-up costs of specific institutions such 
as regulations and controlling agencies must be considered. All policies must be based on a 
legal regulation:  
• In the case of an incentive approach, the agency must be authorised to offer incentives 
for specific measures. This usually needs to be based on EU-regulations. Then, the 
regulations are further implemented on the national (and federal state) level. 
• In the case of specific land use restrictions, they can be either based on national or 
regional planning decisions, or, be part of an EU-wide framework directive 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006). The same is true for a targeted 
approach that needs to be based on a legal act for the selection of the regulation area. 
As a result, the institutional boundaries for all policies need legal regulations (see Figure 37, 
p.148, area A and B) and therefore, can be assumed to be similar except for targeted 
approaches, which require greater efforts.  
8.5.2 Agents involved in the policy making process 
Transaction costs affect different actors within the process of developing an agri-
environmental programme. The following chapter highlights the actors that could be possibly 
involved and their assumed behaviour in such a policy making process. 
Most agri-environmental programmes are based on Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 
(European Council 2008a), which regulates and approves the design of these policies. 
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Furthermore, since the adoption of the “Thematic Strategy for Soil Protection” (Commission 
of the European Communities 2006), soil conservation will be increasingly addressed on the 
European level14.  
On the national level, the relevant legislators are the German Federal Government 
(Bundestag) that adopts national laws (e.g. the German Soil conservation act) and the 
governments of the German federal states (Laender) that have to implement national law on 
the federal state level by means of an enactment. The way the Federal Act will be 
implemented can vary between the federal states. 
The federal state governments (Laender) are likely to formulate the enactment of the EU-
guidelines in a way that meets the interests of certain interests groups (Latacz-Lohmann 
2001). The relevant interest groups involved in soil conservation aspects are farmer unions, 
environmentalists and experts in soil science. The pressure from some interest groups can 
influence the administrative agencies (federal, federal state and local agricultural and 
environmental agencies) to formulate the enactment in such a way that EU funds are likely to 
be used to minimise farmers’ costs and externalize most of the incurred costs to the EU 
budget (Latacz-Lohmann 2001). The formulation of the German Soil Protection Act was 
influenced on the federal level by interest groups (in this case the farmers’ lobby) in such a 
way that “good technical practice”, a rather diffuse definition of proper land use was assigned 
to be the appropriate way to prevent soil erosion (Landel et al. 1998) (see also Chapter 3.3.2). 
Even independent expert commissions have their individual, subjective interests, since it often 
is their goal to promote a maximum level of soil conservation. To some extent, this group 
assigns an intrinsic value to soils that is not derived from actual, potential or future use values 
(Cicchetti and Wilde 1992). However, it is the task of policy-making institutions to facilitate 
the differing interests of society. For the discussion on values reference is made to the works 
of Dabbert (1994), Navrud (2000), and Pearce (1993). 
On the juridical level, the Constitutional Court can be involved if the legislation process is 
considered inconsistent with the German constitution, thereby impairing the property rights of 
land owners. Private individuals regulated by the policy are the farmers, but also everyone 
that suffers from the degradation of soils and off-site damages caused by erosion (i.e. 
residents along farmland, fishermen, power stations and recreational users of water courses).  
The above considerations can affect all of the analysed policies in a different extent. 
Incentives will face of course less opposition among farmers than restrictions, especially if 
                                                 
14
 Even though the proposal of a draft directive for soil protection was not accepted by the European Council 
(European Council 2008b). 
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windfall gains are possible. However, in times of limited budget and increasing justification 
pressures against subsidies, taxpayers will favour restrictions.  
A further distinction can be made for targeted policies: in this case, the stakeholders affected 
are divided into two groups: one group benefits from or suffers under the new policy while 
the other group is not affected, but might feel disadvantaged because it cannot participate in a 
soil conservation programme. In this case aspects of fairness and equity become important. 
Latacz-Lohmann (2001) illustrated that “farmers participating in an agri-environmental 
incentive scheme may find it “fairer” if all participants receive the same payment for the same 
level of commitment (egalitarianism), while it would be more cost-effective to offer different 
farmers different payments according to their individual compliance costs (proportionality).”  
This example is also valid in the extreme case of total exclusion by means of a targeted 
programme. Farmers with fields in a non soil erosion risk area cannot offer the service of 
erosion reduction, and therefore cannot expect any payment for it. This aspect needs to be 
considered when spatially targeted programmes are taken into account. 
8.5.3 Forms of transaction costs 
In order to find an efficient policy option, the forms of transaction costs have to be evaluated 
and compared. Given the difficulties in measuring transaction costs, a description of the 
relevant transaction costs in a qualitative, comparing way provides an overview of the 
expected costs.  
Using the Thompson classification of Table 54, the procedure is described below (see Table 
58).  
Table 58: Estimation of transaction costs types for the policy options in this study  
Cost type Evaluation approach in this study 
Enactment costs Assumed to be equal for all policy options  
For spatial targetedness higher enactment costs can occur. 
Implementation costs Considerations based on Table 57 plus additional efforts for targeted approaches 
Compliance costs Administrative costs through information gathering, increased organisational tasks, 
monitoring obligations on farm level 
Detection costs Assumed to be similar 
Prosecution costs Assumed to be similar 
Source: own considerations; categories based on Thompson 1998 
 
The enactment costs are assumed to be equal for all policy options given the similar 
legislation process for agri-environmental incentive programmes and legal regulation. 
However, depending on the spatial targetedness higher enactment costs can occur. For the 
implementation costs, the following considerations are based on the cost levels stated in Table 
57 (see Falconer and Whitby 1999), which lead to additional costs for both the contracting 
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and policing of voluntary management agreements (incentive options) and targeted 
approaches (targeted Incentives and targeted row crop restrictions).  
Compliance costs arise on the farm level through information gathering, increased 
organisational tasks, and monitoring obligations on the farm15. These costs are assumed to be 
higher for incentive based policies, since farmers and agencies need to spend time on the 
contracting of the programmes, which is not required in the regulation options. 
Additionally, detection and prosecution costs are dependent on whether a certain action 
(conservation tillage) or result (e.g. soil loss in tons) is awarded. Both alternatives have 
advantages and disadvantages (Latacz-Lohmann 2001): Voluntary conservation programmes 
that include the payment of subsidies have at least the advantage of showing the extent of 
participation through the number of contracts concluded and area covered. However, the 
evaluation of the environmental effect of such programmes can be rather difficult, if only 
agricultural measures are subsidised. This might be the case, when the environmental effect is 
not strongly related to the agricultural measure. If an intensive farm extension programme is 
chosen, detection and prosecution costs will not occur at all. On the other hand, the effects of 
extension programmes are difficult to monitor, since the results of a more intense extension 
can only be evaluated by surveys or proxy indicators. 
Table 59 assigns qualitative values to the specific forms of transaction costs for each analysed 
policy options. The transaction costs of all policy options analysed are expected to be similar 
except for some specific cost types: If programmes are spatially targeted to areas with higher 
erosion risks, higher enactment and implementation costs can occur, given the additional 
effort for the identification of erodible areas and the more specific instructions needed through 
the environmental agencies.  
                                                 
15
 The technical compliance costs at the farm level are partly represented by the on-farm costs evaluated by the 
bio-economic modeling with MODAM. Differences in regional gross margin between status quo and 
conservation scenarios describe the technical compliance costs of a region. These costs represent the opportunity 
costs that farmers are confronted with through changes in the surrounding conditions. Technical compliance 
costs are not considered as administrative transaction costs and are therefore not included in these 
considerations.  
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Table 59: Qualitative grading of the analysed policy options using transaction costs categories  
Cost type Incentive untargeted Incentive targeted Row crop restriction 
targeted 
Enactment costs + ++ ++ 
Implementation costs +++ ++++ ++ 
Compliance costs* ++ ++ + 
Detection costs + + + 
Prosecution costs + + + 
Overall grading 8+ 10+ 7+ 
*Compliance costs consider only the administrative on-farm costs for the incentive options 
Legend: Each + represents an implicated cost module; for additional cost modules more + are added;  
Source: own considerations 
 
A targeted programme requires a more specific database at the administrating agency that 
contains information on where the conservation programmes should be applied. However, in 
terms of cost-effectiveness, a targeted approach has the advantage of focussing transaction 
costs on sites where soil erosion can be expected. Additionally, in the European Union, data 
for the administration of land use regulations (crop restriction) is already available through 
the IACS data, which is currently being used for the administration of both EU farm area 
payments and agri-environmental programmes.  
The regulation approach is expected to face no costs for contracting and lower costs for 
policing (compliance costs), while incentives options are expected to have higher costs in 
these categories (see (Falconer and Whitby 1999).  
Detection costs are assumed to be similar for all policy options, since all policies need 
monitoring facilities based on land use data. Prosecution costs are assumed to be similar, even 
though violations of EU agri-environmental programmes are usually sanctioned through 
withdrawal of payments, while land use regulations are enforced through police law. 
Overall, the regulation approach shows the lowest ranking in terms of the transaction cost 
categories. However, since no data is available for the actual monetary amount of each 
category, this result provides only an orientation of the involved transaction costs and also an 
idea of the possibility that some cost categories might be higher for one option compared to 
another. 
8.5.4 Attributes of participants and of the environmental good 
When focussing on soil conservation, the variability of the producer costs depends on the 
chosen indicator for evaluating soil erosion abatement. Assuming an indicator that can show 
avoided soil erosion in tons per hectare, the producer costs are dependent on the technical 
equipment of the farm as well as on whether the soils of the farm have any potential for 
preventing erosion at all. High potential erosion rates mean low costs for the first ton of 
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avoided soil erosion, if the marginal abatement costs are increasing (Meyer-Aurich and 
Trüggelmann 2002).  
Since it is almost impossible to monitor the actual erosion value caused by a farmer as a basis 
for payments, soil conservation programmes are usually based on measure-oriented schemes 
(e.g. reduced tillage). If a certain soil conserving activity is adopted, this will be rewarded by 
a fixed payment. 
In a regulation approach, all land users of an affected region have to comply with the 
regulation. Differences in their opportunity costs are only reflected in their individual losses 
caused by the row crop restriction.  
The variability of the soil characteristics (e.g. slope, soil type, soil quality) is a central topic in 
this study. As Falconer (2000) had concluded, the high heterogeneity of environmental goods 
and the difficult definition of aims only increase the costs of conservation programmes even 
more.  
The heterogeneity of soils in a region can be covered under spatially targeted programmes 
that avoid payments to applicants with no potential erosion risk at all. However, there is a 
trade-off between centralization and de-centralization. Increasing spatial effectiveness 
increases the costs of goal achievement (Urfei 1999). 
In using Table 56 (p.154) as a decision support, the variability of soil qualities in the sample 
region justifies the use of site specific management agreements and payments. If the adoption 
rates of voluntary programmes are not high enough and the environmental damage is severe, 
more obligatory programmes would be preferable. Compensations for crop restrictions would 
be imaginable in such a case. 
8.6  Conclusions 
The results from the qualitative analysis of transaction costs types supported the regulation 
approach. Using the on-farm costs generated in the bio-economic model MODAM as an 
indicator for technical compliance costs, these were also the lowest for the regulation option 
of row crops, even if compensation equal to the level of on-farm cost would be assumed. 
Both incentive options showed higher budget costs and on-farm costs in the modelling results 
(see Chapter 7) and are less favourable in terms of the qualitative ranking of the transaction 
costs. 
Depending on the political power of the involved farmers’ groups, an incentive option might 
be the only way to reduce the amount of erosion in an agricultural region. In such a case, it 
was shown that it still is more advantageous to implement a targeted option than the 
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untargeted policy. Nevertheless, even the targeted option can be rejected for reasons of 
equality and fairness, i.e. all farmers should have the right to claim incentives, which would 
lead to the untargeted incentive scheme. 
A possible way out of this dilemma is to compensate farmers within a row crop restriction 
scenario for some or all of the losses they face due to such restrictions. This procedure would 
not be considered as an incentive, but could ease the political resistance against such 
instruments. Again, this option brings up the question of how the compensation should be 
handed out spatially; should it be paid by hectare of eligible land, or based on past crop shares 
that had to be given up due to this policy? Even though a spatial targetedness is the common 
sense solution for such payments, payments to farmers are often based on historical data 
instead of economic considerations.  
Both voluntary and regulatory approaches have advantages and disadvantages from a 
transaction costs perspective. As a result of this study, it should be emphasized that regulatory 
approaches can have advantages compared to voluntary incentive based instruments. Even 
though incentive instruments have been shown in some studies to be more efficient in 
comparison to regulatory policies, the findings of this chapter had broadened the scope of 
appropriate instruments for soil conservation policies. Therefore, a decision between both 
options should be based on the consideration of both on-farm and transaction costs.
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9 Discussion 
9.1 The theoretical framework 
Based on the analysis of soil as a natural resource with both private and public good 
properties, it was concluded that society is entitled to curtail soil degradation processes in 
order to ensure a long-term sustainability of soil resources. 
The economic framework based on Ciriacy-Wantrup’s safe minimum standard (Ciriacy-
Wantrup 1963) was applied for the analysis of soil as a resource, which is characterized by 
uncertainty in terms of its replenishment and erosion rate. Soil use that is limited to a socially 
agreed-on standard is more advisable than trying to find an economic optimum that might 
bear the risk of completely destroying the resource (Dabbert 1994), i.e. offering 
intergenerational equity without solving the question of how the “optimal” interest rate for the 
discounting of future profits is determined. The institutional aspects concerning property 
rights on soil use were employed as a starting point of discussion (a given set of property 
rights).  
A cost-effectiveness analysis based on this framework was proven to be operational in the 
way it showed the resulting on-farm costs (opportunity costs) and budget costs of policy 
options. The justification of the policy options was based on the assumption that the need for 
conservation has already been revealed by society in the time spent on the issue in a political 
process, the political will to formulate relevant regulations and the provision of public money 
for the management and support of soil conservation programmes. The soil erosion risk 
values derived from a USLE model served as the selection criteria for eligible area (spatial 
targeting) for soil conservation programmes as well as decision rules for command and 
control solutions that manage agricultural practices.  
The selection of analysed instruments (incentives, regulation) was based on the consideration 
of its applicability within a short time frame and a given set of property rights.  
In the final chapter, the effects of transaction costs are reflected on the soil conservation 
programmes.  
The economic framework is an appropriate tool for the analysis of implementation options of 
soil conservation policies based on a given set of property rights and a static analysis of the 
decision problem.  
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9.2 The bio-economic modelling approach  
The combination of the soil erosion risk assessment model with a regional linear 
programming model provided information regarding the agricultural effects, the resulting 
economic implications and the soil erosion risk implied by policy changes. The model can 
serve as a decision support tool through the simulation of different policy conditions. 
The applied soil erosion risk assessment model was effective in describing soil erosion risk 
originating from the natural soil conditions and the characteristics of crops and the related 
cropping practices, which allowed for a complex analysis based on different variables.  
The USLE based assessment of soil erosion risk combined with a digital elevation model 
provided information on a basic grid size of 25x25 m for identifying sites that are prone to 
erosion in an area with short but steep slopes. 
The model showed, as expected, higher erosion rates for row crops compared to winter 
cereals. Another crucial finding for the development of soil conservation policies is that row 
crops grown with soil conservation measures such as reduced tillage showed higher erosion 
rates than any practice of winter cereals, including those with the highest erosion risk.  
The fuzzy-logic approach facilitated the transfer of the risk assessment on crops and cropping 
practices, which had not been tested under experimental conditions, and allowed for the 
quantitative comparison of such crops. 
The economic regional model based on a linear programming approach reproduced the 
agricultural status quo sufficiently. The highly detailed description of cropping practices 
allowed for a precise economic and ecological assessment. The linear programming tool 
simulated farmers’ decisions under the conditions of soil conservation policies. 
The applied modelling system MODAM (Multiple Objective Decision Support Tool for Agro 
Ecosystem Management) was used to generate the on-farm costs of soil conservation 
measures on a regional level (in terms of the opportunity costs of standard production systems 
in the region) with an acceptable effort. The resulting budget costs (payments) were also 
derived from this modelling approach. The model was able to show the effects from the soil 
conservation policies and the general policy changes (from the conditions of Agenda 2000 to 
the CAP2013 reform).  
The indicators chosen in this approach were helpful in the analysis of the effects of policy 
changes. The basic indicators “total gross margin” and “soil erosion risk levels” provided 
general information of the conditions resulting from the implementation of new policies. The 
derived indicator “cost-effectiveness” of soil conservation policies showed clearly which 
policy used the least money for the reduction of soil erosion in a region, with a distinction of 
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where these costs occurred i.e. either as on-farm or as budget costs. The level of detail in the 
modelling system allowed for the specific analysis of the resulting crop shares and the spatial 
positioning of certain crop rotations.  
However, since the model was set up as a single, regional farm, the flexibility of real farms in 
response to different policy changes would be overestimated. This must be taken into 
consideration when interpreting the results. Furthermore, behavioural aspects such as risk 
minimization, social influences within the community of the region and personal preferences 
were not taken into account. Such factors can change the adoption rate of certain practices.  
Overall, the modelling approach can be applied as decision support in soil conservation policy 
making. It is not the intention of this study to present the model results as numbers that 
decisions should be based on, but more as a guideline for policy making i.e. shows possible 
regional effects of specific policy instruments.  
9.3 The relevance of transaction costs 
The inclusion of transaction costs widens the scope of the analysis for soil conservation 
policies. For focussing only on the budget costs of direct payments to farmers would cause the 
underestimation of the overall costs of a policy. Transaction costs seen as costs of (re)-
defining and implementing property rights can reach considerable amounts, thus reducing the 
overall efficiency of a policy approach. Knowing the possible magnitude of the different types 
of transaction costs can help prevent costly policy choices. 
However, given the methodological difficulties of measuring transaction costs and the 
scarcity of transaction cost data for agri-environmental policies, the relevance of transaction 
costs estimations is not yet at a level where well documented knowledge could be transferred 
and used for the detailed evaluation of policy instruments. Most studies on transaction costs 
of agri-environmental programmes can be seen as case studies. The results of these studies 
reflect more the efficiency of the involved governmental agencies than the efficiency of the 
programmes themselves. Furthermore, it is difficult to find an adequate indicator that the 
transaction costs are referred to if the compared policy instruments are diverse (e.g. incentive 
based programmes vs. regulations). 
In the case of this study, a qualitative analysis was applied based on the general conclusions 
of other studies that had estimated transaction costs of agri-environmental programmes and 
regulations. The findings are seen as a list of arguments within the discussion of policy related 
transaction costs.  
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The results of these qualitative considerations also showed restriction policy as more 
advantageous than the incentive options. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the cost 
categories were only analysed in a qualitative way. Assuming that one category is afflicted 
with high costs, this could outweigh the cost of all the other categories and lead to contrary 
results. 
In general, more research is needed for the estimation of transaction costs with the focus on 
the generalization of the results. 
9.4 Appropriate instruments for soil conservation 
Both a bio-economic modelling analysis and a qualitative transaction costs reflection of three 
possible soil conservation policies aimed at the same level of erosion reduction within an 
example region in North-Eastern Germany were applied. The policies were chosen as 
examples based on assumptions of different sets of property rights towards the right to 
degrade soils. Soils were defined as a quasi non-renewable resource.  
The analysed policy options were untargeted incentive on reduced tillage practices, targeted 
incentive on reduced tillage in areas with a higher erosion risk and targeted legal restriction 
on row crops in areas with high erosion risk. At this point, a general conclusion on the most 
efficient policy is drawn using the arguments of both bio-economic modelling and transaction 
costs analysis. 
The modelling examples showed that all three policies can positively influence the erosion 
situation in a region. Given the voluntary nature of the incentive based policies, the adoption 
of these policies at the expected levels is subject to the attitudes of farmers.  
The row crop restriction option, which bans highly erosive crops from sites with a high 
erosion risk, was proven to be the most effective in terms of budget and on-farm costs. 
However, in reality the compliance rate will depend on the threat of prosecution and expected 
fines for non compliance for such a policy.  
The costs of policies in the modelling framework were restricted to on-farm costs and budget 
costs representing the sum of payments for certain measures. This restriction in the policy 
cost definition underestimates the costs of a legal approach such as the row crop restriction.  
In reality, more costs would arise, which would consist mostly of transaction costs. It can be 
expected that control costs will arise in all three options, since proper compliance with 
restrictions and measures needs to be checked for all options. Additionally, the measures of a 
policy must show a clear effect on the level of erosion risk. 
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Whether a row crop restriction option can be implemented successfully depends on factors 
such as the political power of the involved stakeholder groups and the notion of equality and 
fairness towards affected land users. A compensation payment for a row crop restriction 
policy could reduce the resistance against such command and control policies. Even though 
spatially targeted programmes seem to be more efficient, equal treatment of farmers and equal 
access to payments are a political price to pay for the successful implementation of agri-
environmental programmes.  
From a transaction costs perspective both voluntary and regulatory approaches have 
advantages and disadvantages. Based on qualitative considerations, it was found that 
regulatory approaches were more advantageous compared to voluntary incentive based 
instruments, which were shown in other studies to be more efficient. However, this result 
could easily change if a quantitative approach, which could estimate the amount of each 
transaction cost category, was applied. 
The most relevant criteria for a cost effective policy design are  
• high effectiveness of the agricultural practice and  
• close spatial correlation between programme area and erosion risk zones.  
Incentive programmes related to less effective agricultural practices are very likely to show 
lower cost-effectiveness compared to a policy that is based on a more effective measure.  
The results of this study suggest that the choice of soil conservation policies should be based 
both on a bio-economic modelling analysis and the reflection of the involved transaction costs 
for each specific case of implementation. This will provide decision makers with information 
on the expected costs and effects for the farms within a region and for the governmental 
agencies assigned with the implementation and administration of such policies.  
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10 Summary 
The aim of the study is to analyse the economic and agricultural aspects of soil conservation 
and to propose instrument-measure combinations for efficient soil conservation as a decision 
support for the implementation of soil conservation policies. Emphasis is given to the 
resource and institutional economics of soil conservation. 
Chapter 1 gives an introduction of this study and a description of the study region. Chapter 2 
demonstrates soil functions, the definitions of soil degradation and the need for soil 
conservation based on the current soil conditions. Chapter 3 comprises approaches on soil 
conservation from the international to the national level and describes how soil conservation 
can be implemented. 
The theoretical framework for the economic modelling approach is outlined in Chapter 4. 
Based on the theoretical economic analysis of soils as a natural resource, the existing property 
rights, the public good characteristics of soils and the resulting externalities, one is lead to the 
conclusion that market failure does exist. Therefore, a non-market coordination of soil use is 
justified. Based on the theory of a “safe minimum standard”, a cost-effectiveness analysis is 
derived to be appropriate for the assessment of the implementation options of soil 
conservation policies.  
Chapter 5 describes a fuzzy logic based assessment method of soil erosion risk in a sample 
region, which is based on an adapted USLE-approach. The approach considers both the 
natural conditions and the characteristics of the cropping practice. The method provides site-
specific erosion risk values for standard and adjusted cropping practices, which are used as 
parameters in the bio-economic model. 
Chapter 6 outlines the design of the applied bio-economic model MODAM. This regional 
linear-programming model was successfully adapted and applied to evaluate the economic 
and ecological effects of different policy options using the example of an agricultural region 
in Northeastern Germany. 
Chapter 7 provides the results for a set of scenarios. The basic scenarios comprise the policy 
conditions of the Agenda 2000 and a CAP-reform scenario with decoupled area payments that 
reflect the conditions of 2013. The CAP2013-scenario serves as a comparison for the soil 
conservation policy scenarios. The three main scenarios on policy options include both 
untargeted and targeted incentives programmes for reduced tillage practices and a regulation 
scenario that prohibits the cultivation of highly erosive crops (row crops) on erodible soils. 
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An optimization scenario that finds a low cost solution for different levels of soil conservation 
for the sample region was also calculated.  
The regulation option on row crops generated almost similar cost-effective results as the 
optimisation option. The incentive options resulted in both high on-farm and budget costs for 
a similar level of erosion reduction. Based on the modelling result, the row crop restriction is 
the preferable policy option in terms of cost-effectiveness. 
The preferability of the row crop restriction is related to another important finding of the 
modelling: reduced tillage practices, which are promoted by the incentive options, are less 
capable of reducing soil erosion risks in comparison to crop change (e.g. from row crops to 
cereals), which can result in a higher reduction of the erosion risk. If this result is transferred 
to the design of a policy, the effectiveness of a policy can increase.  
Chapter 8 discusses the influence of transaction costs on the success of soil conservation 
programmes. The inclusion of transaction costs widens the scope of the policy analysis. 
Focussing only on the budget costs of direct payments to farmers would underestimate the 
overall costs of a policy. Transaction costs seen as costs of (re)-defining and implementing 
property rights can reach considerable amounts, which can reduce the overall efficiency of a 
policy approach. Knowing the possible magnitude of the different types of transaction costs 
helps prevent costly policy choices. 
The results from a qualitative analysis of transaction costs also supported the row crop 
restriction approach. The regulation option for row crops had lower compliance costs than the 
incentive options. Both incentive options showed higher budget costs and on-farm costs in the 
modelling results and were less favourable in terms of the qualitative ranking of the 
transaction costs. 
Chapter 9 draws some final conclusions on the theoretical framework, the bio-economic 
modelling approach, the relevance of transaction costs and finally, the appropriate instruments 
for soil conservation based on the overall results of this study. 
In this study, a model was successfully developed to serve as a decision support system for 
the soil scientific, economic and agricultural aspects of soil conservation policies. Different 
policy options were compared so that the most cost-effective solution for a soil conservation 
policy may be found. Based on the final discussion regarding the involved transaction costs, 
the regulation approach was shown to be the most cost-effective option, with potentially 
lower transaction costs. The most relevant criteria for a cost effective policy design are high 
effectiveness of the agricultural practice and the spatial correlation between the programme 
area and the erosion risk zones. Incentive programmes related to less effective agricultural 
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practices show lower cost-effectiveness compared to a policy that is based on a more effective 
measure. 
Compared to other studies, the modelling approach used here is more detailed in the 
description of the cropping practices, which allowed for the highly specific assessment of 
each cropping practice. This in combination with the detailed site description (100x100 
meter) provided a level of detail, which is rather high for a regional modelling approach. The 
inclusion of transaction costs as a final reflection of the results allowed for a broader analysis 
of the policy options. 
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11 Zusammenfassung 
Ziel dieser Studie ist es, ökonomische und landwirtschaftliche Aspekte des Bodenschutzes zu 
analysieren sowie Instrument-Maßnahmen-Kombinationen für einen effizienten Bodenschutz 
als Entscheidungshilfe für die Umsetzung von Bodenschutz-Politiken vorzuschlagen. Der 
Schwerpunkt der Arbeit liegt dabei auf einer ressourcen- und institutionenökonomischen 
Betrachtung. In einem empirischen Teil wird am Beispiel einer Region in Nordostdeutschland 
auf der Basis von Modellrechnungen die Effizienz einzelner Politikoptionen untersucht. 
Kapitel 1 enthält eine Einführung zu dieser Studie sowie eine kurze Beschreibung der 
ausgewählten Beispielsregion. Kapitel 2 geht auf die Funktionen des Bodens ein, liefert 
Definitionen der Bodendegradation und unterstreicht die Notwendigkeit des Bodenschutzes 
auf der Grundlage der aktuellen Bodenzustände. Kapitel 3 umfasst Konzepte für die 
Erhaltung der Böden auf internationaler und nationaler Ebene und beschreibt, auf welche 
Weise Bodenschutz implementiert werden kann.  
Die theoretischen Grundlagen für einen ökonomischen Analyseansatz werden in Kapitel 4 
beschrieben. Auf der Grundlage einer theoriebasierten ökonomischen Analyse werden Böden 
als natürliche Ressource definiert, die aufgrund der bestehenden Eigentumsrechte, den 
Eigenschaften von Böden als öffentlichem Gut sowie den daraus resultierenden Externalitäten 
den Schluss zulassen, dass ein Marktversagen bei der Steuerung einer nachhaltigen Nutzung 
von Böden vorliegt. Eine nicht-marktgestützte Koordinierung der Bodennutzung ist daher 
gerechtfertigt. Basierend auf der Theorie des "Safe Minimum Standards" wird eine Kosten-
Wirksamkeits-Analyse abgeleitet, die für die Beurteilung der Umsetzung von 
Bodenschutzpolitiken als geeignet erscheint. 
Kapitel 5 beschreibt eine Fuzzy-Logik-basierte Methode zur Bewertung des 
Bodenerosionsrisikos in einer Beispielsregion, die auf einem erweiterten Universal-Soil-Loss-
Equation-Ansatz (USLE) basiert. Der Ansatz berücksichtigt sowohl die natürlichen 
Standortbedingungen als auch die Eigenschaften der landwirtschaftlichen Anbauverfahren. 
Eine im Vergleich zu anderen Studien sehr detaillierte Beschreibung der Anbauverfahren 
erlaubt eine spezifische Beurteilung der erosionsrelevanten Effekte. Dieser Ansatz in 
Kombination mit dem hohen Detaillierungsgrad für die Standortbeschreibung bietet eine für 
einen regionalen Ansatz große Genauigkeit. Die angewandte Methode generiert für das 
Erosionsrisiko der konventionellen und angepassten Anbauverfahren standortspezifische 
Werte, die als technische Parameter in ein bioökonomisches Modell eingehen.  
Kapitel 6 beschreibt das Design des in dieser Studie angewendeten bioökonomischen Modells 
MODAM (Multi-objective decision support tool for agro-ecosystem management). Dieses 
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regionalisierte Lineare Programmierungmodell wurde erfolgreich am Beispiel einer 
landwirtschaftlichen Region in Nordost-Deutschland auf die Anforderungen dieser Arbeit 
angepasst und für die Beurteilung der ökonomischen und ökologischen Auswirkungen 
unterschiedlicher Politikoptionen verwendet.  
Kapitel 7 stellt die Ergebnisse einer Reihe von Szenarien dar. Die Szenarien umfassen die 
agrarpolitischen Rahmenbedingungen der Agenda 2000 sowie ein GAP-Reform-Szenario mit 
entkoppelten Zahlungen entsprechend den geplanten Bedingungen des Jahres 2013. Dieses 
CAP2013-Szenario dient als Referenzszenario für die Szenarien zu möglichen 
Bodenschutzpolitiken. Die drei Hauptszenarien zu den Politikoptionen sind 1) räumlich nicht 
gerichtete, 2) räumlich gerichtete Anreizprogramme für Anbauverfahren mit reduzierter 
Bodenbearbeitung sowie 3) ein Szenario zu einer Verordnung, die den Anbau von hoch 
erosiven Nutzpflanzen (Reihenkulturen) auf stärker erodierbaren Böden verbietet. Zusätzlich 
wurde ein Optimierungsszenario berechnet, welches nach der kostengünstigsten Lösung für 
eine schrittweise Anhebung der Erosionsvermeidung in der Beispielsregion sucht.  
Ein Verbot von Reihenkulturen generiert ein ähnlich kosteneffizientes Ergebnis wie eine 
Lösung der Optimierungsoption mit vergleichbarem Erosionsniveau. Die Anreizprogramme 
zu pflugloser Bodenbearbeitung führen bei einer vergleichbaren Reduzierung der 
Bodenerosion sowohl zu höheren betrieblichen Anpassungskosten als auch zu hohen 
Budgetkosten. Auf der Grundlage der Modellierungsergebnisse ist ein Verbot von 
Reihenkulturen auf stark erodierbaren Standorten deshalb die vorzüglichere Option im 
Hinblick auf das Kosten-Wirksamkeits-Verhältnis.  
Die Vorzüglichkeit eines Reihenkulturverbots stützt sich auf ein weiteres, wichtiges Ergebnis 
der Modellierung: Die Verfahren mit reduzierter Bodenbearbeitung, die durch finanzielle 
Anreize gefördert werden, können weniger zur Verringerung des Bodenerosionsrisikos 
beitragen als eine Änderung der Kulturpflanzenauswahl (z.B. von Reihenkulturen zu 
Getreide), welche zu einer stärkeren Reduzierung des Erosionsrisikos führt. Wenn dieses 
Ergebnis auf die Gestaltung der Politik übertragen wird, kann die Wirksamkeit einer Politik 
erhöht werden.  
Kapitel 8 behandelt den Einfluss von Transaktionskosten auf den Erfolg von 
Bodenschutzprogrammen. Die Einbeziehung von Transaktionskosten erweitert den 
Betrachtungsbereich einer Politikanalyse. Wird die Betrachtung nur auf die Budgetkosten für 
die Direktzahlungen an die Landwirte konzentriert, werden die Gesamtkosten einer Politik 
unterschätzt. Transaktionskosten, verstanden als Kosten für die (Wieder-)Festlegung und 
Implementierung von Eigentumsrechten, können erhebliche Beträge erreichen, wodurch die 
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Gesamteffizienz eines politischen Ansatzes reduziert werden kann. Die Kenntnis der 
möglichen Größenordnung der verschiedenen Arten von Transaktionskosten hilft bei der 
Vermeidung von kostspieligen politischen Entscheidungen.  
Die Ergebnisse einer qualitativen Analyse der Transaktionskosten der untersuchten 
Politikoptionen unterstützen ebenfalls den Ansatz eines Verbotes von Reihenkulturen. 
Basierend auf qualitativen Kostenüberlegungen bringt die Verordnungsoption (Verbot von 
Reihenkulturen) geringere Kosten mit sich als die beiden Anreizprogramme. Beide 
Anreizprogramme zeigen höhere Kosten sowohl für Budget- als auch für On-farm-Kosten 
(Opportunitätskosten) in den Modellierungsergebnissen und sind in Bezug auf das qualitative 
Ranking der Transaktionskosten mit mehr Kostenfaktoren behaftet.  
Kapitel 9 zieht Schlussfolgerungen zu den theoretischen Grundlagen, dem bio-ökonomischen 
Modellierungsansatz, der Bedeutung der Transaktionskosten, und schließlich, zu den 
entsprechenden Instrumenten für die Erhaltung des Bodens, basierend auf den 
Gesamtergebnissen dieser Studie.  
In dieser Studie wurde erfolgreich ein Modell entwickelt, welches als Entscheidungshilfe für 
sowohl ökonomische als auch landwirtschaftliche Aspekte des Bodenschutzes dienen kann. 
Unterschiedliche politische Optionen wurden im Hinblick auf eine kosteneffiziente Lösung 
für eine Bodenschutz-Politik untersucht. Auf der Grundlage der abschließenden Diskussion 
der entstehenden Transaktionskosten erweist sich der Regulierungsansatz zu Reihenkulturen 
als die kostengünstigste Option mit potenziell niedrigeren Transaktionskosten. Die 
wichtigsten Kriterien für ein kostengünstiges Politikdesign sind eine hohe Effizienz der 
landwirtschaftlichen Verfahren und die räumliche Korrelation zwischen dem Programmgebiet 
und den erosionsgefährdeten Gebieten. Anreiz-Programme im Zusammenhang mit weniger 
effektiven landwirtschaftlichen Praktiken weisen ein schlechteres Kosten-Nutzen-Verhältnis 
auf als eine Politik, die auf einer wirksameren landwirtschaftlichen Maßnahme beruht.  
Der in dieser Studie zur Anwendung gekommene Modellierungsansatz weist einen im 
Vergleich zu anderen Arbeiten hohen Grad an Detailliertheit bei der Beschreibung der 
landwirtschaftlichen Anbauverfahren auf. Dieser Detailgrad erlaubt eine sehr spezifische 
Bewertung der Verfahren. Dies in Kombination mit der sehr genauen Standortbeschreibung 
(100x100 Meter) gewährleistet eine Genauigkeit der Analyse, die relativ hoch für einen 
regionalen Modellierungsansatz ist. Die Einbeziehung von Transaktionskosten in eine 
abschließende Reflektion der Ergebnisse ermöglicht eine breitere Analyse der Politik-
optionen. 
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